

# Promoting Conflict Prevention through Security Sector Reform:

Review of Spending on Security Sector Reform through the Global Conflict Prevention Pool

April 2008

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**Nicole Ball, Center for International Policy**

**Luc van de Goor, Clingendael Institute**

**Authors**

# Acronyms and Abbreviations

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| ACPP    | Africa Conflict Prevention Pool                                    |
| ADIDU   | Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit                               |
| ANDS    | Afghanistan National Development Strategy                          |
| CEE     | Central and Eastern Europe   |
| CN      | Counter-narcotics  |
| CPA     | Comprehensive Peace Agreement                                      |
| CPP     | Conflict Prevention Pool   |
| CSR     | Comprehensive Spending Review                                      |
| DAC     | OECD Development Assistance Committee                              |
| DCAF    | Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces       |
| DFID    | Department for International Development                           |
| DPKO    | UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations                           |
| EU      | European Union   |
| EUCOPPS | European Union Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support |
| FCO     | Foreign and Commonwealth Office                                    |
| GCPP    | Global Conflict Prevention Pool                                    |
| GFN-SSR | Global Facilitation Network for SSR                                |
| HMG     | Her Majesty's Government   |
| ICG     | International Crisis Group   |
| M&E     | Monitoring and evaluation  |
| MENA    | Middle East / North Africa   |
| MEPP    | Middle East Peace Process  |
| MOD     | Ministry of Defence  |
| ODA     | Official Development Assistance                                    |
| OPT     | Occupied Palestinian Territories                                   |
| PA      | Palestinian Authority  |
| PSA     | Public Service Agreement   |
| SAF     | Stabilisation Aid Fund   |
| SALW    | Small Arms and Light Weapons                                       |
| SCA     | Strategic Conflict Assessment                                      |
| SOCA    | Serious Organised Crime Agency                                     |
| SSAC    | Security and Small Arms Control                                    |
| SSDAT   | Security Sector Development Advisory Team                          |
| SSR     | Security sector/system reform                                      |
| SU      | Stabilisation Unit   |
| USSC    | United States Security Coordinator (OPT)                           |

# Key Messages and Recommendations

1. Along with the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) has been one of the UK's main vehicles for supporting security sector reform (SSR). This review was undertaken as Her Majesty's Government (HMG) decided to merge the two pools into the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) and create a new Stabilisation Aid Fund (SAF) for 'hot stabilisation' countries. It has afforded the opportunity to assess lessons learned from implementing SSR activities through GCPP in order to provide a sound basis going forward.
2. This review confirms HMG's role as the 'market leader' in SSR. The UK plays an important role in applying a strategic approach to SSR programming, promoting joined-up approaches, influencing partner governments and other members of the international community and seeking to co-ordinate international SSR efforts.
3. This review identifies eight areas that could benefit from additional attention in order to maximise the strategic and sustainable use of CPP resources. Many of these areas have already been identified as high priority by GCPP and the following recommendations are intended to further strengthen CPP practices.

## 1. Policy foundations

4. There appears to be an increasingly shared view of what constitutes SSR across the three CPP departments. Nonetheless, the UK lacks one of the key elements of conflict sensitive SSR interventions: a formal policy explaining HMG's definition of SSR and its objectives in promoting SSR. From a CPP perspective it is important to consider how SSR can address the underlying causes of conflict. Given this growing alignment of departmental views, the environment might be favourable for the development of an HMG SSR policy.

**Recommendation 1: That HMG develops as a matter of priority an SSR policy that recognises the multi-faceted nature of SSR, i.e. promoting security and justice broadly, strengthening governance, and preventing conflict.**

## 2. Clarifying the role of CPP

5. GCPP's value-added has not always been well defined or transmitted to the individuals making funding decisions. GCPP SSR funding has often been used without adequate consideration of its contribution to conflict prevention. The availability of funding appears to have been the driving force rather than a strategic decision on how to use funds most effectively and with the greatest impact. Some GCPP activities appear to have been chosen to support stabilisation activities that were not necessarily sustainable or accountability oriented. In addition, many SSR activities funded through GCPP have been relatively small, limited in duration, and geographically dispersed. While this might raise the profile of SSR more widely, it is likely to have implications for overall effectiveness and impact.

6. Going forward, expectations of what can be delivered through Public Service Agreement (PSA) 30 and CPP may be at odds with reality given the level of CPP funding and the new requirements for Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility (see paragraphs 15 below and paragraphs 66-68 in the text). Furthermore, while new options for three-year programming are welcome, experience shows that most SSR programming requires an even longer time frame.

**Recommendation 2: That HMG clarifies whether CPP should address longer-term needs or be used as seed money to jump start longer-term SSR activities.**

- If CPP funding is used as seed money, it will be important to consider the options for longer-term funding for the SSR projects started by CPP and the agreements necessary between CPP and other HMG or international funding mechanisms before commencing programming; and
- If CPP funding is used for longer-term SSR activities, it will be important to ensure that it does not duplicate work carried out by individual departments, by international partners, or with other funding streams and that adequate funding is available over the longer-term.

### **3. Strengthening the Security and Small Arms Control (SSAC) programme**

7. In the past, GCPP's SSR strategy did not fully meet the needs of HMG officials in country in providing guidance on how to engage in SSR or adequate additional resources to develop and implement SSR activities. As a result, there are unnecessary and counterproductive differences in how country teams respond to SSR needs. To mitigate these problems the SSAC programme should provide value-added over and above the activities that it funds.

**Recommendation 3: That in developing the new SSAC programme, CPP consider how best to maximise operational support. In particular, CPP may wish to consider how the SSAC can promote:**

- Formal SSR policy development to help guide CPP SSR programming;
- A deeper understanding across HMG of the value and objectives of engaging in SSR in the short, medium and longer term, with special attention to senior officials, and greater clarity on the contribution SSR can make to improved governance, economic and social development and conflict prevention; and
- Greater geographical focus and longer-term engagement, to enable the Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT) to deepen their knowledge of context in order to improve effectiveness and impact of CPP investments, without limiting the flexibility to engage as short term needs arise.

### **4. Joined-up SSR programming**

#### **HMG-wide strategies**

8. The importance of a joined-up approach to maximising the effective, coherent and sustainable use of GCPP resources is increasingly well understood. HMG-wide strategies that guide all HMG activity (Afghanistan) or all joint HMG activities (Nepal) constitute significant steps in the direction of enhancing the complementarity of the various conflict prevention mechanisms at the disposal of HMG.

**Recommendation 4: That HMG draws on GCPP experience to develop HMG-wide strategies to guide all activities in priority CPP countries.**

#### **SSR strategies**

9. To assess how SSR can promote conflict prevention in a specific country or region, it is important to understand the full range of entry points for engaging in SSR (conflict prevention, broader aspects of justice and security, and democratic governance). This in turn requires:

- Developing an adequate, joined-up understanding of the security and justice environment, including the drivers of conflict;

- Agreeing a strategy for addressing priority needs;
- Demonstrating concrete progress over the short and medium term; and
- Obtaining input from all departments.

**Recommendation 5: That where SSR is a priority in the HMG-wide strategies, focused SSR strategies should be developed to clarify the role SSR plays in conflict prevention and the value-added of different departments in implementing SSR.**

### **Evidence-based programming**

10. Programming often has to begin before the security and justice environment can be reviewed in detail or an in-depth strategic approach can be developed. In these cases, it is essential to consider all readily available information at the outset and to progressively increase access to the information needed for strategy development and longer-term programming. UK officials currently collect information on each country context, but the methods used often do not produce adequate information to underpin effective and sustainable SSR programming.

**Recommendation 6: That CPP takes the necessary steps to develop an adequate appreciation of the security and justice environment to guide the development of an SSR strategy, including scoping studies, combining ongoing project work with informal assessments, and using inception phases to gather information, in addition to full assessments of the security and justice environment.**

### **Monitoring, evaluation and risk management**

11. Monitoring and evaluation is an area of weakness for HMG, especially with regard to SSR work and risk management. As CPP supports more multi-year programmes, the importance of monitoring and evaluation will increase. GCPP has taken steps to improve risk management, with Middle East /North Africa leading in terms of practice. One tool that has been underutilised by both GCPP and ACPP is scenario development. Building scenarios can provide options for next steps when projects succeed or run the risk of failure.

**Recommendation 7: That CPP strengthens monitoring, evaluation and risk management procedures for multi-year programmes, with a view to issuing specific guidance for CPP regional programmes.**

## **5. Reconciling long-term objectives and the need to demonstrate results**

12. UK country teams face the twin challenges of supporting SSR activities designed to provide sustainable changes in the delivery of security and justice and demonstrating concrete progress in the short term. The highly political nature of SSR and its foundation in institutional reform and transformation means that outcomes will be achieved over a period of years. Nonetheless, there are many concrete steps that will need to be taken to achieve desired outcomes that can and should be highlighted.

**Recommendation 8: That where focused SSR strategies are produced, in addition to specifying the medium to longer-term outcomes, these strategies should:**

- More clearly identify specific outputs that will contribute to achievement of outcomes during each six-month period; and
- Contain a communication strategy aimed both at local stakeholders and UK policy-makers.

## **6. CPP bidding process**

13. UK officials have expressed the desire for more guidance on what constitutes a good SSR project and good bid.

**Recommendation 9:** That the CPP SSAC programme develop guidance for CPP bidders to assist them in thinking through the core principles of successful SSR programming and potential synergy with related activities.

## **7. Flexibility of resource use**

### **Breaking down funding silos**

14. Funding silos within CPP, especially the new SSAC programme, are a potential constraint on financing the highest priority conflict prevention SSR activities.

**Recommendation 10:** That CPP consider exploring how to break down funding silos within the SSAC programme to promote and link the flexible allocation of resources to the highest priority conflict prevention activities.

### **ODA eligibility issues**

15. HMG's international partners have consistently praised the flexibility of the conflict prevention pools and their ability to finance a wide range of activities without having to consider ODA limitations. It is possible that the new requirements for ODA eligibility of CPP investments may reduce this flexibility. It is also possible that the new ODA requirements may provide incentives for more comprehensive and integrated SSR programming, thereby further enhancing joined-up UK work.

**Recommendation 11:** That CPP assess the impact of ODA requirement on its ability to support the highest priority conflict prevention activities with a view to presenting the evaluation to HM Treasury at the end of the first year of CPP operations.

## **8. Human resource needs**

### **In-country programme officers and administrative support**

16. GCPP experience demonstrates that the quality and consistency of regional and country strategies and interventions improves with the addition of sufficient dedicated capacity at the strategy and programme management level both at headquarters and in-country. CPP intends to appoint strategy managers for all regional programmes, which will be an important step in strengthening the strategic use of resources.

**Recommendation 12:** That CPP considers appointing full-time programme officers in countries where security and SSR are identified as a priority and the magnitude of programming warrants such an investment and determines how to provide requisite administrative support.

### **SSR advisory support**

17. In 2008/09, CPP work will account for 40 per cent of the SSR adviser's time and 10 per cent of the justice adviser's time. The new SSAC programme and the need to provide increased support for multi-year projects will generate additional demand for advice. Additionally, in order to deliver and evaluate SSR programmes, specific skills will be required within the SSAC and HMG more broadly. This could be promoted by establishing a competency framework to determine the skills required to design, deliver and evaluate SSR programmes more effectively. It could also be promoted by further training and capacity development activities, including existing activities such as the SSR practitioners course and routine Defence Attaché training. These activities should ideally be undertaken in partnership with other bilateral and multilateral partners to the extent possible.

**Recommendation 13:** That CPP consider whether additional London-based SSR/ justice advisory support is desirable to improve the quality of SSR interventions, as well as to maintain HMG's position as 'market leader' in SSR, and if so, how to obtain and improve that support.

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# 1 Introduction

1. Security sector reform (SSR) is a key area of work for the UK government. This is based on the recognition that security and access to justice are essential to conflict prevention; stabilisation of fragile and conflict affected environments; investment and economic development; sustainable development and poverty reduction; counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics; reducing trans-national serious and organised crime.
2. One of the UK's main vehicles for supporting SSR has been the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP), both through the SSR and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) strategies and through the geographic strategies.<sup>1</sup> A significant portion of SSR work has also been financed through the African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP).
3. In 2006, the Department for International Development (DFID) and ACPP commissioned a strategic review of their respective portfolios and engagements on SSR programming in Africa.<sup>2</sup> A review of GCPP spending on SSR in Iraq was initiated in 2007 in order to develop a forward strategy. GCPP therefore decided that a review of its SSR financing would help provide a solid basis for SSR decision-making in future.
4. The decision to review GCPP SSR funding took on additional utility when, as a result of the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), it was decided to merge GCPP and ACPP into the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) and transfer Afghanistan and Iraq (and potentially other countries with 'hot' security environments) to a new fund, the Stabilisation Aid Fund (SAF).<sup>3</sup> This review affords the opportunity to take a step back and assess the lessons learned from implementing SSR activities through GCPP to provide a sound basis going forward.
5. This review has focused on the process by which decisions have been made to finance GCPP SSR work. Particular attention has been given to the coherence, effectiveness and impact of SSR activities and on the policy and practical relationship between GCPP SSR activities and conflict prevention.
6. The review team consisted of two independent consultants. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in London, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Nepal and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). Interviews were supplemented by a review of available documentation.<sup>4</sup>
7. The report begins with an overview of the policy foundations and financing trends of GCPP (section 2). It then reviews in section 3 key aspects of the approach to the use of GCPP resources for SSR since 2004/05:
  - Joined-up UK approach;
  - Sustainability of investments;

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<sup>1</sup> GCPP geographic strategies were: Afghanistan, Balkans, Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), India/Pakistan [Kashmir], Indonesia/East Timor, Iraq, Latin America [including Belize and Guatemala], Middle East/North Africa (MENA), Nepal, Russia/CIS, Sri Lanka. Thematic strategies were: SSR, SALW, and United Nations.

