SSR Case Study:
SSR in Liberia

• SSR in Liberia:
  A Cursory Look at
  Civil Society

• ICTJ SSR Work
  in Liberia

• Useful links for
  SSR in Liberia

• GFN-SSR Document
  Library
  

Security Sector Reform in Liberia: A Cursory Look by Civil Society

The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)* provides in Article VII for the restructuring of the Security Sector with a new command structure. The call for the restructuring of the security sector was essential given the suppression and brutality that has characterised the Liberian security sector’s history. In 156 years of existence, Liberia’s security has been that of regime security, not of civilian security, with a security sector that engaged in state sponsored terrorism and institutional violence. It failed to legitimise its role by protecting the populace. Thus, many Liberians do not currently view the security sector as an agency of protection.

The arrival of the international community is seen by civil society and the public at large as an opportunity to recreate the Liberian security sector as one that responds to the genuine needs of the populace. As such, the security sector reform process is a crucial element in sustaining Liberia’s nascent democracy.

However, while Article VII (3) of the CPA provides for the participation of the Liberian people in determining the nature and character of the security sector, through public dialogue, the current process is skewed in the direction of international donors. For example, civil society sees the current army training process as flawed, in that it is contradictory to the establishment of a national security architecture that is governed by and is responsive to the requirements of the Liberian people. It is viewed as a concept implemented without the necessary involvement of key stakeholders - primarily the legislature. The army is being built without its citizens having the opportunity to either debate a national security doctrine or partake in a national security threat analysis. Furthermore, civil society is not involved in the vetting process of the new army, and Defence Ministry officials have complained of not being consulted by DynCorp** on numerous issues.

The Liberian government is not being directly involved in the restructuring of the army and police forces, nor is civil society. Yet establishing these two security agencies from the beginning as pillars of a democratic government with civilian oversight is fundamental for peace and stability in Liberia. On 26 May 2008, ex-members of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) called for the impeachment of the president for what the group termed a ‘violation of the CPA’. The ex-soldiers contended that instead of restructuring the AFL, as provided for by the CPA, the government had dissolved the army without a retiring scheme for the former soldiers.

These serious conflict issues should not be ignored. What is clear is that the absence of key stakeholders in the SSR process could erode public confidence in the new security architecture.

* The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed by Liberian Politicians and leaders of warring factions, in Ghana in 2003.
** DynCorp is a a Private Military Company contracted by the US government to train the Armed Forces of Liberia. They are also training the Liberia National Police Force.

For further information, please contact Urias Pour, Liberia Policy Research Group (LPRG)

ICTJ SSR Work in Liberia

Liberia’s prolonged war effectively ended in 2003 after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) and the deployment of 16,000 UN troops. Elections in 2005 brought to power Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the first elected female President in Africa. Since then the country has made steady progress. In August 2007, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1777, approving the drawdown of its mission in third phases, but by 2010, after the third phase, there will still be 9,000 UN troops in Liberia.

The problem is that the country remains very fragile, and indications – including an alleged coup attempt in 2007 and an escalation of violent crime – are that regime and human security remain at risk. Both the Liberian government and its development partners, including the UN and US, are making remarkable efforts to (re)build state institutions across the country. But the process has been painfully slow and somewhat lacks coherence.

The CPA had called for the restructuring of the Liberian Army (AFL) and Police (LNP), but because these two institutions had been so badly degraded, efforts in this direction has gone falteringly. Since 2004, with no money to build a new police force, the UN police (UNPOL) had been assisting what remained of the LNP to maintain law and order, and UNPOL also recruited and vetted new officers. The LNP has reached its targeted strength of 3000, with a further 500 to be trained as an elite special force by DynCorp, an American security company. But 3,500 police is obviously very small for a country of over 3 million, falling way below the UN’s stipulated police-citizens ratio of 1:400.

