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Relations among Security and Law Enforcement Institutions in Indonesia

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The dominant perceptions of the academic literature on relations among security and law enforcement institutions in Indonesia tend to be negative. In part, academic works on the past behaviour of security forces in some of Indonesia's conflict areas inform the perceptions of the literature. Research on conflict zones often suggests that unclear boundaries of jurisdiction and poor internal command and control frustrated the efforts to coordinate security forces in such areas. While these conclusions may be accurate in places that are or were riven by high conflict, this article questions if such conclusions are accurate for the large parts of Indonesia that have only experienced low levels of security problems. The evidence presented in this article suggests that coordination and an effective division of labour does exist among government security agencies in a low conflict environment. This article outlines relations between the three primary law enforcement and security actors — the National Police, territorial units of the Indonesian military and regional government — in three district case studies in Yogyakarta. This article finds that while agencies at the sub-national level are highly autonomous, their autonomy does not present an obstacle for cooperation. In the case studies presented, government law enforcement and security actors acknowledge jurisdictional boundaries between one another. Where inter-institutional cooperation does take place, regional government plays an important, facilitative role. Despite this, the Indonesian police remain the lead agency in combating most threats to order and stability.

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Indonesia is not often considered a state where security management is well conducted. The dominant perception appears to be that law enforcement and security institutions cooperate poorly. In part, this trend is informed by academic works on the past behaviour of security forces in some of Indonesia's troubled areas, like Ambon, Papua and Central Sulawesi, to name a few.¹ Some authors argue that in these cases, unclear boundaries of jurisdiction and poor internal command and control, frustrated efforts to coordinate security forces. However, we can perhaps question whether conflict zones provide a sound basis for our impressions of the relationships among police and military forces. Much of the best evidence that demonstrates poor inter-institutional cooperation occurs in the years after 1998, at a time of acute crisis in Indonesia and in the institutions themselves. This fact prompts us to consider how state security actors interact today when managing security problems.

Scholars contributing to the debate about security sector reform in Indonesia have offered potential explanations for why Indonesia's police and military forces do not interact well. Part of the security sector reform literature has discussed the problem of "grey areas" or a supposed lack of clarity in the job descriptions of the police and the Indonesian military. The literature also identifies another potential problem with the high autonomy between security and law enforcement actors. To the contrary however, this article finds that while agencies at the sub-national level are indeed highly autonomous, autonomy does not vitiate inter-institutional cooperation. In the case studies examined government security actors also respect one another's jurisdictional boundaries. Where inter-institutional cooperation does take place, regional government plays an important role as a facilitator. Regional government is able to use mechanisms under its own authority (particularly joint agency committees) to involve national government agencies in resolving local problems. This system in turn depends on broad consensus over the job descriptions of the different actors. Accordingly, the Indonesian police are the lead agency in combating most threats to order and stability. The police possess statutory and normative supremacy, while the military and regional government act to back up the police.

This article outlines the relations between the three law enforcement and security actors — the National Police (Polri), regional government and its own law enforcement agents, the *Polisi Pamong Praja* or civil service police (Pol.PP) and the territorial units of the Indonesian military (TNI) — in three district case studies

in Yogyakarta. These districts are Sleman, the city municipality of Yogyakarta and Bantul. This article begins with an examination of the historical development of these institutions, highlighting in particular the integration and separation of the police from the Indonesian military. This history provides a basis for understanding how the police have become the lead agency in managing security today. We then review some of the reasons for the widespread perception that security institutions in Indonesia have problematic relations. Finally we examine the data from the case studies that outlines the existence of inter-institutional cooperation.

It is acknowledged, however, that this article is not the last word on the behaviour of security and law enforcement agencies in Indonesia. Other sources have investigated many negative practices perpetrated by such actors, ranging from corruption to abuses of human rights. This article does not, for example, touch on one of the other probing questions on the topic — competition in the black economy — as this is something rarely seen in the case studies. The purpose of this article therefore is not to deny the existence of serious misdeeds by security actors. Rather this article seeks to focus on one specific part of the picture: how state security actors inter-relate in managing security. Based upon the findings from one low conflict area, this article can perhaps qualify some of the more pessimistic views on relations among public security actors in Indonesia.

The Historical Development of Polri and the Civil Service Police

The post-Soeharto era has seen an empowerment of the police — and to a lesser extent regional government — while the influence of the military has declined. This scenario is the inverse of the historical trend that existed prior to the current democratic era. The history of Polri has been one of subordination to military control followed by a very abrupt separation. The result of this separation has been an enhancement of the police role in internal security management. For regional government though, Indonesia's decentralization policies have provided the authority to develop long neglected capabilities in the area of law enforcement.

Initially, the Indonesian police began its development on a different trajectory from that of the military. In the early Republic, the Indonesian National Police was a civilian force that operated under the office of the Prime Minister. During its infancy the police fiercely defended its civilian credentials and independence. In 1959 the country's first Police Chief, Soekanto, chose to resign rather than

support the inclusion of Polri in the *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (Armed Forces of the Indonesian Republic or ABRI). Although in 1960 the police formally became one of ABRI's four services, Polri managed to maintain its independence as a separate Ministry under the Defence and Security portfolio.²

With the end of the Soekarno era, the Soeharto administration consolidated its grip on the armed forces and gradually subordinated Polri to the military. In 1967, the Chief of Police and the other heads of the armed forces lost their ministerial status. The Chief of Police henceforth became responsible to the Minister for Defence and Security, who at that time was Soeharto himself. Soeharto's reorganization of ABRI in turn initiated a gradual depletion of police capabilities. Police recruits were subject to a compulsory military curriculum and the armed forces headquarters discriminated against the police in the ABRI budget. As evidence of this, by the early 1980s the police to population ratio slumped from 1:500 in 1967 to 1:1,200, three times lower than the international recommended minimum.³ While various efforts were made to rehabilitate police performance during 1980s and 1990s,⁴ the limits of the Soeharto regime did not allow the armed forces to treat the cause of Polri's problems — its subordination to the military.

After the downfall of Soeharto in May 1998 the TNI developed its own agenda for the reform of the armed forces. Under this programme, which the military dubbed the "New Paradigm", ABRI began a process that unwittingly led to the empowerment of the police. One of the centrepieces of ABRI's self-styled New Paradigm was the separation of the police from the armed forces command structure.⁵ As a result, Polri formally left ABRI and came under the Minister for Defence in April 1999.⁶ One year later in 2000, President Abdurrahman Wahid severed the last links between the police and the military by directly positioning Polri under the office of the President.⁷ Abdurrahman thus finished a circular historical revolution by restoring the Indonesian police to their original position as an autonomous civilian agency under the executive government.

