Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone 1997 - 2007

Working Paper Series

Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007

United Kingdom (UK) Military Intervention and Progress in Sierra Leone 2001-2006

Brigadier Barry J Le Grys[1]

Edited by
Dr Paul Jackson, University of Birmingham
Mr Peter Albrecht, International Alert

The working paper series on Sierra Leone is part of the research programme 'Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007'. These working papers present perspectives from both Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom regarding the implementation of activities broadly defined as security sector reform (SSR) in the period towards the end of and following the Sierra Leone war.

Following a core narrative constructed around four key events in the history of post-war Sierra Leone, starting in the mid-1990s and finishing with the successful General Elections of 2007, the work draws on a range of experiences from the process that may be used to inform future SSR policy and implementation. The final output of this research is a book documenting the security system transformation activities in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007.

This series is both an intermediate stage and an important output in itself. All papers were written by Sierra Leonean and British participants in security system transformation activities. The philosophy of the series is to edit as little as possible so that the views and opinions of the individuals are expressed, as much as possible, in their own words. As such, while the papers vary considerably in style and length, they provide a unique, collective insight into the Sierra Leone security system transformation process.

Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to examine progress in Sierra Leone between 2001 and 2006, within a regional context, as a result of UK military intervention and assistance. It focuses on what is commonly termed post-conflict reconstruction and development. In particular, it will explore the transformation of the security sector[2] and the relationship between security and development.

The paper draws on research, but also on first-hand experience of the author, who served in Sierra Leone under United Nations (UN) command during 2001 and then as Military Advisor to the Government of Sierra Leone/Commander International Military Advisory Training Team (GoSL and IMATT, respectively) in 2006.

Security Arrives (Eventually)

Civil war broke out in Sierra Leone in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) entered the country from Liberia in the east. The bitter struggle continued until an apparent truce in 1999 (the Lomé Agreement). UN Security Council Resolution 1270 established a UN force (United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone [UNAMSIL]) to oversee the Agreement. The UN force was to relieve a force from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that had been mandated by the UN in 1997 to restore Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to power (who was elected President in 1996, but removed by a coup the following year). The troubles experienced by the ECOWAS force were passed onto the UN, whose blue helmet troops came under attack as soon as ECOWAS troops departed in April 2000. The RUF once again threatened to overrun the capital of Freetown; the UN Mission was in severe jeopardy. A UK military force, originally ordered to conduct an evacuation of British nationals, intervened decisively and turned the RUF back in 2000. UN and UK forces then cooperated to establish security. Whilst the UN focused upon peacebuilding, UK forces concentrated on rebuilding state security structures. The war was officially declared over in 2002 and Kabbah won the presidential elections the same year.

While the RUF ceased hostilities in 2001, there were sporadic local outbreaks of violence. UNAMSIL was regaining confidence, rebalancing and building strength after earlier, almost catastrophic, setbacks. But since a great deal of the country was not under GoSL civil authority UNAMSIL's access and freedom of movement was restricted. Makeni was largely under RUF control, Kabala was surrounded by RUF and Koidu was in RUF hands. The UN accepted a UK offer of seven military officers to serve with the UN Force Headquarters in Freetown. Their primary task was to give UNAMSIL a heretofore inadequate planning capability. Their secondary task was to ensure that co-ordination with the UK Joint Task Force was seamless. The result of this infusion was a far better collaborative effort to roll out security across the country. Ties between UNAMSIL's provision of wider area security and support, the UK-led Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) were greatly strengthened.

The most significant move forward for UNAMSIL was the implementation of a plan to put a coherent, one-nation, combined arms brigade into the east of the country, centred on Koidu. After a tremendous diplomatic effort involving Freetown, New York, Washington, London and Islamabad, Pakistan provided the required brigade. The psychological effect on the RUF of a UK-sponsored SLA advancing from the west and a robust UN brigade in the heart of their revenue source was hugely positive. Violent confrontation was no longer an option for the RUF. At this early stage of emerging stability, the concept of SLP primacy for internal security was instigated. UNAMSIL conducted joint patrols with the SLP, whilst the SLA was encouraged to defend the border and guard against external threats. Civil authority, at the time more a case of show rather than substance, was established as Sierra Leone's districts were disarmed. Illegal arms caches were sought out by SLP cordon and search operations, supported by SLA and UNAMSIL troops.

National Security in Sierra Leone (So Far, So Good)

There are signs that security sector reform (SSR) in Sierra Leone has been relatively successful. UNAMSIL, which numbered some 17,000 troops at its height, withdrew in 2005; the primary responsibility for internal security now lies with the SLP. A security sector review[3] has been undertaken and is linked to the country's 2005 Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP). This review's recommendations are now being implemented, albeit slowly, due to a severe lack of funding.

The reality and perception of security in Sierra Leone is seen as indispensable for the growth of domestic economic activity as well as for increased foreign investment. This is a key theme of Pillar One of the PRSP, which states 'good governance, consolidated peace and a strengthened security sector are key elements of the enabling environment for delivery of services for attainment of food security, creation of employment opportunities, human development and economic growth'[4]. To date, the UK has invested heavily in Pillar One of the PRSP, including substantial funding of the security sector. As part of the SSR process, the National Security and Central Intelligence Act was passed in 2002, leading to the establishment of the Office of National Security (ONS) and the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU). The ONS, a post-conflict innovation, is responsible for ensuring joint, sector-wide assessments on a regular basis and coordinating the activities of the security agencies. It serves as the secretariat to the National Security Council (NSC), which is chaired by the President.

The ONS also sponsors Provincial and subordinate District Security Committees (PROSECs and DISECs) that enable local community involvement in threat assessment and risk management. These are formal regional forums established to bring together primary security players, local government, civil society representatives and traditional leaders to encourage local community participation to deal with security as it affects them. PROSECs and DISECs forward their concerns and views to the ONS. It must be stressed that these Committees are not intelligence-gathering agencies, nor is the ONS a Security Ministry; UK support to the end of 2006 was predicated on the principle that the ONS should not perform ministry functions. It is essentially a secretariat that alerts and informs the Government and produces options, better honed by bringing the security sector constituents and other government departments together and merging their collective professional advice[5] for the NSC to decide upon. It then helps security sector constituents implement whatever the NSC directs.