<sup>2</sup> See Nicole Ball, Piet Biesheuvel, Tom Hamilton-Baillie, and 'Funmi Olonisakin [Security and Justice Sector Reform Programming in Africa](#), DFID Evaluation Working Paper no. 23, April 2007.

<sup>3</sup> In common with CPP, SAF will also pool the resources of DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and have a tri-departmental key.

<sup>4</sup> Since neither consultant has UK security clearance, their ability to review documentation was limited.

- Evidence-based programming;
- International co-ordination and collaboration; and
- Use of GCPP SSR tools.

8. The report then examines the linkages between SSR work and conflict prevention (section 4) and highlights a number of process issues that have affected the effectiveness and impact of GCPP funding (section 5). It concludes with some thoughts and recommendations on next steps for the transition to CPP (section 6).

# 2 GCPP Overview

## 2.1 SSR and conflict prevention: Policy foundations

9. SSR funded by GCPP must both meet 'SSR' criteria and promote conflict prevention. When GCPP was established in March 2001, the concept of SSR was itself quite new. In the intervening years, the concept has been developed, both in the UK and internationally.

10. The 2003 UK [Security sector reform policy brief](#) describes SSR as:

"(...) a broad subject that covers a wide spectrum of disciplines, actors and activities. In its simplest form, SSR addresses policy, legislative, structural and oversight issues set within recognised democratic norms and principles. The UK recognises security as a necessary and important function of the state and works from the premise that security should be provided in an appropriate, accountable and affordable way.<sup>5</sup>"

11. In 2004 Her Majesty's Government (HMG) endorsed the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) [Policy Statement and Paper on Security System Reform](#), which is fully consistent with the approach outlined in HMG's policy brief. The four core objectives of SSR as defined by the DAC are:

- Establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system;
- Improved delivery of security and justice services;
- Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process; and
- Sustainability of justice and security service delivery.<sup>6</sup>

12. Somewhat surprisingly, the country that is widely recognised as the 'market leader' in SSR does not have a formal SSR policy. The approach to SSR agreed by OECD DAC governments increasingly seems to underpin thinking within HMG, but there is no formal statement of how HMG as a whole intends to take forward an SSR agenda and how the different institutional actors can contribute to achieving HMG objectives.

13. Conflict prevention work is guided by a Public Service Agreement (PSA). During the period under review, DFID, FCO and MOD shared a common PSA relating to conflict prevention which did not specify linkages with SSR:

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<sup>5</sup> Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, [Security sector reform policy brief](#), 2003, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, [The OECD/DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice](#), 2007, Section 1, p. 21. The DAC approach forms the basis for MOD's Joint Doctrine Note 3/07, 'The Military Contribution to Security Sector Reform,' March 2007.

In common with the DAC approach, this review considers SSR to include security and justice work. Specifically on justice sector reform, there are a number of important DFID publications, including: DFID, [Justice and Poverty Reduction: Safety, Security and Access to Justice for All](#), 2000; DFID, [Safety, Security and Accessible Justice: Putting policy into practice](#), 2002; and Department for International Development, [Non-state Justice and Security Systems](#), Briefing Note, 2004.

“By 2008, deliver improved effectiveness of UK and international support for conflict prevention by addressing long-term structural causes of conflict, managing regional and national tension and violence, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction, where the UK can make a significant contribution, in particular Africa, Asia, Balkans and the Middle East.”<sup>7</sup>


14. As part of an effort to enhance UK capability to prevent, manage and resolve conflict and to build peace in a strategic and coherent manner, the 2008-11 conflict, [PSA 30](#), mandates the merger of ACP and GCPP into one Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) and the creation of a new fund, the Stabilisation Aid Fund, for ‘conflict stabilization activity in volatile or hostile areas’.<sup>8</sup> CPP will consolidate all country strategies into geographic strategies while the SSR and SALW strategies are to be merged into the Security and Small Arms Control (SSAC) programme. The United Nations Strategy is being renamed International Capacity Building programme.

15. PSA 30 identifies four international institutions that HMG considers key partners in preventing, managing and resolving conflict: UN, European Union (EU), African Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. It also mandates increased DFID and CPP investment in countries where security is a priority. The emphasis of this work is to be on: 1) strengthening safety, security and access to justice; 2) promoting SSR; 3) reducing small arms and light weapons proliferation; and 4) supporting disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, grassroots peacebuilding and initiatives to tackle social exclusion and radicalisation.<sup>9</sup>

## 2.2 GCPP expenditure, 2004/05 – 2006/07

16. GCPP outlays were approximately £245 million between 2004/05 and 2006/07.<sup>10</sup> Some 46 percent of this was allocated to Iraq and Afghanistan, and expenditure on these two countries has dwarfed all other GCPP outlays (figure 1). The pressure of financing stabilisation activities in these two countries prompted HMG to create SAF and to allocate additional Ministry of Defence resources to it. While SAF should take some of the pressure off CPP programmes, the move to regional programmes raises some questions about the sustainability of activities in countries that may have received a relatively substantial amount of funding through GCPP in the past, such as Nepal and Sri Lanka, but will now have to compete within their geographic regions for resources.

**Figure 1. GCPP spend, 2004/05 – 2006/07**



\* Other = Caribbean, India-Pakistan (Kashmir), Indonesia-East Timor, Latin America (including Belize and Guatemala), and Sri Lanka.

<sup>7</sup> HM Government, [Spending Review 2004: public service agreements 2005/2008](#), p. 25.

<sup>8</sup> SAF ‘will take on the responsibilities currently handled by the Global Conflict Prevention Pool for civil effect in the operational theatres of Iraq and Afghanistan, allowing the new single Conflict Prevention Pool to refocus on prevention activity in other parts of the world.’ HM Treasury, [Meeting the aspirations of the British People: 2007 Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending Review](#), CM 7227, London: The Stationery Office, October 2007, p. 129.

<sup>9</sup> HM Government, [PSA Delivery Agreement 30: Reduce the impact of conflict through enhanced UK and international efforts](#), revised November 2007, para 3.56, pp. 16-17.

<sup>10</sup> The review team was asked to provide expenditure data for 2002/03 – 2006/07 but it was not possible to obtain data for 2002/03 and 2003/04.

17. Due to a lack of detailed data for most strategies, the exact proportion of GCPP resources allocated to SSR can not be determined. As the data presented in the case studies annexes demonstrate, the share of SSR in total GCPP outlays can vary significantly year on year (annexes A-D). To a large extent this variation can be explained by political events – such as the international reaction to the Hamas victory in the January 2006 legislative elections or the 2006 peace agreement in Nepal. At the same time, the absence of a formal SSR policy means that the parameters of SSR are unclear and it is difficult to measure what has been spent on SSR activities.

# 3 Approach to SSR Work

18. Clear policies are essential for defining programme and project priorities and establishing strategies. GCPP CPP is an instrument to deliver HMG policy on conflict prevention. Hence a clear policy platform is essential for its success.

19. GCPP and ACPP were set up in 2001 “to integrate UK policy-making” and enable DFID, FCO and MOD to “develop shared strategies for dealing with conflict and make the practical programmes they fund as effective as possible.”<sup>11</sup> More specifically, “GCPP’s activities cover conflict prevention and management, as well as post-conflict reconstruction. They bring together diplomacy, defence and development work, in a common strategy based on a conflict analysis shared between FCO, MOD and DFID.... [T]here is also flexibility to respond to changing situations and new priorities.”<sup>12</sup>

20. It has become evident, however, that simply creating a cross-departmental fund will not ensure effective cross-departmental working or sustainable outcomes. Although the three GCPP partners shared the goal of conflict prevention and management, there was often a lack of strategic focus in how GCPP was used. It supported a broad range of poorly linked activities that may or may not have represented the highest priority objectives for conflict management and reduction and that may have limited long-term impact. The linkage between SSR and conflict prevention was also weak at times.<sup>13</sup> One reason for this is that SSR is not only a conflict prevention tool. It has important linkages with broader aspects of justice and security, as well as with democratic governance. Equally some of the activities funded are not SSR in the traditional sense, nor are they linked to broader strategic, locally owned objectives. This underscores the importance of formal guidance on what SSR is, how it can contribute to conflict prevention, and how – and to what extent – the non-conflict prevention aspects of SSR will be funded.

21. Following an internal audit that highlighted a number of problems with GCPP investments, GCPP took important steps to address these problems. This section summarises the review team’s findings relating to how different GCPP strategies addressed the problem of developing a coherent approach to SSR aimed at using GCPP resources to produce sustainable outcomes. Section 4 examines the linkages between SSR and conflict prevention, management and reduction. Section 5 examines a number of key process issues that can improve GCPP outcomes.

## 3.1 Joined-up UK approach

22. GCPP resources generally accounted for a comparatively small amount of the resources allocated by HMG to any given country, particularly when DFID was engaged. In addition to being joined-up, all UK resources should ideally work to a common HMG-wide strategy for GCPP to work. This means that the FCO Country Business Plan, DFID’s Country Assistance Plan (CAP) and MOD’s Defence Strategy should be guided by an HMG-wide strategy approved by ministers. It would be helpful for such strategies to be underpinned by joint assessments.

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<sup>11</sup> Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, [The Global Conflict Prevention Pool: A joint UK Government approach to reducing conflict](#), 2003, p. 6.

<sup>12</sup> ‘[Global Conflict Prevention Pool](#),’ Summer 2006.

<sup>13</sup> A recent review of ACPP security and justice work came to similar conclusions. See, Ball, Biesheuvel, Hamilton-Baillie, and Olonisakin [Security and Justice Sector Reform Programming in Africa](#).

23. The four case studies indicate that the utility of a joined-up approach is increasingly understood. It is, however, only in Afghanistan that the basis for aligning different HMG resources has been established. (See annex A.) Table 1 illustrates the range of joined-up approaches across the review's four case studies. The inclusion of a 6-month action plan in the Nepal Strategy is seen as essential for making the strategy a living document, rather than a list of aspirations. Although there have been various types of assessments conducted, it appears that in none of these cases is the strategy currently guided by jointly conducted conflict assessments.

24. The process of actually hammering out a joint strategy helps both to bring the work of the departments at post closer together and to reduce some of the inevitable tensions between London and post. Many UK officials at post expressed concern that their ability to respond to the situation on the ground was being circumscribed by an incomplete understanding of the situation on the part of London-based officials. Producing a joint HMG-wide strategy can clarify where HMG's broader policy objectives properly override locally determined approaches and where HMG's broader policy objectives can benefit from a deeper understanding of local context. Such a review could ideally include HMG's in-house delivery agents – Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT) or the Stabilisation Unit (SU) depending on circumstances.

25. Going forward, a clear statement of HMG's priorities in countries receiving CPP funding will enable better use of CPP resources. Because the amount of money available through the pools has been and will continue to be relatively modest, it is essential that CPP resources be used strategically to achieve top priority conflict prevention / management objectives. Nepal offers a good example of how financial and diplomatic or influencing resources can be allocated against agreed objectives, drawing on the strengths of each of the three GCPP partners, and complementing DFID programme resources (annex C). In contrast, in Afghanistan, the lack of clear strategic guidance for GCPP work prior to December 2007 meant that no consistent criteria were applied to funding decisions. Rather, there was a tendency to 'shop around' for funding from various windows, with GCPP often described as 'a place of last resort.' It is anticipated that the new HMG Afghanistan strategy will lead to more strategic use of pooled resources (from SAF), coupled with assistance from the new Embassy Programme Office (paragraphs 77-78 and annex A).

**Table 1. Joined-up approaches**

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| Afghanistan | HMG Afghanistan strategy. Alignment of other strategies (CN, Helmand, DFID CAP, FCO Country Business Plan) foreseen.   |
| Nepal       | HMG Nepal strategy. Focuses on state building in areas where the three departments work together. Does not drive all HMG activities in Nepal. Contains six month action plan that is updated regularly.  |
| OPT         | Tri-departmental agreement on drivers of conflict, priority areas for UK action: a) civil policing; b) security service reform; c) security governance.  |
| Lebanon     | Tri-departmental agreement on drivers of conflict, priority areas for UK action: a) weak security sector, b) weak rule of law, c) Palestinian issue, d) confessionalism and poor governance, and e) Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) / Israel-Lebanon relations. |

## 3.2 Sustainability of investments

26. SSR is by its nature a long-term endeavour. As with other highly political undertakings that require significant political transformation and attitudinal change in fragile and conflict-affected states and environments, it takes time to build a constituency for and the capacity to plan and undertake change.