While the history of the police and the military is relatively well known, the law enforcement capabilities of regional governments has been a long neglected topic of analysis. This is despite the fact that regional governments have actually been involved in enforcing law and order for a long time. After the establishment of the Indonesian Republic, the Interior Minister in 1950 mandated the creation of small Pol.PP units for sub-district government in Java. Over the following two decades, the Interior Ministry gradually allowed the Pol.PP to

spread among regional governments across the country.⁸ From its inception to the present, the purpose of the civil service police has remained essentially the same: to enforce regional government ordinances relating to “public order” (*ketertiban umum*). Regional governments have historically exercised their powers over public order through regulating such things as the use of public and private spaces (like the construction of buildings) and eliminating social vice (like prostitution and the trade in illegal alcohol).⁹ However, during its first decades the effectiveness of the civil service police was limited. The Pol.PP’s greatest obstacle was its lack of authority in law. Until the 1970s, the Minister for the Interior provided the only regulations governing the Pol.PP. In 1974 the central government passed Indonesia’s first regional autonomy law. This law enhanced the status of the Pol.PP by giving regional — in particular sub-district — governments, the right to maintain Pol.PP units and “uphold public order”; but the national government did not provide guidance on key organizational matters, jurisdiction or the Pol.PP’s relations with the police.¹⁰ Furthermore, the civil service police has historically been a small, under resourced part of regional government. Even in the self-proclaimed largest Pol.PP force in the country — the Capital City Province of Jakarta — the numbers of personnel were tiny. In 1995 there were only 753 civil service police for the entire city, giving a police to population ratio of 1:13,750.¹¹ For much of Indonesia’s history therefore the Pol.PP has been a small and impotent part of the local government apparatus.

The significance of the civil service police grew after 1999 with the passage of Indonesia’s “big bang” decentralization reforms. While Laws Nos. 22 and 25 on decentralization did not enhance the powers of the Pol.PP, the laws served to extend much greater power to regional governments.¹² With this, the Pol.PP has taken on greater importance as the enforcement arm of regional governments.¹³ This situation has been experienced in all of the three districts examined in this article. After the year 2000 the district governments of Yogyakarta, Sleman and Bantul created special enforcement agencies consisting only of civil service police. Previously, their enforcement personnel had been split up across a number of different agencies. This reorganization created larger, more efficient regional enforcement units capable of using their limited powers to greater effect. At the same time, local government also began to capitalise on its powers over public order more aggressively. To use one example, in the years prior to 2000, the district of Bantul listed only three finable offences in its register of ordinances. After 2000 however, the district created a total of

thirty-one new finable offences.¹⁴ Despite such empowerment, the Pol.PP today continues to do the same fundamental tasks as it did in the past, enforcing licensing regulations and countering vice.

The Conventional View of Indonesian Security Force Behaviour

Much of the literature on security management in Indonesia conveys the impression that relations among security actors are poor and boundaries of jurisdiction are unclear. A large part of the evidence to support the former of these claims originates from research on some of Indonesia's high conflict areas. The past history of some of these case studies does substantiate the existence of poor coordination and command and control among Polri and TNI elements. In Papua for example, during 2001 and 2002, police and military forces engaged in unauthorised attacks against Papuan separatists and perpetrated violent actions to embarrass the separatist movement. After some of these incidents, Ikrar Nusa Bhakti states that the police and the military separately attempted to discredit each other by releasing evidence of the attacks that their counterparts perpetrated.¹⁵ In the communal violence that occurred in Ambon after 1999, it has been well documented that the police and the military actively took sides in the dispute.¹⁶ As a response to these events and to disagreement between regional police and military commanders as to who precisely should be in charge, in June 2000, the central government was forced to create a special military-led coordinating command for Maluku.¹⁷ However, such arrangements did not prevent individual elements of the security forces periodically taking sides in the dispute for the next several years.¹⁸ During the early years of the communal conflict in Central Sulawesi, police and military leaders at the provincial level agreed in 2000 to give command superiority to the police. Despite such agreement among high ranking officers, police and military forces at the sub-provincial level continued to pursue their own unauthorised operations in the field.¹⁹ These data points help to support the view that there was a lack of cohesion between security elements in these conflict areas. But we should recall however that the best of this evidence emerges from the immediate years after Indonesia's democratic transition. At that time, the laws governing security institutions were undergoing deep, structural reforms, as were the institutions themselves. These factors, as well as the nature of the crisis in the conflict zones, may very well have influenced the relations of local security elements towards one another.

Accounts of the sub-optimal behaviour of Polri and the TNI in high-conflict areas have perhaps given rise to the widely-held view that relations between the security forces are equally poor throughout the country — including in non-conflict settings. According to Dewi Fortuna Anwar:

The sudden separation of the TNI and Polri ... created various problems in the field. The existence of 'grey areas', where there can be found overlapping responsibilities or an absence of clarity about authority between TNI and Polri, was at the beginning not sufficiently anticipated by policymakers. ... This thing does not only trigger conflict between TNI and Polri in the field, but also complicates the handling of various security problems in Indonesia.²⁰

There is no reason to assume, however, that what has happened in unstable parts of Indonesia will be replicated in the majority of the country that remains stable. Nonetheless, as Dewi Fortuna Anwar alludes to, there may be deficiencies in the regulatory and institutional framework of the security sector.²¹ According to this view poor coordination and negative relations may be due to legal and institutional problems that apply throughout the country, not just in the conflict areas.

An important part of the debate about security sector reform in Indonesia is the extent to which national laws provide appropriate governance for this sector. In the post-Soeharto period, the Indonesian Government has passed five important defence and security statutes.²² What these laws have achieved is to provide a normative division of roles between Polri and the TNI. But according to some commentators, what the laws have failed to do is to spell out in detail key definitional concepts and precise responsibilities for the police and the Indonesian military.²³ Historically, Indonesia's highest law-making body, the People's Consultative Assembly (the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or MPR) passed the first of Indonesia's security reform statutes in 2000. Under its decrees, the MPR called for the separation of the police from the Indonesian military. Besides making this paradigmatic shift the MPR also redrafted the mission statements of the two forces. According to the MPR, the TNI is now normatively responsible for "defending" the state and upholding Indonesia's national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The police on the other hand are charged with upholding law and maintaining "security".²⁴ While the organizational separation of the two constituted a major reform in itself, the MPR's clarity of

purpose was marred by the fact that the Assembly did not define what national “defence” and national “security” mean in practice. Further clouding the issue, the MPR ordered the National Police and the TNI to cooperate in circumstances where their duties overlap. The MPR did not, however, delineate lines of jurisdiction between the two forces or create protocols to govern joint activities.²⁵

In passing its own legislation, the Indonesian parliament (DPR) has not rectified any of the ambiguities of the MPR. In 2002, the Parliament passed two separate laws on the National Police and National Defence. These laws resolved a number of important organizational issues for the police and the military. But the DPR did not go beyond repeating the MPR’s declarations on Polri and the TNI’s normative roles or clarify how the two forces should coordinate joint activities.²⁶ Later in 2004 the military sponsored its own law which further blurred lines of authority over internal security.²⁷ Law 34/2004 on the TNI expanded the mission of the armed forces into fourteen different functions “other than war”. Among the TNI’s “other than war” tasks are roles common to many conventional militaries — such as combating insurgent movements. Other powers arguably intruded on standard activities of the police, such as provisions authorizing the TNI to guard strategic objects and combat piracy and smuggling.²⁸ In sum, Indonesia’s major statutory laws on the security sector have succeeded in doing two important things: separating the two primary instruments of security and of differentiating the normative roles of the two forces. Yet Indonesian law has not specifically determined where the boundaries lie between them. Of equal concern is the fact that the Indonesian Government has still not promulgated guidelines to govern joint operations.