During the post-colonial era, before war broke out in 1991, the army, the police and what remained of legal intelligence services were profoundly emasculated and reduced to heavily politicized institutions, often set against each other. The SLA and the SLP collapsed almost completely during the war; chains of command and lines of communication were broken; orders, pay and supplies rarely reached fighting troops or stations.

The inflated but broken SLA numbered around 16,000 at the height of the conflict. The new Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) is now 10,300 strong, having taken in 2,600 former rebels and militiamen under the Military Re-integration Programme and downsized in three phases of military retirement (the Sierra Leone Chief of Defence Staff called it 'rightsizing'[6]). The SLP is now approaching the national manpower target of 9,500, having been reduced severely by the ravages of war. The rationale for a RSLAF of 10,300 and a SLP force of 9,500 is not articulated formally; both force strengths need reviewing in depth.

Donor assistance to reform the armed forces is spearheaded by IMATT. The UK-led IMATT was established formally in 2002, following the UK's military intervention. IMATT's mission is to support the GoSL in the development of effective, democratically accountable and affordable armed forces capable of meeting specified defence missions and tasks[7]. IMATT sums up its support as an 'Effect'[8], which is the widespread, constant transfer of common themes, messages and practices to ensure an enduring transformation. At the end of 2006 IMATT employed just over 100 servicemen and included contributions from the UK, Canada, United States, Nigeria, and Jamaica. It is funded totally by the UK Africa Conflict Prevention Pool; its stakeholders are the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the (UK) Department for International Development (DfID). The success of IMATT is dependent, however, upon two conditions: Firstly, IMATT credibility must be protected by providing objective and realistic advice, strictly managing expectations and acting as an exemplar; secondly, that the RSLAF's ability and willingness to continue transformation maintains momentum[9].

The IMATT 'Effect' is delivered by personnel deployed with the RSLAF, including brigades and battalions, the Armed Forces Training Centre, the Officers' Academy, the operational level Joint Force Command Headquarters and the civilian-led MoD. Initially, IMATT held command and executive posts, but now only fills a handful of staff posts where specialist knowledge is required. IMATT

personnel and two DfID- funded civilian posts in the MoD now act predominantly as advisors. IMATT's main effort is to help the RSLAF to 'think', rather than to give them 'things', and engender an attitude that brings moral courage and integrity to the fore of decision making at all levels. This emphasis is important in fostering strong local ownership and guarding against a dependency culture. But it is not always popular.

The SLP has received much technical and financial support from the UN, the Commonwealth and DfID. In contrast to the armed forces, this has been a 'top down' approach, but with positive impacts, especially on improved higher management capacity. Unfortunately, insufficient attention has been given to policing reform at the lower tiers. This situation is expected to change as the DfID- sponsored Justice Sector Development Programme makes an impression out to 2010. Also, UN Police Regional Advisory Support Teams deployed in 2006 are making their presence felt at the station level. In early 2007, the UN Police in the provinces were reinforced by UK Police working under UN direction. This UN support numbers less than 50 personnel (UN Police strength in Sierra Leone has never exceeded 130).The SLP are unarmed (with the exception of the Operational Support Division [OSD]) and rely on building relations with local communities for intelligence gathering. The fact that the SLP is an unarmed police service is unusual for Africa and reflects the GoSL's desire to gain the public's confidence[10].

Security and Development (Going Around In Circles)

The provision of basic security as a precondition for political, social and economic development (and well-being) is becoming increasingly recognized by practitioners and commentators[11]. The GoSL's PRSP underscored this emphasis by placing 'Promoting Good Governance, Peace and Security' as Pillar One of its principles. Ideally, there should be a 'virtuous circle' of security: Promotion of development, and then development sustaining security. For the security sector specifically, this means someone has to pay for the upkeep of the institutions within. Sierra Leone is not yet in

a position to do so and therefore the 'virtuous circle' is currently a 'vicious circle'. In 2006, DfID commissioned a report (Security Sector Expenditure Review [SS-ER]) to take stock and assess just how sustainable the state's security sector really is[12]. Put simply, the GoSL is unable to sustain or, indeed, develop, the security sector without external assistance. If assistance were withdrawn, security may no longer be a given and vicious in-fighting could reappear. The GoSL has to build the 'virtue' of sustaining its own security and prevent sectoral in-fighting.

The SS-ER is sobering in its findings. Security is the highest single spending sector in Sierra Leone, representing 18.1 per cent (180 million US$) of the on-budget[13] total from 2003 to 2006 inclusive (the 2006 spend being forecast). Out of this security sector spend, 61% went to the MoD/RSLAF and 24% to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA)/SLP. The vast majority of the spending was recurrent (operating costs); less than 1 per cent went towards sector development (capital expenditure). The ONS Security Sector Review Implementation Plan of 2005[14] estimated non-recurrent spending requirements of 69 million US$ in 2006, to pursue modernisation, including adequate accommodation for 42% of the RSLAF who currently live in self-made shelters. This has not been forthcoming from the GoSL; the balance of development or capital investment has been provided off-budget through donor-executed assistance programmes.

In 2006, the security sector employed 33% of the total number of public sector employees. Within the sector, 16.5% are MoD/RSLAF; 14.2% are MoIA/SLP.

Public sector pay increases have not kept up with double-figure inflation; public servants on the lowest levels are earning less than 1 US$ per day. In sum, the GoSL is not able to deliver the services required in an affordable and sustained manner. As Commander of IMATT and Military Advisor to the GoSL, this author said to the UK Secretary of State for International Development visiting Sierra Leone in July 2006, "We are going to be right back where we started unless this is addressed with action, soon after the 2007 elections".

Collaboration (More Talking Than Walking)

Whilst leading donors acknowledge the PRSP and are locked into various working groups with the GoSL, accounting for any donor programmes pursued by the host Ministry of Finance (MoF) is at best superficial. Off-budget support to the security sector does not enable the full accounting of the true cost of security provision. Thus, off-budget support undermines fiscal sustainability, as well as allocation and operational efficiency within the security sector and across government as a whole. The cost of in-kind support is not declared in many cases and difficult to measure in others; some providers are reluctant to follow through or acknowledge the context. Egypt, for example, provided training for RSLAF air and ground crews in 2006, having made the one RSLAF helicopter fly briefly in 2005, without recognising that sustaining a serviceable transport helicopter is well beyond the RSLAF budget.