27. The sustainability of any HMG investment is enhanced to the extent that it is aligned with a strategic approach that provides for continuing support to reform efforts. Many GCPP SSR activities were stand-alone short-term projects. Such initiatives can deliver important benefits, such as professional officer training or human rights protection training for police officers, but the benefits are often not sustainable.



28. The recent GCPP emphasis on programming to meet objectives and outcomes increased the opportunities for sustainable investments, as did a joined-up approach to HMG programming. (See for example annex C.) Sustainability also requires some form of multi-year funding, whether through GCPP itself or other funding mechanisms. The move away from annual bidding may help to eliminate one of the most serious impediments to sustainability, although it remains to be seen how programmes begun with CPP funding can be financed over the longer term.<sup>14</sup>

29. A first step in developing sustainable programming is to align UK activities with the priorities of the host nation to the extent possible. In Afghanistan, HMG adopts national strategies as UK strategies, for example the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy.<sup>15</sup> However, in most countries (and in other security / justice related sectors in Afghanistan), formal national policies and strategies are absent. Under these circumstances, a major objective of UK approaches to SSR is often to encourage the development of relevant policies and strategies. In other cases, such as Nepal and Lebanon, a multi-pronged approach has been adopted to encourage government to:

- Undertake policy and strategy development processes;
- Engage in debate on security and justice reform; and
- Enhance the capacity of civil society to create a demand for and participate in such processes.

30. Another means of enhancing sustainability of GCPP projects was to link them with host government activities in non-security areas that have a high degree of buy in, such as financial management or public sector reform. To date, this approach appears to have been taken only on an ad hoc basis. A World Bank Public Finance Management review for Afghanistan found that one of the main challenges facing the security sector was: 'The need for an integrated security sector strategy and policy framework, without which sound programmatic – e.g. on force sizes, equipment – and public expenditure decisions cannot be made.'<sup>16</sup> There has, however, not been significant progress on developing a security strategy – which is a highly political and highly contentious enterprise – since that report was published. In OPT, attempts were made to deal with this challenge by linking SSR to state-building and public administration reform through the Palestine Development and Reform Programme. However the structures needed to effect this linkage were not in place in the Ministry of Planning at the time the review team visited Ramallah and it is unclear what priority operationalising this linkage has.

31. There are several challenges facing the development of sustainable investments. The first is the need to build security structures to deal with specific security problems confronting the country and its population. While these security gaps may reflect the priorities of local stakeholders – official and / or non-official – they sometimes reflect the security preoccupations of major donors. In Afghanistan, for example, the international community is eager to see the government assume responsibility for counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism efforts and is providing the government with support to build up capacity in these areas. These programmes tend to focus on train and equip with the governance elements of the SSR agenda given minimal attention.

32. A second challenge is the pressure in high profile countries to provide politicians and senior officials with short-term, 'quick win' results. While this does not necessarily impede a focus on longer-term objectives, it can complicate efforts in this regard. Several means of addressing this tension were suggested.

33. Firstly, longer-term institutional reform programmes should have a series of 'quick wins' built in as benchmarks during the design phase. The Programme Office at the British Embassy in Kabul indicated that it could provide support to future SAF bids in this regard.

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<sup>14</sup> See also section 6.2.

<sup>15</sup> For information on UK Counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, see <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1050510446431>.

<sup>16</sup> *Afghanistan: Managing Public Finances for Development. Vol. V: Improving Public Financial Management in the Security Sector*. Report no. 34582-AF, Washington, DC: Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, South Asia Division, World Bank, December 22, 2005. [Principal authors: Nicole Ball, William Byrd, Peter Middlebrook, and Christopher Ward].

34. Secondly, officials in London should be updated regularly on project implementation, including factors that impede rapid progress. The Middle East / North Africa strategy, for example, updates its risk assessment matrix on a monthly basis, and the London-based Strategy Manager brings important issues to the attention of others in London as required.<sup>17</sup>

35. Finally, it is important to manage expectations and find ways of explaining to politicians and senior officials that the difficult environment in which SSR takes place means progress will be extremely slow. The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) has succeeded in developing buy in to lengthy institutional reform activities from senior officials by bringing them to the field for a week or more at a time to demonstrate progress. This is made easier by the fact that although SOCA plans for the long term, it carves its assistance up into five year packages with built in exit strategies in the event that the political environment requires reduced engagement.

### 3.3 Evidence-based programming

36. Programming that supports the achievement of priority outcomes rests on a firm understanding of the local political, security, economic and social context. UK officials at all four posts visited understand the importance of evidence-based programming for the design and implementation of effective and sustainable activities and employ a range of methods to obtain information (table 2).

**Table 2. Methods of gathering evidence to inform GCPP programming**

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Formal assessments                                 | DFID Drivers of Change (OPT); Strategic Conflict Assessment [SCA] (Lebanon, Afghanistan); DFID Country Governance Assessment (Nepal); discrete conflict-related assessments (OPT); political economy analysis (Afghanistan).   |
| Political reporting                                | All posts; Stabilisation and Security Adviser in Lebanon a dedicated resource.   |
| GCPP workshops                                     | Strategy Manager facilitated workshops to identify main drivers of conflict (Lebanon, OPT).  |
| Scoping studies                                    | SSDAT (Lebanon, Nepal); Stabilisation Unit (Nepal), Brigadier Deverall (OPT).  |
| Input from UK advisers                             | In order to supplement other sources of information, especially where it is difficult to undertake extensive assessments, UK advisers in national and international bureaucracies can be an important source of information (Afghanistan, Lebanon, Nepal and OPT).   |
| Research commissioned by UK                        | Afghanistan (Adam Smith Institute report for the Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit (ADIDU); 'Understanding Afghanistan' from consulting firm); Nepal (International Crisis Group [ICG], reporting; quarterly peace process political report from consultant); Lebanon (research on baseline information in Southern Lebanon to provide information on actual security providers); OPT (research commissioned from ICG). |
| Research commissioned by others and shared with UK | Nepal (like-minded group scoping study by DCAF consultant); OPT (Netherlands funded UK review team audit of penal capacity building activities).   |

37. Two points emerge from the review of evidence-based programming. First, while information is often shared within country teams at post, there appears to be relatively little jointly conducted analysis. Second, Strategic Conflict Analyses (SCAs) are often characterised as taking too much time, costing too much, and producing results that are not easily operationalised. This makes country teams reluctant to undertake an SCA. These concerns are understandable in the fluid settings that characterise fragile, conflict affected countries and environments. It often is necessary to begin programming on an urgent basis before national policies / strategies are in place.

<sup>17</sup> See section 6 for a more detailed discussion of process-related issues.

38. At the same time, while it is clear that research should not become an objective in itself and that it should be used in a pragmatic way, it is also clear that research – even when not easily operationalised – can help in pointing out where policies and projects or programmes run risks in terms of lack of effectiveness or even working at cross purposes to HMG's ultimate objectives. This implies a trade-off, but should not be underestimated in terms of value. Limiting research to what can be operationalised can imply a narrow approach that excludes or downplays important risk factors for practical, political or opportunistic reasons. From a conflict prevention and effectiveness point of view, it is therefore important to strike a balance between perfect and 'good enough' research. In this regard, it will be important to monitor and evaluate the plan to internally lead and execute an SCA in Lebanon in order to see whether such approaches can be useful in other places as well, or whether additional research remains necessary (annex B).

39. Irrespective of the type of assessment carried out, these analyses should never be one-off exercises. Working in fragile and conflict affected states and environments requires regular review of the political and geopolitical context and how changes influence the effectiveness and impact of HMG strategies. With the risk of adding to the often overloaded workload of staff at posts, one could also consider incorporating research into programming. In particular in settings where immediate action is required and time for extensive assessments is limited, this could help serve two objectives:

- The practical requirement to begin addressing security and justice needs as soon as possible, and simultaneously; and
- Developing a detailed and nuanced appreciation of the situation.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, research could be integrated into programming in such a way that it helps capacitate local actors to engage in SSR dialogue.

### 3.4 International co-ordination and collaboration

40. In view of funding limitations, it is often necessary to use resources strategically to influence the direction of activities where other international actors are in the lead. What is more, the highly political nature of SSR in these environments requires coalitions of international actors delivering the same message to the parties to the conflict. While the British government is a trusted partner in each of the four case study countries and a major development partner in three of the four, HMG is by no means the central player in any of them. Yet, in some cases, the UK is the most trusted partner for either the partner government or other donors. This gives HMG an advantage over other donors and puts the UK in a position where it has the potential to influence important players.

41. The situation is particularly complex in Afghanistan, where the United States is very much in the lead internationally and there are numerous, poorly co-ordinated international actors engaged in aspects of security and justice work. The US has very specific ideas of how to proceed in military, policing, and intelligence reform and has at its disposal far more resources than HMG, whether through GCPP or other funding instruments. Similarly in OPT, the US has assumed the lead not only on 'SSR', but also defines – along with Israel – what is, and is not, possible politically. This severely restricts the options available to HMG. In Nepal, HMG must be mindful of the policies of the Indian and US governments, but has more room for manoeuvre given its preferential position with both the Government of Nepal and the Nepal Army. In Lebanon, it is particularly important to take French and US interests into account. In consequence, international influencing is an important strand of the UK approach in each of these countries.

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<sup>18</sup> See Nicole Ball, Eric Scheye and Luc van de Goor, [From Project to Programming: Effective Programming for Security and Justice](#), The Hague: Conflict Research Unit / Clingendael Institute, December 2007.

42. Influencing takes many forms and occurs at many levels of HMG interaction (table 3). HMG generally achieves some level of success in its efforts to influence its international partners. A combination of project-level and diplomatic influencing, for example, has succeeded in transforming the German Border Pilot Project in Lebanon from essentially a donation of equipment into a project aimed at creating an integrated border force where personnel from the customs service, police, intelligence and military can work together to effectively control movement across the country's borders. Additionally, GCPP resources have been used to commission research that – when shared with others – can help with influencing. The ICG reports commissioned by OPT and Nepal are one example. Similarly, HMG could consider using its assessments and assessment tools more strategically as instruments to influence. By sharing research and evaluation findings with strategic partners, HMG could seek to guide and shape approaches of other donors and players. The outputs of 'Understanding Afghanistan' commissioned by DFID / Kabul will be used to inform the programming of the Government of Afghanistan the international development community. Similarly, the scoping work carried out by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) in Nepal discussed below is a case in point. The findings of this research will ideally be used to shape the approach of several members of the international community.

**Table 3. Forms of influencing**

|                             |   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Diplomatic                  | In-country and capital-to-capital (all posts).  |
| Policy advisers             | US Security Co-ordinator's Office (OPT), General Deverall and team (OPT), Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (Afghanistan). |
| Programme/ project advisers | German Border Pilot Project (Lebanon), EU Criminal Justice Project (Lebanon), EU Police (Afghanistan).                                    |
| Co-ordination               | Informal security assistance co-ordination mechanism (Lebanon), informal security sector discussion group (Nepal).                        |

43. While British influencing can generally be described as successful, it is important to unpack exactly what success means. The UK has provided three advisers to the US Security Coordinator's (USSC) Office in Jerusalem. Among other things, these advisers have sought to expand the rather narrow definition of SSR used by the USSC, which focused heavily on the Palestine Authority's paramilitary forces, especially the Preventive Security Force and, more recently, the Presidential Guard. UK officials, including DFID's conflict adviser, have also sought to influence the USSC in this regard.

44. The review team judges that they have been successful in this endeavour. The USSC's team now speaks of a 'three-legged' criminal justice system, comprising the security forces, the justice system and the penal system, and understands the need to collaborate with other actors engaged in supporting the criminal justice system, including the European Union Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUCOPPS). Yet it is clear that while the USSC has the lead on SSR for the US government, this is limited to a train and equip function. The USSC has very little influence over the course of US policy. What is more, the Israeli government has limited the effectiveness of USSC activities by ultimately controlling who can be trained and what equipment (even non-lethal) can be delivered to Palestinian security services. As the events of early March 2008 demonstrate, there are serious limitations in attempting to address a political problem through technical means. Under these circumstances, technical inputs will only be partially effective.

45. In the somewhat more benign environments of Lebanon and Nepal, the UK has made reasonably successful efforts to establish or support co-ordination mechanisms for donors engaged in security-related activities and to collaborate with others on specific projects. In Lebanon, the UK developed an information sharing mechanism for security related assistance after the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006. The UK had attempted to develop a co-ordination mechanism but other key actors did not see a value in that type of collaboration. The UK continues to push for more meaningful interactions through the existing mechanism. It also participates as part of a consortium of donors in the Border Pilot Project led by Germany.