Another fault within the governance framework of the security sector is the extensive autonomy of government security actors from one another and from civilian, democratic control. This argument has been levelled at each of the three institutions discussed in this article. Kristiansen and Trijono have examined the impact of decentralization on the enforcement of local government regulations after the 1999 regional autonomy laws. According to their 2002–03 analysis of three districts — Bantul in Yogyakarta, Kutai Kartanegara in Kalimantan Timur and Mataram in Nusa Tenggara Barat — the writers found that regional government Pol.PP units in these areas operated with an exceedingly low level of external accountability. At the time of their research, Pol.PP units in the three districts did not report to district parliaments or cooperate with the police.

Based on their data the two writers imply that the civil service police resemble little more than vigilantes.²⁹

Concerns over institutional autonomy have also been levelled at the Indonesian military. Mietzner for example, calls our attention to unfinished aspects of military reform that have left the TNI capable of operating without democratic civilian oversight. In Mietzner's model of a two-stage military reform process, the Indonesian armed forces has passed many of the initial reforms necessary to extract the TNI from a practical role in formal politics. An example of this is the withdrawal of military representatives from parliament. But other "second generation reforms" designed to curb the military's autonomy, have yet to be fulfilled. These reforms, among others, include reducing the military's non-budgetary sources of income and erasing the army's regional territorial command.³⁰ Mietzner's argument therefore reinforces the perception that the TNI continues to operate without being fully answerable to democratic civilian government.

Concern over institutional autonomy has also cropped up in public debates about the National Police. In early 2007, failed efforts to develop a draft law on internal security drew attention to the low level of accountability of the police to national government. In discussions over the bill, elite commentators strenuously debated whether the position of the Indonesian National Police — directly under the President rather than a civilian minister — offers sufficient accountability.³¹ While the President has an advisory council to help him decide matters of police policy, in practical terms the force effectively governs itself. Therefore if we combine these analyses of the Pol.PP, the military and the police we can see a number of different sources argue that these actors all possess broad autonomy from democratic civilian control. Without strong government leadership we have a further reason to be pessimistic about the ability of these institutions to cooperate at the regional level.

Taken collectively, we can infer three things from the preceding discussion. At one level there is an argument that in Indonesia's high-conflict zones the security forces were unable to manage their relations in a way that led to effective coordination. At a more general level, commentators argue that failures of coordination begin with the lack of clarity in Indonesia's security laws. It is also reasonable to speculate that if public security agencies are highly autonomous, high autonomy would also present another challenge for cooperation.

What has rarely been done, however, is to take these different claims and subject them to scrutiny within local case studies. In

particular, it is worth asking whether former difficulties of cooperation in some of Indonesia's conflict zones are replicated in low-conflict areas. In non-conflict areas, are there overlapping core functions among security actors and, if so, does this cause disputes among them? Does high institutional autonomy and the absence of a single controlling entity hinder the ability of different actors to jointly manage security?

As will be seen, these questions can be answered in the negative. There is an extensive degree of joint-institutional cooperation in the three case study sites. This cooperation occurs within the context of a clear division of labour among the law enforcement and security agencies. The police take the lead role in most security tasks, supported by military territorial units. Interestingly, regional government emerges as an important locus of coordination. Regional government provides the opportunity for inter-institutional dialogue through regional leaders meetings and intelligence sharing forums. Regional government also provides limited financial backing for the activities of its national security counterparts. While the institutions are indeed quite autonomous, high autonomy surprisingly does not inhibit collaboration.

A Brief Overview of the Research Location

The three districts in this article form part of the Special Province of Yogyakarta in central Java. Yogyakarta is a small province composed of five districts: the city of Yogyakarta, which is bordered by two moderately urban municipalities, Sleman and Bantul plus two very rural districts, Gunung Kidul and Kulon Progo. At the last census in 2005 the population of the province was a mere 3.281 million. Of this figure around 59.1 per cent were classified as living in urbanised areas and most of them in the case study areas of this research. The region's economy is also relatively small. The largest single sector — based on 2004 statistics — is the tourist and hotel industry. In 2004, hotel and restaurant trade produced around 19.9 per cent of gross regional product which, in 2004, sat at Rp. 21,848,682 million.³² The profile of regional crime is also illustrative of the relative stability of Yogyakarta. In the years 2002–07 only 764 of the 6,547 serious cases handled by the police were classified as violent crimes. Thus, to present a one sentence description of the three case studies would be to say that they are mostly under-developed but heavily populated, with a stable security environment.

Institutional Autonomy and the Core Functions of the Police, the Military and Regional Government

What reformist intellectuals have often argued at the national level — that the police and the military have too much autonomy — is even more applicable to the regions. Regional governments and the national security agencies that operate in the regions are not merely autonomous. In practice, they are independent. Under the terms of Indonesia's 1999 decentralization laws, the national government retains control over defence and security.³³ Local heads of government therefore, have no ability to exercise command over national agencies like Polri and the TNI. After the separation of the police from ABRI, police and military personnel are obliged under Indonesian legislation to obey their internal hierarchies of command. At the apex of their force structures, the leaders of Polri and the TNI take their orders directly from the President.³⁴ What this set of arrangements means is that at the sub-national level there is no single authority that is capable of *compelling* all of the security actors to collaborate. Joint security cooperation therefore takes place practically on a voluntary basis.

While the autonomy of the respective institutions may be high, it appears there is little functional overlap between them in the case study sites. Taking the role of regional government as an example, regional government is not capable of duplicating activities performed by other actors because its powers are heavily constrained. Firstly, regional government is only permitted to draft regulations to enforce “public order”. As discussed previously, the concept of public order is normatively limited to eliminating vice and enforcing local government licenses. Secondly, violations of local government regulations only have the status of a misdemeanour (or *tindak pidana ringan*).³⁵ Thirdly, even in executing their limited mandate, the regional government Pol.PP require the assistance of the police; for instance, regional governments must submit all violations of local government laws to the inspection of the police before such cases are able to be heard in court.³⁶ Because regional government's powers are limited in these ways, regional governments are simply incapable of duplicating the power of the police.