Collaboration between leading assistance agencies is also mixed. Whilst DfID does not extend its development assistance to military capability, support for the creation of effective and accountable security and justice institutions is legitimate[15]. This has enabled DfID to fund directly the employment of civil advisors to the MoD, ONS and SLP, housing for the SLP and the RSLAF, severance payments to retired soldiers and policemen and contributions towards GoSL compensation payments to wounded soldiers and policemen and relatives of those killed in action. In addition, the UK Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) can support military expenditure other than for weaponry and ammunition. The ACPP joint funding arrangement[16] is important, as it provides the foundation for a comprehensive, more holistic, approach to UK security sector support. It certainly promotes close UK FCO, MoD and DfID working relationships in country.

In practical terms, the relationship with the World Bank is not as constructive. Whilst policy may be aligned between the World Bank and DfID, interpretation of policy by World Bank agents in the Sierra Leone MoF often runs counter to SSR plans. The Sierra Leone Deputy Minister of Defence expressed frustration when attempts to trade manpower for modernisation and infrastructure and greater financial accountability were countered by MoF officials. These officials cited World Bank rulings on what did or did not constitute a poverty reduction measure,

which invariably blocked defence spending on anything other than the staples of wages, rice and fuel.

A Regional Approach (So Far, Rather Slow)

ECOWAS was active throughout the 1990s in Sierra Leone, but intervened for the last time in 1998 before being relieved by the UN and stepped into Liberia in 2003 whilst the UN assembled its force. Until 2004, when the African Union (AU) deployed troops, ECOWAS was the only regional organisation in Africa to use military forces in an attempt to manage a crisis. Not surprisingly, ECOWAS has been very receptive to the AU's Standby Force concept, under which the five Regional Economic Communities in Africa will each introduce a military element to their structure and establish a regional stand-by military force for conflict prevention and management. An ECOWAS Standby Force Headquarters is being established in Nigeria under a Nigerian brigadier. Sierra Leone has a staff officer on that team.

The proposed ECOWAS force structure has Sierra Leone donating – or generating – at least an infantry company, possibly a battalion. The debate in 2006 was whether to select the company or battalion as a whole (based on the best operational evaluation reports) or to select the best individuals to make up the company/battalion. Either way, there was one major incentive to be noted: the possibility of being employed on UN subsistence rates would be highly attractive. A small number of officers have already been employed as UN Military Observers (the SLP have also deployed individuals to be part of the UN Civilian Police Force [CIVPOL] in Haiti).

Regional involvement in Sierra Leone has been spearheaded by ECOWAS and significant regional contributions have been made to UN forces in the country. The weakness of this involvement has been the lack of effective funding. The UN provided staple supplies to UNAMSIL troops, but there was little forthcoming to support SSR. ECOWAS plans, made prior to UNAMSIL, to reform the SLA came to nothing, again because there was no funding. A regional presence in UNAMSIL was not a conduit to external assistance from

Nigeria (though the RSLAF are invited to attend the Nigerian Staff and War Colleges). In recognition of the efficiency and appropriateness of regional arrangements, IMATT funded individual training for the RSLAF in Ghana.

The three leading donors to the region – the United States (US), UK and France – actively support the ability of ECOWAS to prevent and manage conflict. The US is prepared to finance training and logistic support; the UK is financing preparations for AU operations (notably for Nigeria) and sponsoring the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana. France supports training exercises; Canada, the European Union, and the Netherlands have also offered to further develop ECOWAS capability to conduct peace support operations (including infrastructure for and staffing of the Standby Force Headquarters in Nigeria). The US presence may become more significant with the creation of a new US military command called Africa Command (AFRICOM). An embryo of AFRICOM is already based in Germany, co-located with European Command (EUCOM). The AFRICOM concept includes basing headquarters on the African continent[17].

Forward basing in West Africa would likely generate a greater US military presence in Liberia, which would imply a longer-term physical presence beyond training the new army. Interestingly, the concept also emphasizes the need for greater collaboration between the US Department of Defense, the United States Agency for International Development, partners and non-governmental organizations. The GoSL would welcome support from AFRICOM, but the ONS is wary that the US focus may be on countering terrorism, which is a low priority in Sierra Leone. (The main priorities for ONS are issues of income generation and fighting crime.)

The poverty of the region brings pressures that obstruct investment in public goods, including the provision of security for the future. A tangible example is the ECOWAS proposal to build a logistic depot at Hastings Airfield in Sierra Leone as part of the Standby Force capability. The US declared the availability of funds to construct and stock the depot, provided they would inherit the existing UN depot intact. However, when the GoSL handed the airfield to ECOWAS in November 2006, it had been stripped by the RSLAF (with GoSL

approval). The project was no longer within the US budget. The proposal is now under review by the US and ECOWAS; Sierra Leone may no longer be the preferred location. This incident, which was a big disappointment to ECOWAS and donors, illustrates how lack of resources forces actors to live hand-to-mouth, to the detriment of longer-term investment. This is a culture that perpetuates the 'vicious circle' of an unsustainable security sector. The emerging Africa Peace and Security Architecture, prompted by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and launched in 2001 is immature and will not be self-sustaining for a long time; thus, donors must continue to assist. The alternative would be to essentially let the establishment of the architecture fail altogether. Should that be the case, conflict will be more likely to emerge unchallenged and there would be no regional response. In West Africa's sub-region, the Mano River Union (MRU), the Presidents of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia met in February 2007 to discuss political and economic tensions in Guinea and agreed that their state security organisations should share information[18]. However, whilst military-specific information exchange is occurring and Sierra Leone is playing a pivotal role, there are significant difficulties. The lack of established security architecture in Liberia frustrates Sierra Leone's ONS; there is no equivalent office in Guinea. Guinea itself looks like a failing state with an increasingly fragmented security sector.

National Security Sector Reform (Within Rather Than Without)

The RSLAF are being reformed from within; there is a new breed of officer class moving towards the top echelon. While the RSLAF and IMATT find the building of a training ethos to be a challenge, they are continuing annual training cycles to prepare troops for border duties and developing plans to provide troops for ECOWAS, AU or UN operations.

While the RSLAF achieved the 2003 Sierra Leone Defence Council target of reducing its numbers to 10,500 by the end of 2005 (almost a year ahead of schedule), further modernisation will require more manpower reductions to offset costs. A key consideration for the GoSL is how many more soldiers can be retired and successfully re-integrated into society. There was similar concern when the Civil Defence Force (CDF) were

processed through the UN-administered Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme and a smaller number accepted for the Military Reintegration Programme (to be absorbed into the RSLAF). At the time, it was thought that CDF forces could find part-time employment in a territorial defence force to address potential threats from Liberia. While such part-time employment would have eased re-integration, once Liberia stabilised, the idea was not pursued.