46. In Nepal, the UK has participated in an informal information sharing mechanism initiated by Switzerland that brings together likeminded bilateral donors and the UN mission. This group is supporting an assessment of opportunities for dialogue on SSR, funded by Switzerland and conducted by DCAF. The UK has a particularly important role to play given its relationship of trust with the Nepal Army and its ability to build bridges with the United States, which is not a member of this group. The UK informally briefs US officials on discussions within the group and conversely is able to keep the group apprised of US activities and views.

### 3.5 Use of GCPP SSR tools

47. GCPP has three special tools at its disposal for promoting SSR:

- The SSR Strategy;
- The Security Sector Development Advisory Team; and
- The [Global Facilitation Network for SSR](#) (GFN-SSR).

The review team found that familiarity with two of these tools – the GFN-SSR and the SSR Strategy – was very limited and that they were of limited value to most HMG officials interviewed.

#### Box 1. Perspectives on GFN-SSR

- The conflict adviser in Afghanistan commissioned research from GFN-SSR on former counterinsurgency experiences and was satisfied with the outcome.
- The strategy adviser for the Russia / CIS Strategy obtained suggestions for consultants to carry out an evaluation. GFN-SSR also did a survey of ongoing SSR work in the region.
- The strategy adviser for the Russia / CIS Strategy also found the GFN-SSR-facilitated Practitioners course helpful.
- The DFID Office in Nepal knows of the GFN-SSR but has not used them much. The Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative has a library that includes information on SSR experiences from around the world and there is no need to consult GFN-SSR to obtain that type of information.
- In Nepal it was suggested that the GFN-SSR-organised training courses on SSR could be used as an instrument to manage change in the Nepal MOD and Nepal Army by exposing key players to the various aspects, advantages and opportunities of SSR.

#### GFN-SSR

48. GFN-SSR's current activities focus on information sharing, networking, research, and training and capacity building. Where known, GFN-SSR was most often associated with its monthly e-newsletter and the practitioners' course it facilitates. It was very rarely used for research by officials at post who preferred to commission work from individuals or organisations with proven regional knowledge (Box 1). It was not possible to determine the extent to which officials make use of GFN-SSR's helpdesk.

49. DFID has commissioned a review of the prevailing view of the concept of GFN-SSR and the SSR needs of stakeholders. The GFN-SSR review has found that the GFN-SSR concept is so ambitious as to be unworkable and that DFID's expectations are unrealistic given the resources allocated to GFN-SSR. GCPP review team's field visits suggest that officials at post require targeted support from individuals who either can be resident in the country in question for a period of time or are able to bring specific knowledge (of SSR, components of SSR and / or the country / region in question) and skills (such as facilitation, ability to conduct policy relevant and operationally oriented needs assessments) to bear as needed over a period of time.



## SSR strategy

50. The SSR Strategy has not been properly developed in the past, and as a result, it has not fulfilled its potential to support SSR. To date the SSR Strategy has not directly provided guidance for officials wishing to develop bids for SSR activities or supported activities in geographic areas. This has created both a knowledge gap and operational shortcomings that need to be addressed. It also means that the activities funded by the SSR strategy do not always correlate with the needs of those at post. Rather the SSR Strategy has fulfilled a seemingly useful role focusing on filling knowledge gaps, helping to mainstream SSR in London, building capacity through support for courses (facilitated by GFN-SSR) and regional networking, and promoting SSR in multilateral fora such as the UN.

51. In merging the SSR Strategy and the SALW Strategy, CPP partners may wish to reflect on how the new Security and Small Arms Control programme can be made more useful to HMG officials, particularly those at post. It is, for example, clear that officials at post place a high value on knowledge of local context. It is not sufficient to have technical expertise. It is extremely important to understand the nuances of the local political and social environments to help create a reform friendly climate. Additionally, the new strategy will have at its disposal resources earmarked for SSR, SALW and Defence Education. There is a considerable danger that what one will end up with is three siloed pots of money within a cross cutting strategy. That will affect the flexibility of the SSAC programme to meet needs and suggests that some form of prioritisation will be required. (See also discussion in section 4)

## SSDAT

52. SSDAT is more widely known and appreciated by HMG officials at post and in London. It has engaged in a large number of GCPP countries, although of the four countries visited by the review team, SSDAT is currently active only in Nepal. SSDAT activities range from initial scoping studies to ongoing support for MOD reform, and more recently policing and justice reform in Nepal to helping design a highly participatory [internal security sector review process in Kosovo](#).<sup>19</sup>

53. A number of issues relating to SSDAT arose in the course of this review, many of which have been debated virtually since SSDAT's creation in 2001. The first relates to SSDAT's contribution to the policy process. There is a perception among at least some HMG officials that SSDAT has a purely technical role. Members of the SSDAT team are, however, engaged in some of the most highly political undertakings of any British officials. It is essential that they have more than simply technical skills and it is equally essential that their experiences be fed back into the policy process at post and in Whitehall. The move from Shrivenham to London in late 2007 was intended to facilitate SSDAT's contribution to the policy process in Whitehall. It was too early for the review team to judge how successful this has been but anecdotal evidence suggests that the pace of interactions has increased in 2008.

54. The second point relates to SSDAT's profile. SSDAT is the only dedicated HMG resource with the specific mandate to work on security sector reform in non-stabilisation environments.<sup>20</sup> In most countries where SSDAT has worked, it is considered a valuable resource. In areas where SSDAT has not engaged, SSDAT's comparative advantage is often not clear to British officials. Indeed, one group of officials asked why properly trained stabilisation advisers or conflict advisers could not play the same role as the SSDAT. This suggests that SSDAT could usefully give more attention to explaining what it does to others within Whitehall.

55. In particular, it is important that SSDAT – which is a tri-departmental unit – gets across its cross-Whitehall accreditation, as there are still those who believe that SSDAT provides only defence-related assistance. The absence of a senior governance adviser for the better part of two years and the current lack of a senior policing / justice adviser no doubt contributes to this perception. Ensuring that the team is well-rounded should be a top priority for the three departments SSDAT serves.

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<sup>19</sup> See, for example, SSDAT, *Annual Report, 2006-07*.

<sup>20</sup> In stabilisation environments, particularly 'hot stabilisation' countries, the Stabilisation Unit is engaged in security and justice related activities, although these may not, strictly speaking, be SSR activities but activities that help lay the foundation for SSR work.

56. Third, there is the long-standing discussion of how SSDAT should be tasked. In the past, SSDAT has largely responded to requests for its services. While this indicates that there is need for SSDAT's expertise, it also means that SSDAT team members are spread quite thin geographically. In 2006/07, for example, SSDAT was active in 23 countries. While there are some long-term engagements, a good deal of SSDAT's work involves shorter term activities such as scoping missions to determine the feasibility of UK engagement and presentations to help develop a pro-reform climate. This means that SSDAT team members are often required to engage in a country without an adequate knowledge of context. This has been flagged as a concern by some country teams and should be addressed by SSDAT's departments.

# 4 Conflict Prevention and SSR

57. While the previous PSA did not specify linkages with SSR, PSA 30 places SSR squarely at the heart of conflict prevention activities. It clearly identifies SSR and related activities (such as DFID's work on safety, security and access to justice and efforts to manage the proliferation of small arms and light weapons) as key components of managing conflicts during the 2008-11 period (Box 2).

58. It also recognises that DFID, FCO and MOD all have important roles to play in managing, preventing and reducing conflict beyond their engagement in CPP. For example, in DRC PSA 30 anticipates that FCO and DFID 'will continue also to ensure the EU uses its development assistance constructively, and supports good governance through European Security and Defence Policy missions.'<sup>21</sup> In the Middle East, 'MOD's regional network of Defence Attaches supports close military relations with many Middle Eastern states through which the MOD leverages support of UK government-wide objectives.'<sup>22</sup> The review team has seen how defence attachés can promote SSR objectives. More generally, PSA 30 foresees increased security and justice-related investment from DFID as well as CPP (see paragraph 15 above).

59. Going forward, CPP investments in SSR will need to be particularly cognisant of the way in which they can promote conflict prevention objectives. In assessing the degree to which SSR promotes conflict prevention, the starting point would ideally be a clear understanding of what HMG means by SSR and its objectives in promoting SSR. The effectiveness and impact of HMG's approach to SSR from a conflict prevention perspective could then be examined in relation to HMG's conflict management, reduction and prevention objectives in specific countries and regions. The absence of an SSR policy complicates this process and should be addressed as a matter of urgency should HMG wish to continue to retain influence in this field.

## Box 2. Conflict prevention and SSR

Afghanistan: "By 2011 the outcomes that the UK government are seeking are:...progress in central institutional capacity-building and Security Sector Reform..."

DRC: "The Conflict Prevention Pool will support demilitarisation and the development of effective security structures with appropriate oversight."

Nigeria: "Conflict Prevention Pool-funded activity will support the professionalisation of the Nigerian armed forces and their capability to play a leading role in African peacekeeping, and peacebuilding in key flashpoint areas across the country."

Sierra Leone: "The UK (largely through the Conflict Prevention Pool) will continue to play an important role in supporting security sector reform including leading the International Military Advisory and Training Team."

Source: HM Government, [\*PSA Delivery Agreement 30: Reduce the impact of conflict through enhanced UK and international efforts\*](#), revised November 2007.

<sup>21</sup> HM Government, [\*PSA Delivery Agreement 30\*](#), p. 11.

<sup>22</sup> HM Government, [\*PSA Delivery Agreement 30\*](#), p. 10.



60. The degree to which country teams undertake formal, joint conflict analyses to identify HMG's conflict management, reduction and prevention priorities varies (table 4). As discussed in section 3.3, SCAs are viewed as costly and unlikely to produce findings that can easily be operationalised in a reasonable period of time. Their strength is the fresh perspective that they can bring to bear. The difficulty is in knowing whether an SCA will provide enough of a fresh perspective to warrant the time and expense. As one UK official interviewed for this review commented: "How do you know how much you do not know?"

61. Joint conflict assessments of some type are important for a joint funding instrument like GCPP because they maximise the opportunities that the activities financed will:

- Contribute to managing or preventing conflict;
- Contribute to identifying the highest priority conflict prevention related activities; and
- Maximise the input of each pool partner.

**Table 4. Conflict analyses underpinning HMG programming**

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| Afghanistan | DFID-commissioned SCA as part of broader 'Understanding Afghanistan' review underway, aimed in first instance at DFID and other development donor programming but secondarily at HMG-wide programming. <sup>23</sup>                                       |
| Lebanon     | Tri-departmental workshop facilitated by Strategy Manager to identify drivers of conflict and priority areas for UK programming; conflict analysis to be undertaken by Stabilisation and Security Adviser with oversight of OPT Conflict Adviser underway. |
| Nepal       | SCAs undertaken by DFID in 2000 and 2002 and findings not agreed by all departments; currently consultant-facilitated discussions of political situation occur quarterly; DFID Country Governance Assessment underway.                                     |
| OPT         | Tri-departmental workshop facilitated by Strategy Manager to identify drivers of conflict and priority areas for UK programming; targeted analyses to be conducted.  |

62. It was suggested earlier that 'good enough' research might address the major concerns about SCAs. Strategies and approaches often need to be adapted fairly quickly in fluid environments such as those receiving GCPP support. The possibility was raised in Kathmandu, for example, that the Nepal country team may decide to conduct an SCA once the (oft-postponed) election is held in order to help identify what changes might be necessary in the current approach, which focuses on supporting implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement or CPA). At the same time, the environment in Nepal has changed since the signing of the CPA, with the increasing violence in the eastern Terai drawing more attention to the problem of marginalised populations. It is not clear how this situation is affecting the approach to the use of GCPP / CPP resources in the period prior to the election. The point here is simply that irrespective of the type of conflict assessment that is conducted, regular updates to capture changed circumstances such as this are desirable.

63. While greater value for money will be obtained to the extent that CPP resources are allocated on the basis of a careful assessment of what is needed to achieve HMG's conflict prevention objectives, assessments alone are not sufficient to ensure the optimal allocation of resources. There are four main issues that need to be addressed.

64. First, some portion of CPP resources, particularly those in the SSAC programme, appears to be pre-allocated.

- The use of MOD's defence education line has been discussed virtually since the inception of the conflict prevention pools in 2001, and the use of GCPP (and ACP) resources to support 'train and equip' activities has also been contentious. Nepal offers a good example of how these types of

<sup>23</sup> Some practically oriented, focused assessments have also been undertaken recently in Afghanistan. For example, GFN-SSR was asked to survey past counterinsurgency experiences and the Adam Smith Institute did some work on counter-narcotics strategies.

activities can support broader SSR and conflict prevention objectives. But it has to be acknowledged that this is not uniformly the case.

- The review team has also found that there was no small arms and light weapons related programming in any of the four case study countries. Whether this is because the issue has not received adequate attention or whether there simply are higher priority issues cannot be stated with certainty, but this raises a question about earmarking funds for SALW.
- Questions should also be posed about the portion of SSAC resources allocated to the GFN-SSR, as the GFN-SSR does not appear to be particularly effective from the field perspective. An HMG needs assessment being undertaken in parallel concludes that resources should be allocated against the specific needs of HMG in country and in London. Any future GFN-SSR role should be focused on where it clearly adds value.
- It seems reasonable to ask if resources are not being spread too thinly across too many strategy objectives, with the attendant risk of little or no real impact in some of the areas currently being funded.