Relatively minor functional overlap also characterises the division of roles between the police and the TNI. Precisely why this is the case is not easy to explain. As parts of the literature suggest, Indonesian statutory law is unclear on how the police and the military share responsibilities. Underneath the ambiguity of Indonesian law, however,

it does appear that the two institutions have mediated a normative understanding over jurisdiction and principles of cooperation. One indication of this is the 2003 Indonesian Defence White Paper. In this document the TNI concedes that, under non-emergency conditions, Polri have primary responsibility for maintaining security within the state. Under such conditions, the role of the military is to support the police.³⁷ Despite this acknowledgement, the Indonesian Police and the Department of Defence still express dissatisfaction with the legal grey area that exists between them.³⁸ Nevertheless, it does appear that the two sides have protocols in place to guide inter-institutional cooperation. According to the Minister of Defence, the Indonesian military makes its forces available to the Indonesian police during non-emergency conditions under a system they term *Bawah Kendali Operasi* (Underneath Operational Control). In principle Indonesian regional police commands may obtain the assistance of local TNI forces through formal requests of assistance. Territorial military personnel are then placed under police command for the duration of the agreed operation.³⁹

My research in Yogyakarta suggests that the principles of joint institutional cooperation at the national level also reflect the way in which Polri and the TNI operate in the case studies. In the case studies, senior police operations officers have stated that whenever their commands require military assistance, the police merely draft letters of request to their local army territorial commands. An example of when the police make these requests is during the annual Lebaran holiday, at the end of the Muslim fasting month. Because of the millions of Indonesians who travel (or *mudik*) to their hometowns during this time of year, the National Police mount a nationwide transport security operation (usually termed *Operasi Ketupat*). Prior to launching this operation, police operations staff in the case studies despatch formal letters of assistance to the military territorial commands. The TNI operations staff in the military district (*Kodim*) then participate in joint operational planning with their counterparts in the police. The TNI despatch personnel for the duration of the agreed operation to be deployed under police command. The experience is usually that the TNI are not needed and instead remain on continuous standby in their barracks. While the example illustrates the superior status of the police in joint activities, on the important question of whether the military may deploy independently in day-to-day internal security tasks, the answer is clear: police sources reply that the TNI do not do so. They respond that there is an understanding between themselves and

their military counterparts that “our job descriptions are different”.⁴⁰ It seems therefore that Polri has something which the TNI does not: normative legal legitimacy that makes the national police the peak agency for enforcing order and security under normal conditions.⁴¹ This is a boundary that the TNI in the case studies seem to respect. Despite the absence of clarity in national legislation, the police and the military do appear to share a normative understanding over how they divide their roles in internal security and how to achieve operational cooperation. The police are the lead agency in maintaining order under normal conditions and the military back-up the police.

Inter-Institutional Cooperation in Yogyakarta: Joint Committees

Turning to examine the data of the case studies, one of the most important tools for creating inter-agency cooperation is joint committees. The most important joint-agency security committee at the regional level is the *Muspida* (*Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah* or Regional Leaders Conference). The Muspida was created during the Soeharto era and has been continued in more or less the same form since.⁴² The Muspida consists of the most important regional executive leaders — the Governor at the Provincial level or the Bupati/Walikota at the District level, the chief of the regional military command, the head of the regional police, the head of the state prosecutor’s office and the chief magistrate. The head of local government is tasked as the Chair of the meetings and calls the conferences once every three months (or as circumstances demand). The Muspida is designed to encourage these parties to synchronise efforts between local government and the national security apparatuses to analyse and respond to threats to stability.⁴³ The central government has given little guidance though as to what, specifically, constitutes a “threat to stability”. This has given flexibility to the Muspida conferences to decide what issues deserve their attention. It is important to underline however that, procedurally, the Chair of these meetings is not empowered to make rulings that are binding upon the members. Instead, mutual agreement is the basis for all joint actions.

Examining the execution of the Muspida conference in Sleman, Bantul and the city of Yogyakarta, there is a degree of consistency across the districts in terms of the topics they discuss and the important role that regional government plays in each of the Muspidas. Declassified meeting notes obtained during the course of this research provide much of the information for what occurs.⁴⁴ These documents

create a picture of a system that has a relatively good level of inter-institutional dialogue as well as cooperation based upon a division of labour between agencies. Over the last five years in Sleman, Bantul and the city of Yogyakarta, a mix of security events have entered into the Muspidas. Topics range from high security problems (like terrorism and inter-ethnic violence) to low security problems (like eradicating vice and evicting squatters).⁴⁵ Because of the profile of Yogyakarta however, as a low conflict area with a fairly stable heterogeneous society, small scale threats tend to dominate the security agenda. The subdued topics that often feature in Muspida discussions also reflect the influence of regional government in these meetings. Because regional government administers the Muspida, the districts and provinces get to formulate many of the agenda items. Most of the time representatives from national government institutions are content to allow local government to direct the meeting process. Because of this, meeting resolutions are often skewed in favour of local government issues, like eradicating vice.⁴⁶ But while the voice of local government may be heard more often in the meeting rooms, the Muspida still requires the repressive powers of the national security apparatus to implement its consensus resolutions.

One example of a security crisis discussed in the Muspida of Bantul serves to illustrate the divisions of labour between the three actors. In 2003–05 Bantul had a long, drawn-out dispute over electricity lines known as the “SUTET” issue (SUTET being the Indonesian acronym for Ultra High Overhead Electricity Wires). Through this precedent we can see that the authority of the police is integral to executing most security activities and other government actors play a supporting role. Although the SUTET issue was eventually resolved through dialogue,⁴⁷ for two years the issue popped up regularly in Bantul’s Muspida discussions. To give a brief background, the problem began in 2003 when the national electricity company, PLN, began excavating sites in eastern Bantul to install electricity towers.⁴⁸ According to the citizens’ version of events, the electricity company refused to award them just compensation for their losses of land. Therefore from November 2003 citizens in the affected communities began a vociferous and sometimes violent resistance to the project, at times involving the project’s opponents manning roadblocks and assaulting outsiders.⁴⁹

From the earliest stage of the SUTET problem, the security elements in the Kabupaten demonstrated their capacity to respond. On 17 November 2003, the head of the Bantul police (the *Kapolres*) declared to his Muspida counterparts that his force had identified

eight ringleaders of the protests and were calling them in for questioning. Deferring to the sectoral superiority of the police, the Muspida resolved to support the Kapolres' handling of the issue.⁵⁰ At a later meeting in December 2003, the Kapolres revealed that national police headquarters had ordered the Bantul police not to allow the SUTET problem to disturb preparations for Indonesia's 2004 Presidential elections.⁵¹ Subsequently the Muspida agreed to pass the problem to the sub-district levels of government for negotiation. The Muspida's decision, however, only allowed resistance to the project to smoulder during 2004.