Thus, all security services in Sierra Leone are full-time and formal, which is important for accountability. The chain of command is clear and there are no private armies. Possession of illegal weapons by former combatants is now monitored and under control. The CDF 'hunter-militia' legacy has withered away to the extent that the death of CDF wartime leader Hinga Norman, whilst on trial in Sierra Leone in 2007, occurred without violent reaction. Moreover, security structures are generally simple and transparent, which makes oversight more achievable and reduces the risk of public institutions becoming tools for private leverage.

In 2004, the security sector review was well underway. With DfID encouragement, the MoF decided to lead the way to accounting for the security sector as a whole by providing the sector with a budget ceiling. Thus, allocations within the security sector would be decided by the NSC, in order to allow sector-wide prioritisation and encourage a focused, comprehensive and integrated budget. However, the inability to decide upon sector-wide priorities caused this approach to fail and individual budget entities went back to bilateral discussions with the MoF[19].

The 2005 ONS Security Sector Review Implementation Plan offered another opportunity to transfer more administrative responsibility to the local security sector, ensuring a greater degree of accountability to donors. Having identified gaps, needs and priorities, the Plan also represents a locally-owned, accountable channel for management and coordination of funds. DfID are using this channel incrementally; in 2006 it put 1.5 million US$ at the disposal of the NSC Co-ordinating Group[20] to be spent according to the 2005 Implementation Plan. For the first time, sector entities, coordinated by the ONS, agreed amongst themselves on how the money should be spent. This is a good indication of how professional managers

within the sector can work together for the greater good, but it has taken five years to achieve. However, it is still premature to resurrect the MoF's ambitions of 2004 and debate all security sector budgets as one at the far more politically-oriented NSC.

Other process initiatives relating specifically to the RSLAF were the IMATT inspired Plan 2010 and Core Review. The Plan's objective was to deliver a smaller, better RSLAF with capable Maritime and Air Wings. The RSLAF were to be self-sustaining, thus permitting the eventual withdrawal of IMATT. While the Plan secured a funding profile from the UK ACPP for IMATT out to 2010, it was not so much owned as consented to by the Sierra Leone MoD and raised too many expectations. What the UK saw as an objective in the Plan, the RSLAF saw as something to be provided by the UK. In addition, financial assumptions of the Plan relating to the GoSL contribution were flawed and the Plan was deemed undeliverable.

The MoD then instigated a Core Review at the end of 2005. Based on the principles of sufficiency, efficiency, sustainability and quality over quantity, the review is ongoing and may well end up as a more comprehensive Defence Review under the new Government. IMATT's insistence on local ownership of this review process may seem to be an impediment in the short-term, but it will bring dividends in the longer term. In this regard, there are lessons to be learned from Plan 2010.[21]

The Leading Partner Model (Not All It Appears)

The UK is the major aid donor in Sierra Leone; Sierra Leoneans look to the UK as a past colonial master whose military intervention at the turn of this century helped save the country from an Armageddon scenario. DfID signed a memorandum of understanding with the GoSL in 2002, committing the UK to a ten-year partnership. IMATT is also expected to provide assistance until at least 2012.

The UK's lead in security sector assistance in Sierra Leone has brought breadth and depth to its reform. The sector lacks some specialist capabilities, particularly in the SLP, and needs modern equipment and better infrastructure. However, responsibilities are well

understood and civil oversight seems to have taken root, particularly in the civilian-led, civilian and military staffed MoD. The ONS project, bringing apolitical coherence to the sector as a whole, is deemed a success. It has steadfastly refused to be anything less than neutral with regard to the major political parties and has been singularly objective in its pursuit of improved security. When the idea of a Ministry of Security began to circulate in 2006, both the ONS and the UK rebuffed it, considering it a dangerous politicisation of the sector.

Being the lead donor partner does not necessarily mean one's objectives go unchallenged, particularly over time, as the country's ruling elite no longer see their survival threatened by open conflict. The UK realises that DfID have limited leverage on the Government to ensure the quick changes needed to facilitate effective governance and promote development. Furthermore, DfID have moved away from the standard model of policy conditionality to provide direct budget support in a single year and aims to judge the impact annually[22]. Put differently, GoSL actions, not words, will trigger direct budget support. The fundamental governance dilemma in Sierra Leone is that good planning is profoundly difficult for its MoF: the Ministry cannot predict what direct budget support it may receive. It also cannot judge whether DfID will consider actual results satisfactory enough for the release of tranches of funding. The same can be said for other ministries in receipt of assistance programmes.

However, being a major partner does provide a wider comprehension of the strengths and weaknesses of the host state and its machinery. This ought to enable more productive targeting of aid. There is also the opportunity to ensure that the greater amount of donor spending is made visible to the host government, is taken into account within that government's overall fiscal strategy and that the fiscal sustainability 'lens' is applied to decision making.

National Capacity and Motivation (Still Immature)

UNAMSIL left Sierra Leone in December 2005, leaving only an Integrated Office behind, including a small team of military observers. Since then, the Sierra Leone national apparatus has been solely responsible for security of the country. The SLP have looked inwards to counter internal

security threats and the RSLAF have been looking outwards to guard against external threats. This role clarity is enshrined in a recently revised 2006 NSC Directive 'Military Aid to the Civil Power' that tasks the SLP with primary jurisdiction on internal security issues[23]. The OSD element of the SLP, besides being trained to use small arms, are also prepared and equipped to control crowds, filling a role that would otherwise be performed by the military. This division of labour should resonate with the public: non-military civil security units are far more reassuring than armed soldiers with bayonets. Whilst this subordination of military forces to the police in internal security situations is not the norm for an army in West Africa, the SLP and RSLAF have overcome their traditional rivalry; their relationship is much improved. While in the past, this rivalry was demonstrated by pulling political strings and making threats, both security entities have begun to develop a common purpose – to perform their separate functions in order to establish a secure state.