65. The point to be made here is simply that there may not be sufficient flexibility within the new SSAC programme to move resources from one category (SSR, SALW, Defence Education) to another. If there is not, then one has to ask whether the highest priority SSR activities from a conflict prevention perspective will be supported. One means of mitigating this risk would be to undertake an SSAC prioritisation process and then allocate resources on the basis of the demands of high priority countries and regions. This would require a critical review of the conflict prevention approach and criteria to be used in CPP.

66. A second, related point is that an important outcome of the 2007 CSR is the decision that a significant portion of CPP resources (as well as SAF resources) will in the future need to meet the DAC criteria for Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility.<sup>24</sup> This requirement could have both positive and negative outcomes.

67. The ability to respond rapidly to changing circumstances has been one hallmark of the conflict prevention pools. The review team was told on many occasions: "Only the UK was able to provide funding rapidly and flexibly to meet our needs." Many donors are unable for one reason or another to support security-related activities or to disburse such assistance rapidly. The conflict prevention pools have given HMG a distinct advantage in this regard. The requirement of increased ODA eligibility runs the risk of reducing this flexibility and undermining HMG's ability to meet its highest priority SSR / conflict prevention objectives.

68. It is also possible that the new ODA requirements may provide incentives for more comprehensive and integrated SSR programming. For example, an MOD reform may be ODA eligible if it is embedded in a broader SSR programme with the host government. This in turn could lead to more joined-up and sustainable UK programming. It will be important to monitor carefully the influence of the new ODA requirements on CPP's impact and effectiveness.

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<sup>24</sup> Basic information on ODA eligibility can be found in OECD Development Assistance Committee, '[DAC Statistical Reporting Directive](#),' DCD/DAC(2007)34, 6 April 2007, pp. 13-14. When it comes to designing projects that are ODA eligible, there are many nuances that become essential. For example, only 6 percent of resources allocated to UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) activities can be counted as ODA. This means that only 6 percent of the funds the UK spent to help the UN as a whole develop an SSR can be counted as ODA because DPKO led on this work. Additionally civilian assistance to MODs is allowable if it is part of a broad based SSR programme. But this type of assistance may in fact be an entry point for such a comprehensive programme.

69. Third, high policy frequently trumps conflict assessments of any description. For example, UK policy toward OPT is based on the successful conclusion of the Middle East Peace Process. In this context, strengthening the capacity of the Palestinian Authority's (PA) security services as the UK has done makes sense, since this is an essential element of the Roadmap. However, it is now evident that the same activity can make another conflict worse – in this case, the intra-Palestinian conflict.<sup>25</sup> Similarly prior to the King of Nepal's coup in 2005, UK policy supported the King and the government – seen as democratic forces – against the Maoists – seen as an anti-democratic force, a position that was widely shared in the international community. DFID's assessments, however, suggested that the picture was more nuanced, and based on this, opposed GCPP-funded provision of helicopters and aircraft to Nepal. A decision was ultimately taken at ministerial level to transfer the equipment. While policy issues will not be decided by GCPP, the review team believes that it is nonetheless important to consider all of the ramifications of GCPP activities.

70. Lastly, a tension often arises in stabilisation environments between tackling immediate security needs, on the one hand, and putting in place the underpinnings of broad based security and accessible justice, on the other hand. An unstable security environment may require the deficits of security services to be addressed urgently. It may also be necessary to build trust with local partners and obtain their buy in for more fundamental change by acceding to requests for short-term train and equip support. From an SSR perspective, it is essential to ensure that the short-term support does not close off opportunities for longer-term change. All efforts should be made to identify interventions that will effectively improve the immediate situation, particularly with regard to reducing violence and human rights violations, without jeopardising longer-term initiatives for fundamental change.<sup>26</sup>

71. The situation in Lebanon illustrates this problem quite well. The UK judges that longer-term conflict prevention needs include: 1) peace with Israel; 2) accommodation with Syria and Iran; 3) disarmament of Hizbollah and Palestinian groups; and 4) creating a state capable of effectively providing security and justice for all Lebanese and equal economic opportunities across its territory. The shorter term need is to develop the capacity of security and justice bodies to support achievement of these objectives. The UK provides assistance directly to the Lebanese Armed Forces, to the German Border Pilot Project and to the EU Criminal Justice Project. One of the tensions that arise is that the Border Control Project requires engaging with the armed forces in a policing type role in view of the relative strengths of the different security services. Officials at post manage this tension by emphasising change management objectives and creating an integrated approach to border control in which the armed forces operate in support of civil agencies.

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<sup>25</sup> The International Crisis Group has noted that in the aftermath of the January 2006 Palestine Legislative Council elections that were won by Hamas, the US and some Arab states 'selectively bolster[ed] elements expected to play a leading role in any armed confrontation with Hamas.' This contributed to a climate 'during the second half of 2006 and early 2007' that led to 'clashes between the movements.' International Crisis Group, [After Gaza](#), Middle East Report no. 68, 2 August 2007, p. 7.

<sup>26</sup> See Ball, Scheye and van de Goor, [From Project to Programming](#), esp. p. 20.

# 5 Process

72. Good outcomes depend not only on sound policies and analysis. They require attention to the process by which decisions are made and implemented. Over the years, GCPP has become more aware of the need to address process issues and has made important progress in strengthening its management procedures. Key among these are ensuring that:

- Strategies have access to adequate human resources;
- Strategies have access to multi-year financing;
- Programming occurs against objectives and outcomes rather than just outputs;
- Risk management strategies are developed; and
- All relevant stakeholders participate in making decisions about project funding.

## 5.1 Adequate human resources

73. One of the problems confronting GCPP from its inception has been the inability to charge administrative costs to the pool. This has required the departments to 'donate' a portion of staff time to GCPP activities. While the desire not to create costly administrative structures is understandable, the reality is that a funding pool cannot run on auto-pilot. At present, most strategy managers allocate far less than 50 percent of their time to GCPP and GCPP activities generally have a low priority for other officials. The problem has become increasingly acute in recent years as staffing numbers have declined throughout HMG.

74. The lack of a strategy manager able to devote a significant amount of time to ensuring that GCPP processes work effectively was felt particularly strongly in regional strategies such as MENA and Russia / CIS. As a result, several years ago DFID and FCO began allocating additional resources to hire a strategy adviser to the Russia / CIS Strategy Manager (80 percent time) and a full-time MENA strategy manager. In view of the decision to consolidate all CPP geographic strategies into regional programmes, it is important to understand the impact of these two positions on GCPP outcomes.

75. The review team has only had first hand experience with the MENA strategy but interviews have suggested that similar benefits have accrued in Russia / CIS as well. The MENA strategy manager has helped country teams to:

- Identify conflict prevention priorities in Lebanon and OPT;
- Develop and implement risk monitoring procedures so that risk is reassessed on a monthly basis; and
- Develop higher quality activities.

The MENA strategy manager has also provided an important interface between posts and London, which has helped improve understanding of the situation in Lebanon and OPT. She has also been able to bring DFID's perspective to the table in Lebanon where DFID's engagement is limited to humanitarian assistance for Palestinian refugees. Overall the review team believe that this investment has been worthwhile.

76. Having a full-time, or near full-time, programme officer in country also appears to have advantages in terms of identifying higher quality activities, improving coherence of GCPP investments, encouraging international co-ordination and identifying linkages across departmental silos in security/justice area. In Lebanon there is a full-time stabilisation and security adviser who plays an important role in ensuring that post's security-related portfolio (financed by the Global Opportunities Fund and the Defence Assistance Fund as well as GCPP) is on track, assessing risks, promoting co-ordination among donors and identifying new funding activities. This position has been funded as a GCPP project and the stabilisation and security adviser is a consultant. In OPT and Nepal the Conflict Advisers do not devote 100 percent of their time to either GCPP or security-related work but give significant input nonetheless.

77. In Afghanistan, the conflict adviser has played a key role since late 2007 in helping assess HMG's strategic direction in the country but has not played a major role in bringing greater coherence to GCPP work. In recognition of the need to strengthen its project management capacity across the board, FCO created its second ever programme office in Kabul. This office was in the process of staffing up while the review team visited Afghanistan. However, it appears likely that, properly configured and working in close collaboration with the DFID office in Kabul, the Embassy Programme Office could provide guidance aimed at developing SAF projects oriented toward achieving priority outcomes.

78. The creation of the Embassy Programme Office in Kabul also underscores the importance of the administrative aspects of project management. A stabilisation and security adviser or a conflict adviser has much to contribute to the strategic and substantive aspects of project management. They should ideally not need to spend a large amount of time with the administrative aspects.

## **5.2 GCPP procedures**

79. When the transition to CPP was announced, GCPP had already begun to implement a series of reforms based on the findings of an internal audit. These included a three-year time horizon for projects and greater emphasis on objectives, outcomes and risk management to enhance the strategic nature of GCPP programming. Officials interviewed generally agreed that these changes have the potential to improve the quality and strategic focus of GCPP projects. The ability to programme against objectives and outcomes depends on, at a minimum, agreed conflict prevention objectives and, ideally, agreed country strategy (section 3.1). It is also clearly facilitated by the allocation of adequate London-based and in-country human resources (section 5.1).

### **Multi-year programming**

80. There was widespread agreement that the ability to develop multi-year projects as foreseen in the 2008-11 CSR would improve the sustainability of CPP investments as long as guaranteed funding levels apply to country allocations and not regional allocations. The Nepal country team expressed particular concern that its inclusion in a South Asia programme would reduce the predictability of funding and undermine their ability to support important institutional reforms such as the ongoing MOD strengthening work.

81. The new three-year time horizon will pose particular challenges for FCO and MOD staff. It will require new skills in terms of designing and managing projects that will deliver desired outcomes. The fact that FCO has established a programme office to assist its staff in Afghanistan to deal with these activities indicates that there is a skills gap that needs to be addressed. The Embassy in Kabul is also offering a programme management course for its staff and there appeared to the review team to be good communication between the programme office and the DFID country office.

82. In addition to skill gaps, it is also evident that there will be challenges in terms of the duration of tours of duty, which are typically very limited in a country like Afghanistan. Staff tours are sometimes only 6-12 months, including regular retreats and leave. These conditions are sensible and realistic given the hardship conditions. However, they complicate the design, implementation and monitoring of programmes. Staff in Afghanistan increasingly view a tour of two years as a minimum requirement to become effective given the complexity of the situation. The Defence Attaché in Kabul, for example, informed the review team that the tour of future Defence Attachés would be extended to 24 months.

## Monitoring and evaluation (M&E)

83. The need for effective monitoring and evaluation is increasingly recognised throughout HMG as essential to achieving outcomes consistent with UK objectives. Although GCPP has increased attention to programme monitoring, the review team judges that more expertise is needed in this area. Lessons learned from the MENA strategy in this regard might usefully be applied to other regional strategies in the future. Additionally, there do not appear to have been many evaluations conducted of GCPP projects.

84. Monitoring and evaluation will become increasingly important as more multi-year projects are developed. Currently, M&E is an area of weakness for HMG in general and SSR more specifically. This is an area that a future SSAC programme should prioritise. In doing so, the SSAC can build on good practice that is currently being developed. The review team found, for example, that a full-time strategy manager / adviser could make an important difference by strengthening monitoring and evaluation practice in London. At field level, the team found that in Kabul, the FCO programme office could provide similar support. Given the expertise already available in CPP and the SSAC, joined-up approaches at post might in the future draw on DFID M&E experience / capacity / staff where DFID programme offices exist. It should be recognised however that requirements for monitoring and evaluation have costs in terms of staff time and financial resources. In this regard, consideration could be given to working with other partners and organisations to develop and execute M&E.

## Risk management

85. Because so much of GCPP programming has occurred in countries that are either still in conflict or could easily move back into conflict, an assessment of risks to GCPP programming is essential. A strategy for managing those risks is equally important, as is the regular updating of risk assessments.

86. The MENA strategy is most advanced in developing risk management monitoring and risk management strategies. The strategy manager has worked closely with country offices to help them understand the value of identifying and monitoring risks. MENA country strategies have risk matrices that are updated at post monthly and sent to the strategy manager. In addition, MENA strategies periodically review their programme in year and carry out prioritisation exercises to ensure that activities reflect changing priorities. GCPP team in Lebanon finds that the monthly updates are an essential part of their risk mitigation strategy. They report that by regularly providing realistic appraisals of the conditions under which projects are being implemented, officials in London are more willing to accept slow progress. The review team believes that specific guidance on undertaking risk assessments for SSR would be useful.

87. Political conditions sometimes force significant changes in GCPP programming. In some cases it is possible to change course and continue to spend within the overall programme. At other times, as with the Hezbollah-Israel war in June 2006 and after the January 2006 Palestine Legislative Council elections, ongoing projects have simply had to be halted. MENA officials report that in such cases potential replacement projects are accepted only if GCPP teams agree that they are of good enough quality.