In January 2005 physical protests exploded across a number of Bantul's eastern sub-districts.⁵² At this juncture the TNI demonstrated one of the few abilities it still appears to possess in the realm of internal security — intelligence collection. At the January 28 Muspida meeting, the territorial military commander (the *Dandim*) declared that his command had mapped the sub-districts most likely to pose resistance to the project. The Dandim requested the District government become involved as an impartial mediator in the chosen communities.⁵³ Going forward it seems that the Dandim's analysis was accepted as the consensus view on resolving the issue. Showing up one of the essential differences though between military and police authority, the Kapolres at the Muspida's next meeting in February 2005 pointed out that he had already ordered his sub-district commands to deploy and provide physical security to the sub-districts identified as troublesome.⁵⁴ The police role sharply contrasts with the role that the military had assumed to that stage in the crisis. The military's territorial unit had only been able to passively accumulate information rather than provide direct physical security, a duty instead performed by the police.

By July 2005 however, the situation noticeably worsened. The citizens of one area, Kersen, resorted to violence against police units while residents of other villages openly defied the police by initiating fresh demonstrations. The Bupati then decided, in a special open meeting of the Muspida, to lend his authority as the elected head of civilian government, to the final success of the SUTET installations. To defend the project against further attacks, the Kapolres declared that his force would pre-emptively arrest suspected ringleaders. The Muspida expressed its support for the Police actions.⁵⁵ The whole conflict came to a climax in an extraordinary meeting at one of the disputed villages, Kresen, attended by the full complement of the Muspida, the sub-district and village leadership and the heads of the police and military sub-district commands. At this conference,

the head of the village expressed his fears that his citizens were readying weapons for a final stand-off. In response the Kapolres declared that he would deploy a company of police to secure the embattled village chief and to anticipate the potential anarchy that would follow.⁵⁶ Ultimately however, all these preparations proved anti-climactic: days after that meeting the revered Sultan of Yogyakarta stepped in and mediated a final solution between the disputing sides.

For our purposes though, the SUTET episode is an interesting example of coordination among security actors. Throughout the situation, the district government assumed the role of legitimating the consensus of the Muspida group and encouraging negotiations. Through such negotiations civilian government was able to use its normative legitimacy. The SUTET episode also shows that the police have the authority to provide physical security and direct response to threats of disturbance. The police led the actual handling of the incident and other elements played a supporting role. The TNI's territorial command refrained from direct participation in the crisis but continued to exercise its ability to gather intelligence and plan the coordinated response.

Looking at other forms of inter-institutional cooperation, the second most important joint security committee in the districts is the *Kominda* (*Komunitas Intelijen Daerah* or Regional Intelligence Committee). This joint committee is unsurprisingly the most secretive. The *Kominda* is a modern day revival of the Soeharto era *Bakorinda* (*Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Daerah* or Regional Intelligence Coordination Body). The *Kominda* does today essentially the same thing as its Soeharto era predecessor — bringing together the intelligence elements of all national and local government agencies in the regions. By bringing these agencies together, the *Kominda* facilitates a government-wide effort to pool intelligence data and create joint analyses. In 2006, the Minister for the Interior (re)created the *Kominda* through an executive order that directed all heads of government in the provinces and districts to establish a *Kominda* meeting. Under the Ministerial Order, the *Kominda* consists of all of the principle intelligence elements at the sub-national level; Police intelligence, the *Badan Intelijen Negara* (National Intelligence Agency or BIN), Indonesian military intelligence, the intelligence units of the State Prosecutors Office (*Jaksa*), local government enforcement agencies and any other agency with an intelligence capability. The core role of the *Kominda* is to pool data, analyse potential threats to security and make recommendations to the regional leaders' meeting.⁵⁷

It is not clear why the Interior Minister created the Kominda. Perhaps the Minister was using his authority over regional governments to encourage them to revive dialogue among the various parties involved in internal security and renew intelligence sharing. If facilitating dialogue was the Minister's intention, it seems that the objective had succeeded.

Information on how well the Kominda operates is difficult to obtain, but the few sources available indicate that agencies that sit on these joint committees do share intelligence and analysis effectively and have an influence on security outcomes. Within the case studies, the Kominda exists in two of the three districts, Sleman and Yogyakarta city.⁵⁸ In Yogyakarta city, the Kominda has six permanent members, the deputy mayor as Chair, the heads of the district police intelligence unit, the district military intelligence unit, the head of the state prosecutor's intelligence office, the commander of the Pol. PP intelligence detachment and a representative from BIN. These figures meet once every month to share information on the security and stability of the district, develop a common analysis and forward recommendations (if any) to the Muspida. Despite some complaints that BIN and the Police withhold their most sensitive information, the writer's source on the Kominda reveals that committee members attach a high level of professional value to the meeting.⁵⁹

One demonstration of the influence of the meeting on security activities comes from an episode in 2006. In that year, the city's Pol. PP intelligence team obtained information that street sellers (*pedagang*) were doing illicit business in the areas surrounding the province's elite police (*Brimob*) barracks. Apparently, the Brimob building was also located near to a military facility. In this environment, the city Pol. PP concluded that elements of the police and the military were protecting the sale of contraband items, like alcohol, in the street markets. After the Pol. PP raised the issue in the Kominda, the Kominda recommended that the Pol. PP use its authority to evict the *pedagang*. The Polri and TNI intelligence elements also concluded there was a danger that the nearby corrupt police and military outfits would oppose efforts to clean the area up. Therefore based on a joint analysis the Kominda recommended that the police, military and Pol. PP hold a combined operation. The unified Kominda recommendation was sent to the Muspida and the regional leaders agreed. The planned operation ended in failure, however, because information was leaked in advance. In the aftermath of the incident, the Kominda decided to postpone intervention and continue surveillance.⁶⁰ Although the activity was a failure, what

the episode shows is that intelligence sharing does happen among the various regional security elements. This intelligence sharing in turn contributes to unified, coordinated efforts to maintain security, whatever the flaws in execution.