ICTJ in 2004 provided advice to UNPOL on the reform of LNP and other law enforcement agencies (at the end of the war, Liberia had 15 uncoordinated state security agencies), and helping civil society actors effectively engage with the SSR process. An internal ICTJ report on an assessment of the police vetting process in early 2008 found that “although surveys in 2006 and 2007 suggest that public trust and support to the Liberia National Police has improved significantly, it is clear that there is much work still to be done to encourage national confidence in the institution and ensure internal respect for human rights standards.” At the moment there are about 90 Community Policing Forums in Monrovia alone, but these hardly meet, are badly coordinated, and few people know about them or the work they are supposed to do. The result is that citizens-police relations are so poor that often enraged community people have in the recent past physically attacked police officers, suspecting them of collusion in criminal activity, at crime scenes, and in a few instances outside of Monrovia, citizens have burnt down police posts and badly assaulted police officers (in a few instances leading to the death of officers.) With the escalation of armed robbery and other violent crime incidents, the situation threatens to worsen.

The creation of an army has been even more fraught. DynCorp and PAE, also an American company, were given the contract by the US – which had pledged $210 million for creating a new AFL – to recruit and train a new army of 2,500. DynCorp was tasked to “recruit and make soldiers”, and PAE to “mentor and develop them into an operational force.” The process has been expensive, opaque and very slow; expenses for the two companies in the first six months of 2007 was $18 million, but by August 2007, only 105 soldiers had gone through basic training. Recruitment accelerated after, and over 700 soldiers are now being trained.

The targeted strength of the army is 2000, and women have been granted a 20 per cent quota. But because of the poor record of the army, the vetting, recruitment and training processes are rigorous, and it is unlikely that this quota will be fully taken up. It also means that the entire process has been slow and very expensive. Recruits are tested for HIV Aids, TB and related health problems, and their background is rigorous checked – including by placing posters with their pictures for identification across the country. Recruits have to be reasonably educated, which means that women – who were far more disadvantaged during the war in terms of access to education – are reluctant to apply, and many who do have failed the various tests.

Command and control of an army being built from scratch is also an issue, and there have been efforts to recruit former officers in the AFL to lead the new army – a very fraught expediency given the notorious record of the AFL.

Civil society has raised questions about transparency with respect to funds for DynCorp and PAE, but the concerns have been rebuffed since the funds come directly from the US treasury, and the reporting requirements do not allow for such open disclosures. But the concern of Liberians is clearly legitimate: before Liberia’s war the US spent about $500 million mostly on the Liberian army, and that army proved atrocious.

There is also a conceptual issue which captures some of Liberians’ anxieties. The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (iPRS) paper of 2007 placed “enhancing national security” ahead of the rule of law and economic development on Liberia’s list of priorities, a deviation from standard SSR principles. This is of interest since the excuse of “national security” was used in the past to abuse individual rights, setting the stage for the civil war.

For further information, please contact Lansana Gberie, Senior Associate of ICTJ and Head of Monrovia Office

Useful links for SSR in Liberia

• BBC Country Profile: Liberia
• Conciliation Resources
• International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
• United Nations Mission in Liberia
• United Nations Police (UNPOL)
• United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Liberia
• Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
• DynCorp International
  • DynCorp Awarded Police Training Work in Liberia, March 2008
    
    

GFN-SSR Document Library

The Document Library contains links to a number of SSR related documents either focussing specifically on SSR in Liberia or looking at the country alongside others as a case study. A selection of these are listed below:

• Lessons from Liberia - Integrated approaches to peacebuilding in transitional settings
  What lessons can be drawn from Liberia’s attempt to implement an integrated peace process? This Institute for Security Studies paper examines the efforts of the Government of Liberia and the UN to craft strategic policy and programming responses with conflict and peacebuilding in mind. It argues that peacebuilding is an undoubtedly messy process and agents have to settle for ‘partially coherent’ solutions.
• Liberia’s Security Sector Legislation
  How can Liberians, following an extended period of civil war, regain effective oversight of their elected representatives and avoid further violent conflict? This Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) report argues that such an outcome can only derive from the rule of law. It is essential that legislators and other stakeholders are aware of the legal framework for security provision and governance in Liberia. This compendium provides a comprehensive list of the existing security legislation.
• Making Liberia Safe - Transformation of the National Security Sector
  Liberia’s national security sector operates under old structures that are unworkable, wasteful and do not engender the support of the people. This paper, authored by Gompert, Oliker, Stearns, Crane and Riley, recommends the organisation of a new sector architecture of both force structure and security institutions. Liberia must create a new security structure capable of meeting the country’s internal and external challenges.
• Peacebuilding and Organized Crime: The Cases of Kosovo and Liberia
  Combating organised crime should occur throughout the conflict continuum, from conflict prevention to post-conflict peacebuilding. This paper, published by Swisspeace, examines the impact of organised criminal groups on peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo and Liberia. Although types of organised crime differ in the two countries, both cases demonstrate that organised crime presents a serious threat to peacebuilding efforts and damages the functioning of democratic institutions.
• Post-War Policing by Communities in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda
  What role does community-based policing have in post-conflict states? In his article, Bruce Baker demonstrates that community-based (non-state) policing in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda has survived conflict, but that its variable form and function is in part the product of conflict. In a context of limited state police resources, community-based policing is not to be dismissed lightly as a significant security provider for post-war democracies.
• Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice
  What lessons can the learned from the 2003 peace process in Liberia? This Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue article aims to record the dynamics, actors and elements that determined how and why many of the key decisions were taken that resulted in the 2003 peace agreement. It argues that leaving questions of justice, accountability and the rule of law open for the future may be the optimal approach to negotiating peace.
• Liberia: Resurrecting the Justice System
  Reform of the Liberian justice system should be made a top priority for donors. However, this report, published by the International Crisis Group (ICG), illustrates that donor efforts to promote long-term justice reform can only succeed if the Liberian government puts justice reform prominently on the agenda and if the legal and judicial fraternities take the lead effort in the reform process. Community-based approaches, with a sustained focus on gender issues and on the urban/rural divide, are also needed to empower individuals and to help people navigate the statutory and customary legal systems in Liberia.
• Principles and Pragmatism: Civil-Military Action in Afghanistan and Liberia
  What does cooperation between peacekeeping forces and aid agencies entail in practice? This report from Cordaid considers civil-military relations, with a focus on Afghanistan and Liberia. It aims to assist policymakers and practitioners in developing adequate strategies. Closer interaction between military and civil actors is a logical consequence of current developments in the international arena and humanitarian and development sector. Aid agencies, donors and the military need to remain aware of these contextual developments and to reflect on their implications.
• Liberia 2005: an unusual African post-conflict election
  What made the 2005 elections in Liberia unusual amongst post-conflict elections in Africa? What factors determined how Liberians voted in the elections? This article from the Journal of Modern African Studies analyses the 2005 presidential and legislative elections in Liberia. It finds that the virtual absence of transformed rebel forces or an overbearing incumbent gave the elections extraordinary features in an African setting. Another unusual feature in the context of African elections was the fragility of party loyalty.
• Red Shoes: Experiences of Girl-combatants in Liberia
  What were the motives of girls who fought in the Liberian civil war and how can the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process address their needs better? This International Labour Office study argues that there are a number of misconceptions surrounding the enlistment of girl combatants. The study examines the motives of Liberian girls for taking up arms and highlights the key issues for improving gender sensitive prevention and reintegration policies.
• The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia
  What is the way forward for peace and stability in Liberia? This paper, by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), looks at Liberian post-conflict reconstruction, particularly at security sector reform (SSR). It argues that SSR needs to focus not only the efficacy of security institutions, but also on ensuring that they are consistent with the democratic norms of transparency, accountability and responsiveness.