Security Sector Reform
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Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection Service

What reforms are necessary to tackle issues regarding the quality and loyalty of Iraqi security forces? This briefing from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) reviews developments within the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police and Facilities Protection Service (FPS). Based partly on a conference including government officials, military officers, law enforcement executives and academic experts, it suggests several reforms. Its recommendations include applying US effort and resources to support the transformation of the Iraqi Interior Ministry and FPS. Further suggestions include assigning responsibility for police training to the US Justice Department and transferring Iraqi National Police (INP) units to the Ministry of Defence.

Despite the achievement of a number of quantitative goals, reality regarding the loyalty and quality of Iraqi security forces is troubling. The Iraqi Interior Ministry is dysfunctional and infiltrated by Shiite militias. The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is unable to protect citizens, while the INP is a patchwork of commando-style counter-insurgency units that harbours sectarian death squads. The Border Police are unable to stop infiltration of terrorists, arms and contraband across Iraq’s borders. Further insights on the condition of the Iraqi Interior Ministry and security forces include:

  • Justice Department police trainers and US military authorities disagree over whether the police should be a community-oriented law enforcement service or a counter-insurgency force;
  • US authorities do not know the number of Iraqi police and police stations or the composition and membership of police forces. They are also unaware of the location and use of US supplied equipment and the disposal of operating funds;
  • Decentralisation of control of the police has exacerbated problems with oversight. Provincial police receive funds directly from the Finance Ministry, but Baghdad is unable to verify provincial budgets’ accuracy or account for how money is used; and
  • The IPS has neither the training nor legal authority to conduct criminal investigations, nor the firepower to confront organised crime.

The Iraqi Interior Ministry requires reform. This requires persistent efforts by US advisers, starting with senior Iraqi officials and working down. It involves establishing a strategic plan, standard administrative procedures, and codes of conduct and operational measures that are accepted by the Iraqis. As the Interior Ministry begins to function effectively, it must exert influence over the provinces and regain the authority lost through decentralisation. Further recommendations include:

  • Means must be found to pay police salaries directly to police officers and transfer money to their families;
  • The INP should be transferred to the Ministry of Defence, with police commandos becoming part of the New Iraqi Army. This would enable close US supervision and better performance of the units’ counter-insurgency mission;
  • The Border Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defence. This would consolidate responsibility for border protection in one ministry and improve cooperation with US forces;
  • The IPS should be refocused toward controlling crime and protecting civilians and should receive the legal authority, training and equipment to perform this function;
  • The Interior Ministry will not be able to register, equip, train and downsize the FPS unless the US applies money and strength; and
  • The US Justice Department should be placed in charge of training Iraqi police. This requires a direct appropriation from Congress and authority to direct the operation.

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Author: Robert Perito
Source: Perito, R. M., 2007, ‘Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection Service’, United States Institute of Peace, USI Peace Briefing, Washington, DC, USA

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