Joint Operations in the Field

While Yogyakarta is a relatively stable area, security actors in the districts do deploy in infrequent joint operations which often involve the provision of security for public events. These operations further demonstrate the existence of cooperation between security institutions and a division of labour between them. An important example of the kind of security activities that demand inter-institutional collaboration are national and local elections. An operation of this kind most recently occurred in 2006 to secure the mayoral contest in the city of Yogyakarta. The district government began this activity when it authorized the creation of an operational steering committee to coordinate security. Illustrating their pre-eminent role, the district police commander (*Kapoltabes*) assumed the leadership of this ad-hoc grouping with the heads of the Pol.PP agency and the military district commander as his deputies.⁶¹ The second act of the district government was to provide a hefty budget to cover the overhead costs of their counterparts. Through a formal memorandum of understanding the parties agreed that the police would be given control over the delivery of security and the district government would fully fund police costs.⁶²

Over the course of the nine months of the operation and through multiple postponements of the vote, the police controlled the provision of security by commanding its own personnel and that of the TNI and the Pol.PP.⁶³ The Police, the Pol.PP and the TNI physically guarded the electoral commission offices, escorted the electoral candidates, patrolled campaign events and supervised the supply of electoral materials and the vote-counting process.⁶⁴ Despite the joint contribution, the allocation of personnel shows which party shouldered the lion's share of the burden. The Poltabes provided 852 police (not including 200 additional personnel from the provincial command) while the TNI provided 200 soldiers. The city's Pol.PP detachment contributed 88 personnel for the mission — over half of the whole agency's workforce.⁶⁵ Again we see in this example the pre-eminence of the police in security operations: the police took the lead in planning, delivering and coordinating security operations. Other parties, the military and local government,

were relegated to a backseat role of backing in force and — for local government — funding the tasks carried out by the superior agency.

Funding

The provision of financial support between institutions is a final example of security cooperation. As scholars elsewhere have pointed out, the armed services in Indonesia have historically taken advantage of financial grants from regional governments to supplement their meagre budgets. This is a pattern of behaviour that has continued into the post-regional autonomy period.⁶⁶ Although the Indonesian Interior Ministry in 2006 prohibited regional governments from directly financing national agencies, sub-national government in Indonesian is still permitted to fund activities that are conducted jointly with national institutions.⁶⁷ This practice of regional governments paying for security operations provided by central government agencies is an important part of inter-institutional cooperation. In effect this “user pays” system allows sub-national governments to rent the services of the central government security actors while permitting national agencies the opportunity to participate in resolving local problems without straining their limited budgets.

Both before and after the Minister’s 2006 ruling, district governments in Yogyakarta were active in supporting the national security apparatus. Before 2006 regional governments tended to give their assistance in the form of modestly large block grants. According to the best available data — audit reports of the Indonesian National Financial Auditing Agency (BPK) — the most generous district by far was the Kabupaten of Bantul. In the financial year 2005, the Kabupaten provided over Rp. 600 million or over US\$65,000 in direct cash grants to the police, military, state prosecutors and law courts. The government also supplemented its appropriations with additional donations of vehicles and miscellaneous electronic equipment. In total the Kabupaten donated over Rp. 1 billion around US\$109,000 in grants in that year alone.⁶⁸ By comparison, in the previous year the city of Yogyakarta gave Rp. 477 million or an estimated US\$52,000 to law enforcement and security agencies while the district of Sleman donated Rp. 807 million or over US\$88,000 to what the BPK dubs “national institutions”.⁶⁹ The situation, so it seems, was common across the province.⁷⁰ Such funding practices in general have continued after 2006. In deference to the regulations of the Interior Minister though, district governments have ceased to

provide block grants. Instead governments now channel their support to funding joint activities. Thus in the 2007 budget for the Pol.PP unit of Sleman for example, the unit provides an annual allocation of funds for joint anti-vice operations with the police.⁷¹

This user pays system again underlines the divisions of labour between the three principal governmental actors in regional security. The police and the military are responsible for providing the majority of the personnel and the material for security operations. In addition, the police provide the legitimate authority to enforce security while military territorial units support the police. The authority and capability of regional government is limited, however, when it comes to enforcing order on the ground. Because of the limitations of regional government, as well as the fact that each of the actors is effectively independent from one another, regional government is obliged to seek other means of engaging the national security elements in local affairs; at one level the engagement occurs through dialogue and at another through reimbursing the costs of national government actors when joint activities are necessary.

Conclusion

In summary, the evidence from the three case studies in Yogyakarta provides a different view of relations among public security actors than the dominant picture. In Indonesia's former hotspots a number of commentators have suggested relations among security and law enforcement agencies have been disorderly, uncoordinated and damaged by institutional rivalry. The data that emerges from the three district case studies in a low conflict area provides a different narrative. In explaining the disjuncture between the situation described in this article versus the dominant picture of how Indonesia's security forces cooperate in managing security, we need to recall that much of the best evidence that shows poor relations between security elements in former conflict areas comes from the turbulent years immediately after 1998. At that time, the forces were negotiating the early days of security sector reform and there were weaknesses of capacity as well as an unclear statutory environment. We need to note that as Indonesia has recovered from the crisis of its early transition years, so too has its security apparatuses. Of course, one may question the relevance of case studies from an area like Yogyakarta when it comes to understanding security management in the rest of Indonesia. But it is nevertheless true that most of Indonesia most of the time looks a lot more like Yogyakarta — stable, secure and

experiencing only periodic disturbances of order — than Central Sulawesi, the Maluku and Papua in the years after 1998. Instead we should question whether extraordinary case studies from conflict zones constitute a good basis for developing our understanding of security force relations in contemporary Indonesia. It is the contention of this article that we should look instead at how security forces interact in “normal” environments, such as those environments found in this article.

What is found in Sleman, Bantul and Yogyakarta is an effective level of cooperation and inter-institutional dialogue based on a division of labour among the actors. Public security and law enforcement institutions at the sub-national level are indeed highly autonomous. But the relative autonomy of these actors does not pose an obstacle to cooperation and collaboration in the face of security threats. There also appears to be little functional overlap. The Indonesian police continue to be responsible for managing security outside of a national emergency while the Indonesian military support the police. Regional government civil service police are responsible for enforcing local ordinances and draw upon police authority to exercise their mandate. Regional government also emerges as an important locus for achieving cooperation. Regional government operates the most important joint committees which assess and manage regional security. Regional government at times also acts to financially support joint operations and to provide political legitimacy to inter-institutional activities. While regional governments have a surprisingly important role, the police remain the key actor in enforcing security on the ground.

NOTES

- 1 See Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, ed., *Relasi TNI dan Polri dalam Penanganan Keamanan Dalam Negeri (2000–2004)* (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI, 2004).
- 2 Awa loedin Djamin, *Menuju Polri Mandiri yang Profesional* (Jakarta: Yayasan Tenaga Kerja, 1999), pp. 40–42.
- 3 Ibid., 44–45.
- 4 Markas Besar Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, *Sejarah Kepolisian di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Mabes Polri, 1999), pp. 222–46.
- 5 Marcus Mietzner, “The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism and Institutional Resistance”, *Policy Studies* 23 (Washington: East-West Center, 2006), pp. 11–12. See also the editorial of then Chief of ABRI General Wiranto, “Komitmen ABRI Menyelamatkan Bangsa dan Negara”, *Kompas*, 10 March 1999.