Aside from the risks posed by Guinea, the first real 'stand-alone' test for Sierra Leone's security sector since peace was declared in 2002 came in August 2007 with the second Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. Preparations were taken most seriously by the security sector, although logistic support was a constant challenge. The ONS, SLP, and when called upon briefly, the RSLAF, remained apolitical and helped prevent serious disruption of the election process. A poignant metric of SSR success is that the ONS supported the National Election Commission's (NEC) lead on elections planning and execution and accepted the secondary role of its sector. The NEC role setting *policy* and the ONS role performing *delivery* worked.

The Sierra Leone MoD was reorganised extensively in 2002; a civilian Director General now sits alongside the Chief of Defence Staff to advise the civilian Deputy Minister. Five years on, the Ministry is beginning to feel competent and confident. Moreover, the roles clarification provided by the 'Military Aid to the Civil Power' Directive, in concert with the 2003 Defence White Paper, articulate the concept of SLP primacy in internal security. It has taken nearly five years of practice for this to be understood throughout the sector management and down to the SLP and RSLAF ranks. The IMATT acted as a guardian of this process, whilst the SLP primacy took root.

Ownership and involvement in change should not just be limited to the institutions most immediately affected. There is a requirement for involvement of various Government departments as well as civil society to ensure that any changes are based on an accurate assessment of need, rather than just supply. The real success of the Security Sector Review[24] in Sierra Leone was the level of consultation with the population. Since security is as much about perception as reality, if the people feel more secure through regular engagement with their government and if security sector institutions are demystified, people's perceptions of insecurity, and insecurity itself, are reduced. The more people feel they and their property are safe, the more likely they are to invest in the future in a bid for greater prosperity. Greater prosperity reduces the risk of conflict. It appears that Sierra Leone has learned this lesson: engage the people and ultimately, perceptions of insecurity will decrease.

Whilst the security sector architecture is maturing, putting that architecture to good use across the Government is not. This is best demonstrated by the previous Government's apparent reluctance to produce a National Security Policy.

Understanding the process of how sector budgets are determined is more important than absolute levels of expenditure[25]. In Sierra Leone, despite progress to date, there has been little enthusiasm at the Cabinet level for a National Security Policy that reviews the true needs and fiscal implications of ongoing security reform and then allocates resources within the framework of a national budgetary process. Ministers have been preoccupied with operational matters and consider change a low priority in the medium- to longer-term. Whilst the RSLAF may wish to modernise, they have little incentive when budgets are allocated arbitrarily and manpower, the largest financial commitment, is administered directly from the MoF. Discussions regarding the balance between manpower and living standards and equipment have unfortunately been absent at the Cabinet level, despite concentrated ONS lobbying efforts.

This issue might change in the medium to longer term as under the new APC Government, a Minister of Defence has been appointed. Under the previous Government, however, the continuing appointment of the President as Minister of Defence was not conducive to a challenging,

constructive Cabinet debate about the security sector. Ministers assumed that Kabbah was content with the status quo, when actually it appeared that he was too remote to question it (after elections in August 2007, a National Security Policy has been finalized and approved by the National Security Council).

In essence, the Government lacks the wider capacity to make better use of security sector progress to date. It sees the context as 'post-conflict', whilst the security sector now sees the context as 'fragile development'. A good example of the disconnect between the GoSL and its own institutions is the RSLAF proposal to establish a Joint Maritime Authority (JMA) to exploit its Maritime Wing's capability to patrol national waters. While the objective of this proposal is to work with other ministries to prevent illegal fishing and to impose fines upon offenders, the Cabinet has consistently deferred making a decision on the JMA since 2004. Meanwhile, two ministers at the Department of Marine Resources have been reshuffled amid accusations of corruption. Such indecision and staff turmoil indicate that Sierra Leone, after five years of peace, does not have the indigenous capacity or motivation to continue security sector transformation without the funding and direction provided by external assistance.

Lessons (Following a Straighter Path)

There are five practical lessons that can be drawn from the above narrative of progress in Sierra Leone:

- Collaboration is vital. Hawley advocates that an intervention requires several mutually supporting coalitions: political, relief, military, rule of law, institution building, economic reconstruction and donor support.[26] Each coalition needs a leading nation or organisation. His case study is post-1999 Kosovo, but his model can be applied to Sierra Leone. While good headway has been made with the UK leading a smaller coalition embarked on military reform, more collaboration must be forthcoming on the security architecture as a whole. In particular, more collaboration is needed to support improved decision-making at the highest level and civil oversight, notably through developing constructive scrutiny by executive and legislative arms of government.

- A regional perspective must be taken. Recently retired UK Prime Minister Tony Blair summarised Sierra Leone's position well:

  'Earlier this week I visited the people of Sierra Leone, still struggling, but at least able to contemplate a better future. But as important is the next-door state of Liberia, now properly democratic. It might never have been so, had Sierra Leone fallen into the hands of the gangsters[27]'.

- SSR takes time, is expensive and must be viewed more broadly than just the reform of armed forces. A security sector is only truly reformed when it is self-motivating and contributing to its own transformation. There is no quick fix for organizational and institutional change. Until the 'virtuous circle' of security promoting development and development sustaining security is reached, an external donor has to fill the funding gap.

  If only the armed forces and police receive the attention, as is often the case in SSR, it will prove more difficult to encourage civil oversight by defence or interior ministries at a later date. Producing better soldiers and policemen is fine, but unless they are placed under uncomplicated and robust national security architecture that is accountable, affordable and sustainable, trouble will ensue. It should be remembered that security sector institutions are government departments like any other; thus, where possible, reforms should be consistent and prioritized against efforts made in other ministries. Reform must include the finance ministry and the governance reform secretariat. The security sector does not stand in isolation; nor can external donors take responsibility for financing it indefinitely.

  SSR is a necessary focus for assistance and must come before economic development can gather momentum. Once state and personal security is addressed, people need economic security. Society as a whole, not only the elite, must be part of the developing economy[28]; the public sector need their share of economic growth to pay for essential services, including security.

Whilst the immediate priority may be SSR, economic reform must be undertaken concurrently and from the outset. Otherwise, there will be a time lag; the 'catch up' time will be perilously fragile and will carry with it an increased risk of serious instability. A phased approach which looks at conflict management, reconstruction and development has limitations because the linkages are much stronger than the sequential phases imply. The reluctance of DfID until 2005 to appoint a Head of Country Office in Sierra Leone with appropriate authority significantly restrained assistance to economic development and is indicative of the limitations of the linear concept.