## Training and capacity building

88. While having adequate numbers of staff is important, the quality of human resources is also critically important to achieving outcomes. One objective of the new SSAC programme is to increase the effectiveness of HMG's SSAC support. To achieve this, the SSAC programme could consider first developing SSR core competences, based on the DAC framework, in collaboration with other donors to increase the consistency of SSR training. Second, it could consider devolving training packages to the local level to increase the participation of the recipients of SSR assistance, both governmental and non-governmental, thus increasing the accountability of HMG to practice what it preaches. Training is of course important but once trained, HMG officials should not forget all the elements of good donor practice, in particular building on local priorities and capacities and promoting local ownership.



89. The advantages of having these core competencies at one's disposal became clear in the case of Lebanon. Here, the Defence Attaché's familiarity of SSR, resulting from his time in SSDAT, led to a comprehensive yet balanced and focused approach in line with best practice in SSR. Additionally, the ability to combine the Defence Attaché's programme level knowledge with strong project level support through the stabilisation and security adviser has further increased effectiveness. As good as this example may be in terms of the advantages of having these competencies, it also indicates that there is a need to ensure that this occurs by process rather than individual disposition. This suggests that Defence Attachés would benefit from having some SSR experience or exposure in order that they position SSR correctly and do not view it simply as an equip and train activity. Defence Attachés undertake extensive training before deployment and SSR should be a part of that training when Defence Attachés are assigned to countries where SSR is a key element of UK activity.

### **5.3 GCPP decision making**

90. The process by which GCPP investments are identified ranges from ad hoc (Afghanistan) to very well thought through (Lebanon). In part this seems to depend on the amount of time that officials can devote to GCPP. With the exception of Nepal, local involvement appears to be limited. Elsewhere, programming seems to be mainly determined by political imperatives (coming from London) and local conditions (role of the US).

91. While the main locus of decision-making appears to be in London, input from post appears to be growing. This was the case in Nepal (which noted an absence of feedback from London) while the MENA strategy manager has established a process by which any proposal submitted to her will first have been seen by all other key stakeholders and agreement reached on the priority of the project. There were no clear criteria for choosing projects, which may be related to the absence of an SSR policy and guidance on how SSR can best promote conflict prevention. Post in Lebanon had perhaps the most strategic view and is actively seeking to improve the synergy of security related activities funded from different funding streams. With the development of the Afghanistan Strategy, Afghanistan seems to be on a similar path. Nepal is also evolving towards an approach that may result in a similar synergy, but it is not yet as far down this path as Lebanon and Afghanistan.

92. The four posts visited have weekly, fortnightly or monthly meetings on these issues. Videoconferences with London and, in the case of Afghanistan, the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team occur regularly.

# 6 Next Steps: Transitioning to CPP

93. This review confirms HMG's role as the 'market leader' in SSR. In this context, the UK plays an important leadership role in applying a strategic approach to SSR programming, promoting joined-up working, influencing partner governments and other members of the international community and seeking to co-ordinate international SSR efforts.

94. This review has also identified eight areas that would benefit from additional attention in order to maximise the strategic and sustainable use of CPP resources. Many of these have already been identified as high priority by GCPP and, as this review has demonstrated, considerable progress has been recorded in strengthening GCPP practices. The following recommendations are intended to further strengthen CPP practices in these areas.

- Establishing the policy foundations for SSR;
- Clarifying the role of CPP in delivering conflict sensitive SSR;
- Strengthening the SSAC programme to act as an enabling mechanism to support CPP SSR interventions;
- Developing joined-up SSR programming;
- Reconciling long-term objectives and the need to demonstrate results;
- Strengthening the CPP bidding process;
- Ensuring the flexibility of resource use; and
- Allocating adequate human resources to CPP.

## 6.1 Policy foundations

95. There appears to be an increasingly shared view of what constitutes SSR across the three CPP departments. Nonetheless, the UK lacks one of the key elements of conflict sensitive SSR interventions: a formal policy defining what HMG means by SSR and its primary objectives in promoting SSR. From a CPP perspective attention should also be paid to the ways SSR can address the underlying causes of conflict. Given the growing alignment of departmental views, the environment might be favourable for the development of an HMG SSR policy.

**Recommendation 1: The review team recommends that HMG develops as a matter of priority an SSR policy that recognises the multi-faceted nature of SSR, i.e. promoting security and justice broadly, strengthening governance, and preventing conflict.**



## 6.2 Clarifying the role of CPP

96. It appears likely that one reason why GCPP had difficulty in adopting a strategic approach to SSR was that its value-added was not well defined or transmitted to those making funding decisions. GCPP / CPP is a mechanism for implementing policy and if neither the policy nor the purposes of the Pool are clear, it is difficult to use this money strategically.

97. In many cases, GCPP funding for SSR was used without adequate consideration of its contribution to conflict prevention. Availability of funding (GCPP, GOF/CT in particular) appears to have driven how projects were presented and funded rather than a reasonably objective assessment of the contribution the project could make to HMG conflict prevention objectives in a particular country. In other cases, decisions about GCPP funding appeared to be made on the basis of stabilisation oriented activities that were not necessarily sustainable or accountability oriented.

98. Additionally, the relatively limited amount of funding that will be available for SSR through CPP will constrain what can be achieved by CPP alone. Many of the SSR activities funded through GCPP were relatively small, limited in duration, and geographically dispersed. While it can be argued that continuing to fund SSR activities in a large number of countries raises the profile of SSR more widely, it may have implications for overall effectiveness and impact of CPP supported activities.

99. Going forward, expectations of what can be delivered through PSA 30 and CPP may be at odds with reality given the amount of money CPP will have at its disposal and the new requirements for ODA eligibility. Indeed, the ODA requirements appear to limit one of the main elements of both GCPP and ACPP in the past – their flexibility (see also 7.7). Additionally while new options for three-year programming are welcome, experience shows that most SSR programming requires an even longer time frame.

**Recommendation 2:** The review team recommends that HMG clarifies whether CPP should be used as seed money to jump start longer-term SSR activities that will be supported by one of the departments or other international actors or have the ambition of itself funding certain types of longer-term SSR activities, such as security policy development or MOD reform.

- If CPP funding is used as seed money, it will be important to consider the options for longer-term funding for the SSR projects started by CPP and the agreements necessary between CPP and other HMG or international funding mechanisms before commencing programming; and
- If CPP funding is used for longer-term SSR activities, it will be important to ensure that it does not duplicate work carried out by individual departments, by international partners, or with other funding streams and that adequate funding is available over the longer-term.

## 6.3 Strengthening the SSAC programme

100. In the past, GCPP's SSR Strategy did not fully meet the needs of HMG officials in country. It provided them neither with guidance on how to engage in SSR nor with adequate additional resources to develop and implement SSR activities. This has led to unnecessary and counterproductive differences in how country teams respond to SSR needs. To mitigate these problems the SSAC programme should provide value-added over and above the activities that it funds.

**Recommendation 3:** The review team recommends that in developing the new SSAC programme, CPP should consider how best to maximise operational support. In particular, CPP may wish to consider how the SSAC can promote:

- Formal SSR policy development to help guide CPP SSR programming;
- A deeper understanding across HMG of the value and objectives of engaging in SSR in the short, medium and longer term, with special attention to senior officials, and greater clarity on the contribution SSR can make to improved governance, economic and social development and conflict prevention; and
- Greater geographical focus and longer-term engagement, to enable the SSDAT to deepen their knowledge of context to improve effectiveness and impact of CPP investments, without limiting the flexibility to engage as short term needs arise.

## 6.4 Joined-up SSR programming

### HMG-wide strategies

101. The importance of a joined-up approach to maximising the effective, coherent and sustainable use of GCPP resources is increasingly well understood. HMG-wide strategies that guide all HMG activity (Afghanistan) or all joint HMG activities (Nepal) constitute significant steps in the direction of enhancing the complementarity of the various conflict prevention mechanisms at the disposal of HMG.

**Recommendation 4:** The review team recommends that HMG draws on the experience of Afghanistan and Nepal to develop HMG-wide strategies to guide all activities in priority CPP countries.

### SSR strategies

102. To assess how SSR can promote conflict prevention in a specific country or region, it is important to understand the full range of entry points for engaging in SSR (conflict prevention, broader aspects of security and justice, and democratic governance). This in turn requires: 1) developing an adequate, joined-up understanding of the security and justice environment, including the drivers of conflict; 2) agreeing a strategy for addressing priority needs; 3) demonstrating concrete progress over the short and medium term; and 4) obtaining input from all departments.

**Recommendation 5:** The review team recommends that where SSR is a priority in the HMG-wide strategies, focused SSR strategies should be developed to clarify the role SSR plays in conflict prevention and the value-added of different departments in implementing SSR.

### Evidence-based programming

103. Programming often has to begin before the security and justice environment can be reviewed in detail or an in-depth strategic approach be developed. In these cases, it is essential to obtain all readily available information at the outset and to progressively increase access to the information needed for strategy development and longer-term programming. As discussed throughout this report, UK officials have developed a number of ways of obtaining information on country context, including causes of conflict, governance deficits and socio-economic conditions. In the opinion of the review team, these do not produce adequate information to underpin effective and sustainable SSR programming.

**Recommendation 6:** The review team recommends that CPP takes the necessary steps to develop an adequate appreciation of the security and justice environment to guide the development of an SSR strategy. Options would include a more structured use of:

- Scoping studies by UK officials and / or consultants with strong political skills, a high level of knowledge of local context and a solid grounding in the principles of SSR;
- Ongoing project work combined with informal assessments to guide the development of longer-term programming by the UK and its international partners, drawing more strategically on local UK staff, project implementers and project advisers (including SSDAT and SU);
- The inception phase of longer-term programming used pragmatically to gather information; and
- A full assessment of the security and justice environment conducted with partner countries to identify priority needs. Experience in ACPP countries (Sierra Leone and Uganda) indicates that such reviews are unlikely to occur in the first few years following the cessation of hostilities but can be a useful exercise in helping to balance investment of scarce resources across the security and justice sectors.

## Monitoring, evaluation and risk management

104. As noted earlier, monitoring and evaluation is an area of weakness for HMG, especially with regard to SSR work and risk management. As CPP supports more multi-year programmes, the importance of monitoring and evaluation will increase. For example, the practice of conducting Output to Purpose reviews that is found in ACPP could usefully be applied throughout CPP in the future. Additionally, the value of identifying, regularly monitoring and developing methods for dealing with risks is increasingly recognised. GCPP has taken steps to improve risk management, with MENA leading in terms of practice. The team also found that one tool that has been underutilised by both GCPP and ACPP is scenario development. Building scenarios can provide options for next steps when projects succeed or run the risk of failure. Greater use of scenarios would require a more disciplined use of analytical instruments such as baseline studies, as well as drivers of change and conflict analyses.

**Recommendation 7:** The review team recommends that CPP explores methods of strengthening monitoring, evaluation and risk management procedures for multi-year programmes, with a view to issuing specific guidance for CPP regional programmes. In particular, CPP may wish to consider building on the experience of the MENA strategy to:

- Develop risk matrices for all countries receiving CPP funding;
- Introduce routine updating of risk factors (monthly, quarterly depending on the situation), including identification of emerging risks; and
- Develop scenarios on a regular basis to promote thinking on how to respond to potential positive and negative outcomes.

## 6.5 Reconciling long-term objectives and the need to demonstrate results

105. UK country teams face the twin challenges of supporting SSR activities designed to provide sustainable changes in the delivery of security and justice and demonstrating concrete progress in the short term. The highly political nature of SSR and its foundation in institutional reform and transformation means that outcomes will be achieved over a period of years. Nonetheless, there are many concrete steps that will need to be taken to achieve desired outcomes (such as reduced conflict, improved personal and community security, accessible justice systems) that can and should be highlighted.

**Recommendation 8:** The review team recommends that where focused SSR strategies are produced, in addition to specifying the medium to longer-term outcomes, these strategies should:

- More clearly identify specific outputs that will contribute to achievement of outcomes during each six-month period; and
- Contain a communication strategy aimed both at local stakeholders and UK policy-makers.

## 6.6 CPP bidding process

106. UK officials have expressed the desire for more guidance on what constitutes a good SSR project and bid.

**Recommendation 9:** The review team recommends that the CPP SSAC programme develop guidance for CPP bidders to assist them in thinking through the core principles of successful SSR programming and potential synergy with related activities. This guidance may not be applicable in all cases, but should assist in increasing the complementarity and effectiveness of HMG's diplomatic, defence and development interventions. Some of the questions that such guidance might address include:

- How was the decision made to undertake this project: context, consultation, a coherent approach linked to relevant HMG policies / strategies?
- Is the national reform environment supportive of the project? Or is the project intended to improve the

reform environment?

- Are there national strategies / policies for HMG to link with? Or is the project intended to help develop such strategies / policies?
- How does the project link with related work being carried out by other international actors?
- What risks are there and how will they be managed? For the host government? For HMG?
- How will the project and its benefits be sustained?
- How will this project be monitored? What indicators? As part of a country team SSR strategy? Independently?