- 6 "Polisi Resmi Mulai Pisah dari ABRI", *Kompas*, 3 April 1999.
- 7 Republik Indonesia: Keputusan Presiden 89/2000 tentang Kedudukan Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, Pasal 2, 1 July 2000.
- 8 Eric M.F. Dajoh and Suwiryono Ismail, *Polisi Pamong Praja: Hari Ini dan Esok* (Jakarta: Kantor Kentraman dan Ketertiban Pemerintah DKI Jakarta, 1997), pp. 5–7.
- 9 Ibid., pp. 24, 52.
- 10 Republik Indonesia: UU 5/1974 tentang Pokok-Pokok Pemerintahan di Daerah, Pasal 81, 86. Also Dajoh and Ismail, *Polisi Pamong Praja*, pp. 7–10, 25–26.
- 11 Dajoh and Ismail, *Polisi Pamong Praja*, op. cit., p. 38.
- 12 There is one important point that needs special explanation. Prior to Law 22/1999 the central government considered the Pol.PP to be — primarily — a tool of sub-district governments. While each of the case studies in this article had their own small Pol.PP units prior to 1999, the districts lacked the authority to fully exploit them. Typically, they performed such tasks as guarding regional government assets. Pasal 120 of Law No. 22/1999 however gave districts and provinces the authority to field their own Pol.PP detachments, thus encouraging the districts to more fully utilize the Pol.PP as regional law enforcers.
- 13 Stein Kristiansen and Lambang Trijono, "Authority and Law Enforcement: Local Government Reforms and Security Systems in Indonesia", *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27, no. 2 (August 2005): 236.
- 14 Kantor Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja Kabupaten Bantul: Daftar Perda Yang Menjadi Dasar Hukum Dalam Penegakan Peraturan Daerah (2007). The ordinances added since 1999 include regulations governing everything from the environment to business registration.
- 15 Bhakti refers to an alleged attack by Kopassus forces on the Freeport mine in 2002. After that attack private NGOs such as Elsham Papua provided forensic and other evidence of Kopassus involvement. It turns out this evidence was leaked to them by the police. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, "TNI, Polri dan Penanganan Masalah Separatisme di Papua 1998–2004", in *Relasi TNI dan Polri dalam Penanganan Keamanan Dalam Negeri (2000–2004)*, edited by Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI, 2004), p. 52.
- 16 Najib Muhammad Azca, "Security Sector Reform, Democratic Transition, and Social Violence: The Case of Ambon, Indonesia", Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004. <www.berghof-handbook.net> p. 8.
- 17 Sri Yanuarti, "Relasi TNI-Polri dalam Penanganan Konflik Komunal di Maluku Tengah dan Ambon 1999–2004", in *Relasi TNI dan Polri dalam Penanganan Keamanan Dalam Negeri (2000–2004)*, edited by Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI, 2004), pp. 67, 75.
- 18 Ibid., 76–83.
- 19 It is pointed out that after the creation of a combined security operation under the codename "Sintuwo Maroso" in 2002, much better coordination did take place. M. Hamdan Basyar, "Relasi TNI-Polri dalam Penanganan Konflik Komunal di Poso", in *Relasi TNI dan Polri dalam Penanganan Keamanan Dalam Negeri (2000–2004)*, edited by Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI, 2004), pp. 126–27, 132–37.

- 20 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Karakter TNI-Polri Pada Masa Transisi", in *Relasi TNI dan Polri dalam Penanganan Keamanan Dalam Negri (2000–2004)*, edited by Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI, 2004), pp. 20–21.
- 21 See also Propatria, website, "Socialization of National Security Draft Bill — 'National Security Systemic Framework'", 27 March 2007 <<http://www.propatria.or.id/index.php>>; and *Penataan Kerangka Regulasi Keamanan Nasional*, edited by T. Hari Prihatono (Jakarta: Propatria, 2006), Pendahuluan.
- 22 These include the Decrees of the Indonesian MPR (VI and VII of the August 2000 session), Law No. 2/2002 on the National Police, Law No. 3/2002 on National Defence, and Law No. 34/2004 on the TNI.
- 23 E.g. Propatria, Monograph 7: *Kajian Kritis Paket Perundangan di Bidang Pertahanan dan Keamanan* (12 September 2006): 3–7. Also International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy* (20 December 2004), pp. 9–13.
- 24 For hierarchy of command see Article VII, Bab.1, Pasal 3(2) and Bab.2, Pasal 7(2). For job descriptions see Article VII Bab.1, Pasal 2(2), and Bab.2, Pasal 6(1).
- 25 Article VIII, Bab.1, Pasal 4(2) for the TNI and Bab.2, Pasal 9(3) for the Police.
- 26 On this point the TNI/Polri fraction even moved to register their concern over the absence of protocols for joint cooperation during the drafting process of the Police Law. *Proses Pembahasan Rancangan Undang-Undang Tentang Kepolisian* (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 2002), Third Hearing and Seventh Hearing, Submission of TNI/Polri Fraction, p. 619.
- 27 ICG, *Rethinking Internal Security*, op. cit., p. 11.
- 28 Republik Indonesia: UU 42/2004 Tentang TNI, Bab.3, Pasal 7(2) b.
- 29 Kristiansen and Trijono, "Authority and Law Enforcement", 2005, pp. 247–48.
- 30 Marcus Mietzner, "The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia", op. cit., pp. 59–63.
- 31 "Keamanan Tak Cuma Urusan Polri, Posisi Polri Membingungkan", *Kompas*, 8 January 2007.
- 32 Website, Pemerintah Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Statistik Webpage <www.pemda-diy.go.id>. Badan Pusat Statistik: *D.I. Yogyakarta dalam Angka 2006/2007* (Katalog BPS: 1403.34), pp. 3–5.
- 33 Republik Indonesia: UU 22/1999 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah Bab.4, Pasal 7(1). Renewed under: UU 32/2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah Bab.3, Pasal 10(3).
- 34 Pasal 10 and 18 respectively and UU No. 34/2004, Pasal 19.
- 35 In Indonesia this carries a maximum punishment of six months imprisonment or Rp. 50 million fine (approximately US\$5,500). Republik Indonesia: UU 32/2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah, Pasal 143(2).
- 36 See Republik Indonesia: Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana 8/1981 Pasal 107 and Keputusan Menteri Kehakiman Republik Indonesia Nomor M-04-PW-07-03/1984 tentang Wewenang PPNS, Pasal 1.
- 37 Former Chief of Staff for Army Territorial Affairs, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Agus Widjojo (2000–01) also indicates that during and after his time the TNI held to the same interpretation. According to Indonesian internal security laws, the country has

a four stage security posture (which the President may declare either in one locality or nationally): normal conditions, civil emergency, military emergency and all out war. Under normal conditions the police form the first line of response to any instability with the military lending assistance as needed; under a civil emergency the regional head of government takes charge supported by the security forces; under a military emergency the military takes control of all of the government apparatus in the area/s of the emergency; while in a war situation the President assumes command of the war effort, exercising his or her orders through the head of the military (*Panglima*). States of emergency have been very rare in Indonesia. One example comes from Aceh in 2003, when the President declared a state of military emergency over that province. See Republic Indonesia: UU 23/1959 tentang Keadaan Bahaya and Lembaran Undang-undang Nomor 52/1960, Interview, Agus Widjojo, former Kepala Staf Teritorial, TNI-AD (2000–01), 29 April 2008. Republik Indonesia, Department of Defence, “Mempertahankan TanahAir Memasuki Abad 21”, March 2003, pp. 55, 57.