- A lead or framework partner model does have advantages, especially at the sector level. Moreover, if this lead can span several sectors, the approach will be more robust and sustainable. Reform of the RSLAF to date has prospered from this approach, in which the UK has led IMATT to provide a framework for other nations to 'lock' into. Similarly, DfID has led the wider reform of other elements across the sector, with emphasis upon the ONS and the SLP. The resulting continuity and coherence has been reassuring to the GoSL and provided the foundation for the developing security architecture. This model now needs to encompass the MoF and the MoIA. But above all, this framework partner approach is dependent on considerable political will at the highest levels of the lead donor nation.

- Local involvement is critical, both in the design and implementation of reform. External pressure to change may facilitate progress in the short-term, but this progress will not be sustainable unless those affected can see the benefits of change. Local ownership requires significant capacity building and consumes more time than an externally-driven quick impact process. But it does ensure that the foundations of change are stronger and able to survive a leadership turnover over time.

  In Sierra Leone, great executive and legislative strides were taken in 2002-2003 that impacted heavily upon the security sector. Since then, despite lingering questions about the sustainability of Sierra Leone's reforms, the enthusiasm has been overtaken by a degree of complacency because the status quo is acceptable to the Government,

Interestingly, Kotter has identified the first step in any transformation effort as the need to convince management that allowing a status quo to continue will be more dangerous than bringing about change[29]. Security sector players in Sierra Leone have long felt a sense of urgency, which the Cabinet, until recently, has not. This touches upon the general issue that strong ownership at the sector level may conflict with weak ownership at the cabinet level. A survey[30] of perceptions carried out by the UK MoD in November 2006 found that concerns for the people of Sierra Leone were dominated by a lack of economic development. The sample also cited Government as one of the factors inhibiting development progress.

This widespread discontent with the Government, in conjunction with an increasingly improved civil/military relationship and perceptions of a more capable and powerful RSLAF, has the potential to create an unstable societal environment, possibly one in which the civilian population could encourage a coup. Given that the RSLAF display an increasing tendency to position their civil/military relationship as a role rather than a code of conduct, a civilian population that starts to see the military as a viable alternative to the Government may coincide with a RSLAF receptive to the idea. Such a hypothesis points out the dangers of inconsistent levels of local ownership across government sectors.

Comparison and Conclusion (It All Takes Time)

In 2001, the SLA was effectively led by UK officers. While there were some courageous and capable SLA officers at battalion level and below, they were in the minority. UK officers were formally embedded in command positions, including that of the Joint Force Commander. While the SLA were progressively being retrained by the UK, they were minimally equipped as marching infantry. Without UK spine, the SLA would have continued to fall into chaos and disrepute. Indeed, UNAMSIL's view at that time was that without international military assistance, complete disbanding of the SLA would have been the only option.
By 2006, the RSLAF had consolidated its formal role within the national security architecture. Whilst trust is a rare commodity in Sierra Leone, particularly between the

constituents of the security sector, the RSLAF showed due respect to its partners. It is now under civil control; its chain of command is in Sierra Leonean hands. While some corruption and patronage still exists, the RSLAF has improved its honesty, transparency and professional conduct more than most GoSL institutions. Most of the officers at battalion command level are competent and motivated, a training ethos is emerging and participation in AU and UN operations is close at hand.

However, battalion commanders are not confident enough of their standing to wish IMATT farewell yet. They still feel that without IMATT on hand to monitor standards, old habits in the chain of command might overwhelm their good deeds. While the need to trade quantity for quality is recognised, the RSLAF is frustrated by the lack of will and the means to deliver such trade-offs on the part of other government departments. While they have an effective Maritime Wing, land mobility, communications, and small arms supplies, military infrastructure, especially housing, is pitiful. All that has been achieved to date remains fragile and the risk of being undermined by a financial crisis is high. Without a fundamental review by the new Government, the prediction of IMATT and the Sierra Leone MoD that the RSLAF by 2009 will only be able to sit, quite literally, in barracks and do nothing else may prove to be true. It is a dangerous state of affairs.

To quote Prime Minister Tony Blair again: 'The international action of the past few years hasn't transformed Africa; but it has undoubtedly made it better'[31]. This is true for Sierra Leone. For the UK military, making a difference in Africa means a long-term involvement, taking a regional perspective, being realistic about what is achievable and affordable, managing expectations tightly and working towards local ownership whilst cognisant of national and regional politics.

When acting as a 'force for good', military assistance is never likely to be short-term. Making a genuine difference in the development of conflict-ridden countries, turning them into productive, peaceful states, can be seen as a series of battles fought not on the field, but within and amongst institutions. These battles may be won, lost or drawn, but they are worthwhile, in the light of the greater goals of peace, security and long-term economic stability.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Albrecht, P, Malan, M. Post-*Conflict Peacebuilding and National Ownership: Meeting the Challenges of Sierra Leone*. Berlin: Zentrum fur Internationale Friedenseinsatze (ZIF), February 2006.

Benn, H. 'Politics, Development and Media'. *Global Voice*. London: Premium Publishing, 2007.

Blair, H. *Africa*. London: Harpers Collins, 1991.

Covey, J, Dziedzic, J, Hawley, L. *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Termination*. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2005.

Huntingdon, S. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957.

Kissinger, H. *Does America Need a Foreign policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*. New York: Touchstone, 2002.

Milliken, J. *State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction*. London: Blackwell. 2003.

Oche, O. 'The Changing Forms of Conflict in West Africa and Issues in Regional Security: A Case-Study of Liberia and Sierra Leone'. *Civil Society, Good Governance and the Challenge of Regional Security in West Africa*. Edited by Akindele, R. Nigeria, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 2003.

Pakenham, T. *The Scramble for Africa*. New York: Random House, Inc., 1991.

Pham, J. *Liberia: Portrait of a Failed State*. New York: Reed Press, 2004.

Richards, P. *No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts*. Oxford: James Currey, 2005.

Rotberg, R. *When States Fail, Causes and Consequences*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Sogge, D. 'Governance without Politics?'. *Give and Take: What's the Matter with Foreign Aid*. London: Zed Books, 2002.

Talentino, T. *Military Intervention after the Cold War – The Evolution of Theory and Practice*. Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2005.

Weiss, T. *Local Catalysts, Global Reactions: Cycles of Conflict in the Mano River Basin*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, June 2005.

