Vicious circles and the security development nexus in Somalia

Conflicts that appear to be self-reinforcing in the short-term can in the long-term produce conditions out of which new political orders emerge. This paper, published by Conflict, Security & Development, uses Somalia to illustrate the dramatic changes that can occur in patterns of armed conflict, criminality and governance in a collapsed state. Among other factors, shifting interests in the business community have helped Somali communities adapt to state collapse, manage risk and provide a more predictable economic environment.

Contemporary post-conflict assistance discourse often reflects the view of war-torn countries caught in vicious circles, with failure reinforcing failure, trapping countries in a downward spiral of crisis. This notion appears to be the best explanation for the intractability of many instances of civil wars and state collapse.

Somalia has been in complete state collapse since 1991. Its central government does not function; there is no reconciliation and little security. Armed conflict appears to be endemic, levels of crime and unemployment are high and levels of human development low. Its economy is based almost entirely on remittances from the Somali diaspora.

Self-declared administrations at trans-regional, regional, district and local levels now provide modest levels of administration and maintain a level of peace. Such self-governing developments also include:

• Commercial interests provide more stable environments. Such interests in Somaliland maintain security in order to secure stable trade at the Berbera seaport. The Jubba Valley Alliance maintains order so as to enjoy a monopoly on trade at its seaport.
• Neighbourhoods or municipalities use sharia courts to maintain peace, provide some basic services and collect taxes and fees to cover salaries.
• Political and economic interests once linked to a war economy have shifted to legitimate commerce and services. Current conflicts are brief, more localised and less costly in terms of lives and property damage.
• Demobilisation has emerged from multiple sources. Militiamen in Somaliland were absorbed into the army, producing better levels of public order. Infusion of cash by the United Nations’ demobilisation programme created jobs that allow men to opt for peaceful occupations.
• Mogadishu businesses now hire former militia men as security guards; they are now law enforcers, not law-breakers.
• Charitable initiatives have created more schools, which are likely to redirect men away from militias and criminal gangs by providing an alternative source of training and values.

International aid agencies should ensure that interventions work with, not against, such political trends toward political organisation and consolidation. They should also note the following obvious yet often overlooked claims:

• In zones of war, criminal violence and state collapse, individuals and communities actively seek to reduce and manage risk, and fashion informal systems to provide security and predictability.
• Even local actors profiteering from the collapse of rule of law tend to gravitate toward risk management and predictable behaviour.
• Crises that first appear to be manifestations of the ‘conflict trap’ may in fact be in a state of evolution.

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Author: Ken Menkhaus
Source: Menkhaus, K., 2004, ‘Vicious circles and the security development nexus in Somalia’, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp.149-165
Size: 19 pages