- 38 “TNI dan Polri akan ‘Dimerger’”, *Pikiran Rakyat*, 16 February 2005.
- 39 Author interview, Indonesian Minister for Defence, Juwono Sudarsono, 27 May 2008.
- 40 Author interview, Head of Operations Section, Poltabes Yogyakarta, 24 October 2007. Interview, Head of Operations Section, Polres Sleman, 1 November 2007.
- 41 Author interview, Agus Widjojo, 29 April 2008.
- 42 Presidential Executive Order Republik Indonesia: Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia 10/1986 tentang Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah.
- 43 Presidential Executive Order Republik Indonesia: Keputusan Presiden 10/1986, Pasal 4 and ‘Menimbang: a & b’.
- 44 Most of these notes date from 2003 until the present. The data sets are at times incomplete and sometimes lapse into brief discussions of the agenda items. But they do form the best available evidence for determining how joint security committees operate at the sub-national level.
- 45 E.g see local government document Kabupaten Sleman, Resume Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah, 4 July 2006.
- 46 In the minutes of the Muspida Secretariat of Yogyakarta city for example in 2004 the Secretariat discussed combating vice ten times and regulating street hawkers (or *pedagang kaki lima*) seven times. Bearing in mind that the Secretariat meets only once a month, this repetition serves to illustrate the bias of the meetings towards regional government issues.
- 47 In 2005 the various sides to the dispute appealed to the Sultan of Yogyakarta for mediation. The Sultan was eventually able to quell the complaints of the affected citizens. “Warga Bantul Menyetujui Pembangunan Jaringan SUTET”, *Pikiran Rakyat*, 29 August 2005.
- 48 Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida, 17 November 2003.
- 49 Author interview, R. Kandiawan, Kepala Kantor Satpol.PP Kabupaten of Bantul, 10 April 2008.
- 50 Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida, 17 November 2003.

- 51 Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida, 30 December 2003
- 52 Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida, 25 January 2005.
- 53 Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida, 28 January 2005.
- 54 Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida, 26 February 2005.
- 55 Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida, 28 July 2005.
- 56 Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida, 23 August, 2005.
- 57 Republik Indonesia: Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 11 Tahun 2006 tentang Komunitas Intelijen Daerah, 'Menimbang' and Pasal 2-4, 7.
- 58 Interview, Kepala Satuan Intelijen-Keamanan Poltabes Yogyakarta and Kepala Satuan Intelijen-Keamanan Polres Sleman, 1–2 October 2007. Interview, R. Kandiawan, 29 October 2007.
- 59 One illustration of this is the fact that Yogyakarta city's Kominda meetings are entirely dependent on the committee members. Although the Deputy Mayor is the nominal Chair, in reality the Deputy Mayor is not especially interested in security matters and does not usually attend meetings. The driving force for intelligence sharing therefore comes from the intelligence professionals themselves. Interview with a confidential source, 29 October 2007.
- 60 Based on the Pol.PP intelligence detachment's initial findings, almost all of the traders in the area were found not to have the appropriate licenses. The Kominda decided this was the easiest way to target them. However, two months before the anti-vice raid was due to be held, the Pol.PP mysteriously discovered *all* of the traders suddenly possessed every license they were supposed to have. Presumably news of the raid leaked. Interview with informant, 29 October 2007.
- 61 Kepolisian Kota Besar Yogyakarta and Pemerintah Kotamadya Yogyakarta: Perjanjian Kerjasama Antara Pemerintah Kota dan Kepolisian Kota Besar tentang Pengamanan Pemilihan Kepala Daerah, 22 April 2006.
- 62 The costs were estimated at Rp. 1.04 billion or US\$114,000. In all the entire security costs were finalised at Rp. 866 million of which the police spent Rp. 789 million or US\$86,000. Perjanjian Kerjasama Antara Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta dan Kepolisian Kota Besar Yogyakarta tentang Pengamanan Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Langsung, 22 April 2006. Kepolisian Poltabes Kota Yogyakarta, Berita Acara Rekonsiliasi, 20 December 2007. Kota Yogyakarta, Dinas Ketertiban: Menyelenggarakan Pengamanan Pilkada 2006, December 2006.
- 63 Author interview, Head of Satpol.PP, Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta, Nurwidi, 14 April 2008.
- 64 Regional government report, Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta: "Pengamanan Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Kota Yogyakarta Tahun 2006", Part IV.
- 65 Kepolisian Kota Besar Yogyakarta: Rekap Penggunaan Dana Lat Pra Ops dan Pam KPUD (sic) Pilkada 2006 Kota Yogyakarta (2006).
- 66 Jun Honna, "Local Civil-Military Relations during the First Phase of Democratic Transition, 1999–2004: A Comparison of West, Central and East Java", *Indonesia*, October 2006.
- 67 Republik Indonesia: Menteri Dalam Negeri: Surat Edaran Nomor 903/2429/SJ tanggal 21 September 2005, Pedoman Penyusunan APBD TA 2006 dan

- Pertanggungjawaban Pelaksanaan APBD T A 2005. For explanation of the Minister's policy, see website, Menteri Dalam Negri, "Penjelasan Dirjen BAKD Mengenai Belanja Bantuan Kepada Instansi Vertikal yang Bersumber dari APBD", 23 February 2006 <www.depdagri.go.id/konten.php?nama=Pers&op=detail&id=15>.
- 68 Republik Indonesia, Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan: Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Bantul Tahun Anggaran 2005 (25 July 2006): 132–33, 141–42.
- 69 The BPK does not elaborate which "national institutions" received money from the Sleman APBD but judging by trends in the other districts it is likely the police and the military absorbed some of these funds. Republik Indonesia, Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kota Yogyakarta, 12 June 2006, pp. 104–05. Republik Indonesia, Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Sleman, 26 July 2006, p. 118.
- 70 Republik Indonesia, Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Gunung Kidul Tahun Anggaran 2004, 28 March 2005, Lampiran II.A & II.B, also pp. 145–46. Republik Indonesia, Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Kulon Progo, 11 May 2006, p. 68.
- 71 Kabupaten Sleman, Dinas Polisi Pamong Praja dan Ketertiban Masyarakat, Rencana Kinerja Tahunan (2007).