## 6.7 Flexibility of resource use

### Breaking down funding silos

107. The review team has identified funding silos within CPP, especially the new SSAC programme, as a potential constraint on financing the highest priority conflict prevention SSR activities.

**Recommendation 10:** The review team recommends that CPP consider exploring how to break down funding silos within the SSAC programme in order to promote the allocation of resources to the highest conflict prevention activities. In this regard, CPP may wish to consider the following questions:

- How can Defence Education and SALW work be better linked to SSR objectives as identified through the SSAC programme and conflict assessments?
- Would conflict sensitive SSR be better served if some of these funding lines were allocated to other SSR objectives based on an assessment of priorities?
- How can the money currently allocated to GFN-SSR be most effectively used to meet the needs of UK officials (partly addressed through a parallel needs assessment process)?

### ODA eligibility issues

108. HMG's international partners have consistently praised the flexibility of the conflict prevention pools and their ability to finance a wide range of activities without having to consider ODA limitations. It is possible that the new requirements for ODA eligibility of CPP investments will reduce this flexibility. It is also possible that the new ODA requirements may provide incentives for more comprehensive and integrated SSR programming, thereby further enhancing joined-up UK work.

**Recommendation 11:** The review team recommends that CPP assess the impact of the ODA requirement on its ability to support the highest priority conflict prevention activities with a view to presenting the evaluation to HM Treasury at the end of the first year of CPP operations.

## 6.8 Human resource needs

### In-country programme officers and administrative support

109. The review team has found that quality and consistency of regional and country strategies and interventions improves with the addition of sufficient dedicated capacity at the strategy, programme management and programme administration level both at headquarters and in-country. CPP intends to appoint Strategy Managers for all regional programmes, which will be an important step in strengthening the strategic use of resources.

**Recommendation 12:** The review team recommends that CPP builds upon the experience of the UK country team in Lebanon by considering appointing a full-time programme officer in countries where security and SSR are identified as a priority and the magnitude of programming warrants such an investment and determines how to provide requisite administrative support.

### **SSR advisory support**

110. In 2008/09, CPP work will account for 40 per cent of the SSR Adviser's time and 10 per cent of the Justice Adviser's time. The new SSAC programme and the need to provide increased support for multi-year projects will only generate greater demand for advice.

111. Additionally, in order to deliver and evaluate SSR programmes, specific skills will be required within the SSAC and HMG more broadly. This could be promoted by establishing a competency framework to determine the skills required to design, deliver and evaluate SSR programmes more effectively. It could also be promoted by further training and capacity development activities, including existing activities such as the SSR practitioners' course and routine Defence Attaché training. These activities should ideally be undertaken in partnership with other **bilaterals and multilaterals to the extent possible**.

**Recommendation 13:** The review team recommends that CPP consider whether additional London-based SSR / justice advisory support is desirable to improve the quality of SSR interventions, as well as to maintain HMG's position as 'market leader' in SSR, and if so, how to obtain and improve that support.

# Appendix A: HMG GCPP Work in Afghanistan<sup>1</sup>

## A.1 Country context

1. After decades of war, Afghanistan is an extremely fragile state struggling to get back on its feet. This requires (re)building state institutions that are capable of providing basic services (including personal and community security and accessible justice system), but also the country's physical infrastructure and economy. In addition to the challenge of state building, Afghanistan still faces open conflict in some parts of the country and the risk of terrorist attacks throughout its territory due to the Taliban insurgency.

2. These problems are compounded by a weak economy in which opium production accounts for over 30% of Afghan GDP. Drug economy related problems are rife and permeate society, fuelling corruption within the central and provincial governments, as well as crime and violence throughout the country. Particularly important for the international community is the linkage between the drug trade and the insurgency. All parties involved in the lucrative drug trade, both the Taliban and the drug traffickers, have a common interest in resisting Afghan Government authority and international forces. As a result, counter-narcotics (CN) ranks high on the international agenda.

3. The challenge for both the Government of Afghanistan and the international community is to face and deal with this broad range of interrelated threats to the long-term security, development and effective governance of Afghanistan. Meeting this challenge calls for a comprehensive and integrated approach of which SSR is a vital component.

## A.2 Current GCPP work

4. GCPP expenditures are most effective when aligned with other strategies and activities. This is key in a setting like Afghanistan where there are currently numerous players with different, often conflicting, approaches within HMG, the Afghan government and the international community. Interviews at post suggest the Embassy has made progress in developing a coherent UK approach since the arrival of the current British Ambassador (HMA) in April 2007. Since that time, HMA has assumed a lead role in developing a new strategy on the basis of a truly joined-up process within the Embassy. The dynamics of joined-up working were widely report as very positive and helpful in providing all UK officials with much-needed coherent guidance. The Prime Minister's statement on Afghanistan in early December 2007 formalised the overall framework for UK support to Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup>

5. Given the fluidity of the situation in Afghanistan, frequent reassessments of the environment and flexibility in responses to new developments are essential. One of the key HMG sub-strategies, the Helmand strategy, was up for serious review after 18 months in operation, but it was not clear to the review team whether and how review processes are built into the HMG-wide strategy and the various

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
<sup>1</sup> The team spent ten days in Afghanistan in October-November 2007, received excellent support from the Embassy, and had the opportunity to meet with a large number of UK Embassy staff, Helmand PRT staff, and international officials including representatives of the United States and the United Nations, and visited several projects. Unfortunately the opportunity to interview Afghan officials was limited. The programme also allowed for a visit to Regional Command-South in Kandahar.

<sup>2</sup> [www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page14050.asp](http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page14050.asp) .

strategies flowing from it.

6. The co-operation within the country team is seen as successful. There are differences in emphasis, but these are discussed and overall the Embassy and DFID, co-located in the same compound in Kabul, work in the same direction. The DFID Conflict Adviser is in practice HMG's conflict adviser. The new strategy appears to give sufficient attention to the various departmental elements of the wider stabilisation, reconstruction, and reform effort. UK programmes and projects in Afghanistan are intended to flow from the policies and choices of the Government of Afghanistan (GoA). They are also part of a wider range of interventions supported by the international community (in particular the US). The country team accordingly tests its ideas and approaches against those of other partners, and influencing is a major aspect of HMG activities. The US is the main player but is difficult to influence. Another major challenge is that the objectives of the many other countries engaged in Afghanistan are often unclear.

7. While available data are imprecise, the share of SSR expenditure in overall GCPP investments appears to have decreased between 2004 and 2008 (see figure). This is a remarkable finding for a country that is in the midst of building a new security sector and is facing multiple challenges relating to SSR. The trend also suggests the need for a closer analysis of the effects of the new Stabilization Aid Fund, where 80% of spending will need to be ODA eligible. It will be important to identify whether and how current expenditures fit within these criteria.



8. GCPP SSR support has focused on establishing effective and accountable security institutions through collaboration with the Afghan Government and international partners. Assistance has included logistical and technical support for the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police force (ANP). It has been provided through a range of channels, including police, governance, prison and justice advisers and mentors in Afghan as well as international/multinational organisations in Kabul. Special attention was furthermore paid to the civilianisation of the Afghan MOD. GCPP also supported CN SSR-related activities and projects by ADIDU.<sup>3</sup>

9. Although all parties acknowledge the need for a closely co-ordinated, comprehensive approach, achieving it in practice has proven difficult. Donor countries – including the UK – increasingly seek to align their assistance with national strategies through the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The security sector, however, is the one element of the ANDS for which a sectoral strategy is still lacking.

10. The US dominates assistance to Afghanistan's security and justice institutions, even where other countries are nominally in the lead. This has largely defined the options for the UK. The strategic decision to work with advisers and to focus on influencing is important. The UK has been able to provide widely accepted and respected advisers in key positions and in this way has been better able to exert influence on plans and their implementation than would have been possible simply on the basis of overall investments.

### A.3 Next steps

11. The review team was impressed by the joined-up approach and the positive reactions it received from all interviewees at post. This approach was generally perceived to provide more strategic direction and co-ordination at post. **Both CPP and SAF may wish to identify the lessons that can usefully be drawn from the experience of developing and implementing this HMG-wide approach for other posts.**

12. Concerning the groundwork for GCPP investments, new approaches, programmes and projects are based on assessments and analyses made at the request of the Embassy and carried out by the GFN-

<sup>3</sup> Most CN work has not been categorised as SSR.



SSR, research organizations and consultants. The HMG-wide Afghanistan strategy drew on analyses of previous counter-insurgency approaches. The CN team has commissioned research and used the findings and reports for developing its new approaches. In 2008 DFID commissioned a consulting firm to conduct a broad review of conditions in Afghanistan, 'Understanding Afghanistan', that is intended to provide input primarily to future DFID programming but is also intended to inform the activities of HMG more widely as well as the international development community active in Afghanistan. This review will include a strategic conflict assessment. ***What appears to be missing is a jointly executed and owned assessment that could be helpful in better prioritising decisions and allocating funds for projects. At a minimum, the results of the 'Understanding Afghanistan' review should be discussed jointly by the UK country team in Kabul and Helmand with a view to agreeing how these findings affect HMG's approach in Afghanistan.***

13. In order to strengthen GCPP management and decision-making and promote a more strategic approach to UK investments so that future SAF projects are aligned with other HMG activities, more and clearer guidance criteria for bids would be desirable. The need for guidance was expressed in particular in regard to the Helmand strategy and related projects. ***Strategies that are able to keep pace with the evolving situation in Afghanistan require more regular assessments. CPP (and SAF) should consider integrating the development of scenarios that focus on different outcomes into future assessments and planning in order to guide decision-making processes.***

14. GCPP investments have often been stabilisation oriented, and have not necessarily responded to a clear SSR strategy. The decision to expand the period for projects from one to three years is most welcome, as HMG officials suggested that this could lead to more sustainable interventions and possibly also improve the synergy between GCPP (SAF) projects and DFID activities. The high turnover of staff is, however, a major challenge. In particular, the short tours for military staff in Helmand (six months) makes it difficult for staff to decide upon, or engage in, longer-term activities and the pressures are great to undertake activities that produce 'quick wins'. The duration of tours may even be shorter than the design phase of projects. ***In order to prevent ad hoc approaches or unnecessary repetitive design processes, it would be advisable for the Afghanistan country team to establish clear procedures for project development and give the Embassy Programme Office a more prominent role in the design and monitoring phases of programming. The Programme Office could also help integrate quick wins into longer-term investments.***

15. Although it is welcomed, the new three-year time horizon for CPP / SAF projects poses a challenge for FCO staff. It requires new skills in project design that will deliver outcomes against agreed objectives. FCO staff will also need more experience in managing projects. The establishment of a Programme Office in Kabul to support Embassy staff in project design and management and bid preparation indicates that this is a skills gap that needs to be addressed. The course in programme management that is now being offered Embassy staff should help in this regard. ***Attention should also be given to improving capacity to monitor and evaluate programs. Such experience is available in DFID, and the Afghanistan country team could consider how best to integrate DFID experience and capacity in the management / monitoring of future SAF projects.***

16. Finally, the review team believes that lessons can be learned from SOCA. Past experience has taught SOCA that strategies are often too short term. Cases like Colombia and Pakistan demonstrate clearly that there are no 'silver bullets' and that the types of changes currently sought in Afghanistan require attention over a period of 20 – 30 years, with strategies developed in 5-year phases with clearly defined exit strategies. ***The Afghanistan country team may wish to consider the extent to which this approach could be applied to other HMG interventions in Afghanistan and CPP may similarly wish to incorporate this lesson into its approach.***



# Appendix B: HMG GCPP Work in Lebanon<sup>1</sup>

## B.1 Country context

1. The situation in Lebanon can be characterised as fragile stability. After the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri and the withdrawal of Syrian troops, hope for a new and more stable period in the country's political history quickly disappeared with Israel's mid-2006 offensives in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon following the capture of three Israeli soldiers by the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Lebanese Party of God (Hizbollah).
2. UN Security Council Resolution 1701 halted the fighting between Israel and Hizbollah and mandated UNIFIL to stabilise the border between the two countries. However, it did not end Lebanon's internal problems. Confessional divisions play a central role in determining political reality, as exemplified by several large protests and political assassinations during the deadlocked presidential electoral process in 2007/08.
3. The effects of internal confessional dividing lines not only influence politics but also the functioning of the Internal Security Forces (the police) and the Sûreté Générale, among others, who are controlled by different groups. The only relatively neutral security actor – the least powerful but most influential – is the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The assassination of General François al-Hajj in December 2007 heralded a battle for the army leadership, which could tilt the balance of power either toward those aligned with the West or toward those aligned with Syria and Iran.
4. These problems are compounded by the existence of several non-state armed groups that can challenge the monopoly of violence of the state, as well as by the role and influence of major powers (the United States) and countries with traditional interest in the region (France). In this setting, the UK is a smaller player. Yet, GCPP funded SSR activities are important.