Government Papers

UK Ministry of Defence, White Paper. *Delivering Security in a Changing World*. UK: The Stationary Office, December 2003.

UK Department for International Development. *Reducing Conflict in Africa: Progress and Challenges, Africa Conflict Prevention Pool Report, 2001-05*. UK: Department for International Development, September 2006.

UK Department for International Development, *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform*. UK: Department for International Development, 2006.

UK House of Commons, International Development Committee. *Conflict Development: Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, International Development – First Report 2006*. UK: The Stationary Office, December 2006.

Internet

Blair, T. 'Doctrine of the International Community'. *Prime Minister's Speeches – 1999, 24 April 1999*, http://www.pm.gov.uk. Accessed 20 June 2007.

Blair, T. 'Speech in South Africa'. *Prime Minister's Speeches – 2007, 31 May 2007,* http://www.pm.gov.uk. Accessed 1 June 2007.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK). *Country Profiles*. http://www.fco/gov.uk. Accessed 20 June 2007.

Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces. *Security Sector Reform Yearbook 2004*. http://www.dcaf.ch. Accessed 20 June 2007.

Government of Sierra Leone. *Development Assistance Co-ordination Office*. http://www.daco-sl.org. Accessed 20 June 2007.

Government of Sierra Leone. *Defence White Paper*. http://www.statehouse-sl.org. Accessed 20 June 2007.

Heritage. *Index of Economic Freedom*. http://www.heritage.org. Accessed 20 June 2007.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. *Security Sector Reform and Governance*. http://www.oecd.org. Accessed 20 June 2007.

Transparency International. *Corruption Perceptions Index*. http://www.transparency. Accessed 20 June 2007.

United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations. *Secretary General Reports*. http://www.un.org. Accessed 11 July 2007.

United Nations Department of Public Information. 'New Peacebuilding Commitment to Sustained Engagement in Countries'. *News and Media – 11 October 2006,* http://www.un.org. Accessed 20 June 2007.

USAID. *Democracy and Governance*. http://www.usaid.gov. Accessed 11 July 2007.

US Department of Defence. European Command. http://www.eucom.mil. Accessed 20 June 2007.

World Bank. *Countries at a glance*. http://devdata.worldbank.org. Accessed 20 June 2007.

Journals

Barakat, S, Chard M, Jones, R. 'Attributing Value: evaluating success and failure in post-war reconstruction'. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 26, No 4-5, 2005, pp 831-852.

Blair, A. 'The US Task Force Experience in Liberia'. *Military Review*, Vol 85, May/Jun 2005, pp 60-68.

Boyce, J. 'Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality after Civil Wars'. *Adelphi Paper*, No 351, September 2002.

Brzoska, M. 'Introduction: Criteria for Evaluating Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Security Sector Reform in Peace Support Operations'. *International Peacekeeping*, Vol 13, No 1, March 2006, pp 1-13.

Dobbins, J. 'America's Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq'. *Survival*, Vol 45, No 4, Winter 2003/04, pp 87-110.

Fanthorpe, R. 'On the limits of liberal peace: Chiefs and democratic decentralisation in post-war Sierra Leone'. *African Affairs*, Vol 101, No 418, January 2006, pp 27-50.

Greene, O. 'Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and Regional Perspectives'. *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol 1, No 1, March 2003, pp 1-15.

Hamre, J, Sullivan, G. 'Toward Postconflict Reconstruction'. *The Washington Quarterly,* Vol 25, No 4, Autumn 2002, pp 85-96.

Hoffman, D. 'The Civilian Target in Sierra Leone and Liberia: political power, military strategy and humanitarian intervention'. *African Affairs*, Vol 103, No 411, April 2004, pp 211-226.

Jackson, P. 'Briefing: The Commission for Africa, Gleneagles, Brussels and beyond'. *African Affairs*, Vol 104, No 417, October 2005, pp 657-664.

Khalizad, Z. 'How to Nation-Build, Ten Lessons from Afghanistan'. *The National Interest*, No 80, Summer 2005, pp 19-27.

Kolbe, J. 'Lessons and New Directions for Foreign Assistance'. *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2003, pp 189-198.

Kotter, J. 'Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail', *Harvard Business Review on Point (March – April 1995),* Product Number 4231, pp 59-68.

Krause, K, Jutersonke, O. 'Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments'. *Security Dialogue*, Vol 36, No 4, December 2005, pp 447-462.

Luttwak, E. 'Give War a Chance'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 78, No 4, July/August 1999, pp 2-17.

Ndulu, B. 'Ramping Up African Growth: Lessons From Five Decades Of Growth Experience'. *Economic Affairs*, December 2006, pp 5-11.

Prins, G. 'An Interpretation of The Significance of The Second Battle of Waterloo'. *Economic Affairs*, December 2006, pp 12-18.

Pugh, M. 'Why a Merger of Peacebuilding and Development would Reform rather than Transform War-Torn Societies'. *Royal United Services Institute Journal*, August 2006, pp 28-31.

Richards, P. 'To Fight or to Farm? Agrarian dimensions of the Mano River conflicts (Liberia and Sierra Leone)'. *African Affairs*, Vol 104, No 417, October 2005, pp 571-590.

Schwarz, R. 'Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Security, Welfare and Representation'. Security Dialogue, Vol 36, No 4, 2005, pp 429-446.

Magazines and Newspapers

Blair, T. 'What I've Learned'. *The Economist,* Vol 383, No 8531, 2 June 2007, pp 29-31.

United Nations Department for Public Information. 'Wanted: jobs for young Africans'. *Africa Renewal*, Vol 20, No 3, October 2006.

World News, *The Daily Telegraph*, 31 May 2007, p 19.

Unpublished Material

Brown, T, Fanthorpe, R, Gardener, J, Gberie, L, Gibril Sesay, M. *Sierra Leone Drivers for Change*. A Paper commissioned by Department for International Development (UK), March 2005.

Hendrikson, D and Ball, N. *Off-Budget Military Expenditure and Revenue: Issues and Policy Perspectives for Donors*. Conflict, Security and Development Group, King's College, London, *Occasional Papers,* # 1, January 2002.

Hendrikson, D. *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform*. A Paper commissioned by Department for International Development (UK), Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, 2006.

Middlebrook, P. Miller, S. *Sierra Leone Security Sector Expenditure Review*. A Paper commissioned by Department for International Development (UK), Sierra Leone Country Office, September 2006.

Nathan, L. *Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Guide for Donors*. A Paper Commissioned by UK Department for International Development, September 2006.

Ebo, A. *Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia*. Conflict, Security and Development Group, King's College, London, *Occasional Papers,* # 9, December 2005.

Year Books

Hendrikson, D and Karkoszka, A. 'The Challenges of Security Sector Reform'. *SIPRI Yearbook - Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, *2002*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002

Wiharta, S. 'Peace-building: the new international focus on Africa'. *SIPRI Yearbook - Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 2006*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006

Footnotes

[1] Brigadier Barry J Le Grys served in Sierra Leone under UN command during 2001 and was Commander of the International Military Advisory Training Team (Sierra Leone) in 2006.

[2] The term 'security sector' includes the police, the military, the intelligence agencies, the prison services, other official security organisations and the civilian authorities that are meant to control and oversee these bodies. UK Department for International Development, Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform (UK: Department for International Development, 2006), p 7.

[3] http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/1_gov/1_4ons_progress_rpt.pdf. Accessed 20 June 2007.

[4] http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/1_gov/prsp.htm. Accessed 11 July 2007.

[5] Diplomacy, Information, Security, Economy, and Community are the headings that ONS imposes upon its papers to the NSC.

[6] Sierra Leone Chief of Defence Staff , MOD Press Conference, 12 December 2005.

[7] http://www.statehouse-sl.org/policies/defence-white-paper.html. Accessed 20 June 2007.

[8] Commander IMATT (SL), Directive for 2006 (Freetown: HQ IMATT (SL), January 2006), p 1.

[9] Commander IMATT (SL), op cit, p 2.

[10] P Albrecht, M Malan, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and National Ownership: Meeting the Challenges of Sierra Leone (Berlin: Zentrum fur Internationale Friedenseinsatze, February 2006), p 131.

[11] R Schwarz, 'Post-Conflict Peace Building: The Challenges of Security, Welfare and Representation', Security Dialogue, Vol 36, No 4, 2005, pp 429-446.

[12] P Middlebrook, S Miller, Sierra Leone Security Sector Expenditure Review (Commissioned by UK DfID, Sierra Leone Country Office, September 2006), pp 1-3.

[13] 'On-budget' is income/expenditure declared in the Government of Sierra Leone accounts. ' Off-budget' is not declared.

[14]   http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/1_gov/1_4ons.htm. Accessed 11 July 2007

[15]   UK House of Commons, International Development Committee. Conflict Development: Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, International Development – First Special Report 2006 (HC 923-I, 19 December 2006), p 71.

[16]   Sierra Leone accounted for £107 million of the total ACPP spend 2001-2005. UK DfID, Reducing Conflict in Africa: Progress and Challenges, Africa Conflict Prevention Pool Performance Report, 2001-2005 (UK: DfID, September 2006), p 8.

[17]   http://www.eucom.mil/africom. Accessed 20 June 2007.

[18]   UN Secretary General, Fourteenth Progress Report of the Secretary General on UNMIL to the UN Security Council (UN:5/2007/151, 15 March 2007), p 3.

[19]   P Middlebrook, S Miller, op cit, p 3.

[20]   The Co-ordinating Group is the body of public servants (department Director General level) which guides the routine work of the ONS, and its interaction with other government departments, on behalf of the NSC.

[21]   The lessons of Plan 2010 were: 1. Local engagement is not enough, ownership is required; 2. Expectation management is of key importance; both host and donor should be open as to what their responsibilities are and committed to meeting them.

[22]   UK House of Commons, International Development Committee, op cit, p 41.

[23]   http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/1_gov/1_4ons/macp.htm. Accessed 11 July 2007

[24]   http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/1_gov/1_4ons_progress_rpt.pdf. Accessed 20 June 2007.

[25]   D Hendrikson and N Ball, Off-Budget Military Expenditure and Revenue: Issues and Policy Perspectives for Donors (London: Conflict, Security and Development Group, King's College), Occasional Papers, # 1, January 2002, p 1, p 10.

[26]   J Covey, J Dziedzic, L Hawley, The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Termination (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2005).

[27]   T Blair. 'What I've Learned', *The Economist,* Vol 383, No 8531, 2 June 2007.

[28]   J Covey, J Dziedzic, L Hawley, The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Termination (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2005), p 208.

[29]   J Kotter, 'Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail', Harvard Business Review, Product Number 4231, March-April 1995, p 60.

[30]   The description of this survey is based upon the author's immediate debrief of the survey team in his capacity as Commander IMATT (SL). The hypothesis was raised by the team and supported by the author.

[31]   T Blair, 'Speech in South Africa', Prime Minister's Speeches – 2007, 31 May 2007, 24 April 1999, http://www.pm.gov.uk. Accessed 1 June 2007.

The Sierra Leone Working Paper Series

1   Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P. (2008) *Issues and Themes of the Sierra Leone Security System Transformation Process, 1997-2007.*

2   Coker, E. B. O. (2008) *Governance and Security Sector Reform.* (ed Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P.)

3   Major General Alfred Nelson-Williams. (2008) *Restructuring the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF).* (ed Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P.)

4   White, M. (2008) *The Security and Development Nexus: A Case Study of Sierra Leone 2004-2006.* (ed Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P.)

5   Gaeta, A. (2008) *Operation Pebu.* (ed Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P.)

6   Kondeh, A-H. K. (2008) *Formulating Sierra Leone's Defence White Paper.* (ed Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P.)

7   Howlett-Bolton, A. C. (2008) *Aiming for Holistic Approaches to Justice Sector Development.* (ed Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P.)

8   Fakondo, K. (2008) Reforming and Building Capacity of the Sierra Leone Police, 1997-2007. (ed Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P.)

9   Brigadier General (Ret) Conteh, K. H. (2008) *Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone and the Role of the Office of National Security.* (ed Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P.)

10   Ashington-Pickett, r. (2008) *National Security and Intelligence Reform in Sierra Leone - 2000-2003.* (ed Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P.)

11   Brigadier Le Grys, B. J. (2008) *United Kingdom (UK) Military Intervention and Progress in Sierra Leone 2001-2006.* (ed Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P.)

12   Hanson-Alp, R. (2008) *Civil Society's Role in Sierra Leone's Security Sector Reform Process Experiences from Conciliation Resources' West Africa Programme*. (ed Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P.)