## B.2 Current GCPP work

5. GCPP strategy for Lebanon fits within HMG's strategy of promoting democracy and governance, supporting the MEPP (peace with Israel and accommodation with Syria and Iran), disarming Hizbollah and Palestinian groups, and developing a security sector strategy to deliver effective security and justice. In particular security sector engagement can affect political developments and progress in the MEPP. It is clear that Lebanon faces a long-term process of change and that GCPP is only a small fund. To maximise impact, GCPP thus has to be used in support of (or supported by) other strands of HMG's strategy toward Lebanon.

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<sup>1</sup> The team spent five days in Lebanon, received excellent support from the Embassy, and had the opportunity to meet with several Embassy representatives, as well as members of the international community, including representatives of the US, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, international civil society and local civil society. The team also took two field trips to important projects in the north (German led Border Pilot Project) and the south (Operation Blue Line: HQ in Nacoura and the Ghanaian Contingent), which led to a better understanding of GCPP supported activities.

6. The review team found that some steps have been taken to establish better co-ordination of GCPP, DAF and GOF/CT funding. In the absence of DFID at post, the lead on GCPP SSR is with the Defence Attaché and the Stabilisation and Security Adviser (a position that currently is also a GCPP SSR project), supported by the Deputy Head of Mission. However, the team was told that due to the dynamics of the different funding windows, the different funding streams operate largely independently, with projects being funded under different headings in a somewhat ad hoc manner. Since 2005, some £250,000 were spent on GCPP SSR activities such as police and judiciary reform, a Lebanon SSR scoping by the SSDAT, human rights training, border security and support to the German Border Pilot (phase 1), and a Stabilisation Advisor for the Embassy (see figure).



7. One of the challenges in Lebanon is the absence of an overall national SSR strategy with which to align UK SSR work. However, SSR is linked to issues of wider stabilisation. One of HMG's objectives is to investigate and use opportunities for engaging with the Lebanese government on the development of a security sector strategy. An earlier attempt by the SSDAT did not succeed to establish a breakthrough, but made clear that more should be done to understand the dynamics of local politics and the role of external actors.

8. At post, the Defence Attaché and the Stabilisation and Security Adviser have invested in smaller assessments that can help in identifying entry points, but at the time of the review team's visit there had been no Strategic Conflict Assessment. Post subsequently decided to undertake an SCA in order to guide all HMG programming, whether through the GOF, the DAF, GCPP / CPP or post's bilateral funds. The SCA will be conducted by the Stabilisation and Security Adviser. The OPT Conflict Adviser will assist in developing the assessment and will also review its findings. It was decided to conduct the review internally, rather than contracting with external consultants, in order to make use of the Stabilisation and Security Adviser's deep knowledge of local context. The involvement of the OPT Conflict Adviser is intended to inject an 'outside' perspective into the process, as well as to provide input from DFID.

9. The review team found that the addition of a Stabilisation Adviser to the team at post has had an important added value by providing an integrated view on security-related activities, and thereby identifying new entry points, highlighting weaknesses in implementation, and promoting co-ordination of different UK strands of activity and international efforts. The Adviser receives administrative support from a full-time Chancery project officer.

10. The limited nature of GCPP funds and the role of donors like the United States and France also make it important to act strategically and to co-ordinate GCPP investments closely with other donors. The review team found that post has taken on this challenge quite successfully. The UK-French programme to strengthen the National Commission on Interministerial Cooperation for Security fits this profile. In terms of acting strategically, post has also opted for seconding advisors (financed from different funds, including GCPP) to important projects like the EU-led project on crime scene management and the German led Border Pilot Project. By seconding advisors, the UK has managed to influence these projects by strengthening project management and injecting a process approach (Border Pilot), as well as by a introducing more strategic planning as part an overall SSR strategy approach.

11. Post also tried to establish a co-ordination mechanism after the 2006 war, but this proposal was not acceptable to the Government of Lebanon and some of larger donors. Currently, post is attempting to improve the exchange of information on projects and programmes among donors by setting up a donor matrix that is discussed regularly. Not all donors are convinced of the utility of this approach, as the matrix is not regularly updated and does not contain all relevant information. Post has also suggestion upgrading the matrix meetings to discuss the content of projects and approaches with the aim of improving co-ordination of activities and avoiding overlap, as well as using the meetings for assessing options for joint programs. The review team noted, however, that approaches in the donor community differ quite strongly. This suggests a reassessment of the current mechanism and its use.

### B.3 Next steps

12. Given the limitations in terms of budget and role of the UK, post has developed an approach of SSR that is guided by strategically positioned advisors, co-ordination and a focused selection of projects where the UK can make a difference. In this way, ***the UK has become very effective in terms of influencing. Continuing along these lines therefore seems advisable.***

13. The role of a Stabilisation and Security Adviser for GCPP has proven to be key. If the position is not continued by a consultant, nor as permanent member of the team at post, choices will have to be made in terms of doing fewer or different (easier) SSR projects, or contracting out SSR work to individual consultants on a case-by-case basis. The downside of that approach would be that the team at post would have less of an overview of projects, would have more difficulty identifying entry points and project opportunities, and might well see a drop in overall effectiveness. ***It is therefore suggested that the CPP MENA programme continue the position of the Stabilisation and Security Adviser or find another means of continuing to fulfil that function. CPP might also wish to examine the applicability of the Lebanon country team's experience with this position for other countries where SSR is a major component of the country team's approach.***

14. The SSR experience of the Defence Attaché has also proven to be key. ***CPP should consider how to ensure that in the future Defence Attachés assigned to Lebanon and other posts where SSR is a high priority receive appropriate pre-deployment training.***

15. Officials at post noted that the UK did not always fully exploit options to link up with other funding streams, such as those of the EU. ***The country team may therefore wish to consider how best to exploit such options more systematically in the future, even if this comes at the cost of spending money less rapidly.***

16. The review team understands that post plans to carry out an SCA as soon as possible, without waiting for a new President to be elected. Given the complexity and volatility of the situation in Lebanon, this decision makes good sense. ***In this context, the country team may wish to give particular attention to developing scenarios that would provide HMG with options to react to different developments. It would be helpful if such scenarios focused on the short to medium term in order to assess next steps.***

# Appendix C: HMG GCPP Work in Nepal<sup>1</sup>

## C.1 Country context

1. Following the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006, Nepal continues to face a precarious political situation. The objectives and future role of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) remain unclear, as does the commitment of the other members of the 7-party interim coalition government to the electoral process and political reforms implied in the CPA. The elections for a Constituent Assembly, twice postponed, are now planned to be held in April 2008, and despite the reluctance of all of the parties involved to adhere to the timetable, it appears that the elections will occur this time around.

2. The main challenges to SSR are:

- The postponement of elections has led to a virtual standstill in the implementation of the CPA and has contributed to new problems, notably increasing unrest due to ethnic and regional grievances and a sense that the peace process is not making progress.
- A deterioration of public security has led to the emergence of criminal and armed groups (such as the Young Communist League, or YCL) that have become a source of unrest in large parts of the country. Problems range from impunity to lack of skills and capacity to the absence of an adequate legal framework.
- Resistance to army integration from the side of the Nepal Army means that the discharge of Maoist fighters has been postponed, a situation that could create problems and mutiny if not addressed. Questions remain as to what will happen with those fighters who should be integrated in the NA.

## C.2 Current GCPP work

3. Current GCPP work is guided by the Nepal Strategy, which focuses on state-building and conflict prevention. The Strategy embodies a multi-strand approach, addressing a number of challenges simultaneously, strategically, and flexibly. Such an approach is very important in Nepal's volatile, fragile state environment.

- Many of GCPP activities led by MOD – such as professionalisation activities and enhancing the capability of the Nepal Army to deal with improvised explosive devices and demining – help to create buy-in from and maintain influence with one of the main potential CPA spoilers.
- Priority has been given to activities critical to the implementation of the CPA. The review team was told by several UN actors that UK support provided through GCPP was essential for their ability to begin their work. This includes the registration and verification of Maoist combatants and the


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<sup>1</sup> The team spent three days in Kathmandu, received excellent support from the Embassy and DFID, and had the opportunity to meet with representatives of all three departments at post, the Nepalese government, other international actors including representatives of India, Switzerland, and the United Nations, international civil society and local civil society. Unfortunately the team was unable to meet with any political party representatives.

establishment of the arms monitoring team. Next steps will be the integration and alternative roles of former fighters in the security system.

- There is also complementarity between GCPP and DFID work: a) use of GCPP funds to jump start public security work which will subsequently be paid for by DFID (e.g. the work on community policing and, possibly, prisons) and b) DFID support to the DCAF initiative which is intended to lay the basis for discussion of broad based SSR.
- Support to the International Crisis Group enables regular reporting that enhances post's understanding of the situation in Nepal and also informs partners. ICG reports are widely read, highly regarded, and taken as a point of reference.
- SSDAT work with the Nepalese MOD is essential because: a) it is a key component of achieving democratic control over the Nepal Army; b) it may help open opportunities for future work on a defence review or even a broader security review; and c) more generally it enhances the UK profile with key Nepalese stakeholders, especially the NA, for whom the UK is one of the few international actors who are really trusted partners.

4. Overall SSR-related expenditures for Nepal have fluctuated over the years, with a significant increase in 2006. This suggests a link between GCPP SSR expenditures and conflict prevention, i.e. peace building and state building. The dip in 2007-08 is related to the postponed elections, as a result of which few new projects were started (see figure).



5. There is a clear need for attention to public security. The UK is in a particularly strong position vis-à-vis the government. The Stabilisation Unit, supported by GCPP funds, has undertaken scoping work and consensus building activities. Other GCPP SSR projects during this period include explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), exchange visits of senior security force officers, human rights training, combating impunity, support to OHCHR, and support to ex-combatants.

6. In terms of approach and management, the country team is aware of the need to be flexible. A 6-month action plan has been developed in line with these requirements. In order to be on top of developments, the Embassy and DFID team are now finalising a Nepal context monitoring / stability indicator tool. Information is shared during weekly meetings in the Embassy.

7. Officials at post noted that more feedback from London would be welcomed. Some also felt that GCPP procedures are time-consuming given the relatively small size of GCPP projects.

### C.3 Next steps

8. The new Nepal Strategy constitutes an important step forward in terms of increasing and formalising a) tri-departmental co-operation at post and b) a London-Kathmandu agreement on approach. A coherent approach at post will provide a good entry point for enhancing the effectiveness of SSR investments by better exploiting cross linkages with other programs. ***This approach provides a solid base for future work. One issue that CPP and the country team may wish to consider in is whether it is feasible to develop a strategy covering all HMG work in country.***

9. The three departments represented at post currently undertake different, and not necessarily joint, assessments, although there seems to be a process for sharing the findings of these assessments. The last SCA was conducted in 2002. ***At this point an SCA might add value by providing: a) a jointly executed and agreed upon and owned assessment at the outset of the CPP's operations; b) a broader assessment of the situation in Nepal at this crucial stage in the peace process; and c) a means of further focusing the Nepal strategy by prioritising the use of scarce CPP resources and providing guidance on how best to achieve greater complementarity of the use of funds from***

**different sources.** The latter aspect may become an even greater necessity if the effect of the new 70% ODA-eligibility criterion is a reduction in the flexibility of the CPP's ability to finance the full range of SSR related work.

10. The highly volatile situation also seems to call for more proactive attitudes and different options for planning ahead. ***Given HMG's position and role Nepal, the review team suggests that in addition to an SCA, more attention should be given to forward thinking. The current 6-month action plan and the stability monitoring matrix, in combination with an SCA, would provide a good starting point to develop scenarios aimed at finding new windows of opportunity and entry points to deal with new situations or shifting alliances.***

# Appendix D: HMG GCPP Work in Occupied Palestinian Territories<sup>1</sup>

## D.1 Country context

1. The Palestinian Authority can be characterised as besieged from without and divided from within. Domestic issues and rivalries between Palestinians such as the power struggles between Hamas and Fateh have created chaos in the political system and added a layer of complexity to the challenges that result from Israel's policies. The current splits between Gaza and the West Bank and Hamas and Fateh have a serious destabilising and paralysing effect on the political system. These splits also imply great difficulties in reaching basic decisions on Palestinian objectives and how these can be achieved. As elsewhere, Palestinian leaders must enjoy popular legitimacy and the capacity to make decisions. The 2006 legislative election and the reaction of the international community and Israel to the outcome has deepened power struggles, led to greater intra-Palestinian violence and strengthened Hamas' position. The latter has further complicated matters, particularly for the international community.

2. Israel's quest for security is at the heart of the Roadmap. This puts great pressure on the PA to perform well in the area of suppressing violence against Israel, in particular the prevention of rocket and suicide attacks. Failure regularly leads to confrontational Israeli responses such as military retaliations and preventive actions. The solution that the PA, Israel and the international community (with a lead role for the US) officially adhere to is the construction of unified, effective and accountable national institutions, appointment of competent and credible officials, rule of law and good governance. Yet, against the background outlined in the above, serious questions can be raised as to what can and should be done in the case of OPT. The development of an effective, efficient and accountable security sector has been prioritised, although what constitutes a satisfactory outcome in this regard varies considerably among key actors.

3. In this setting, the UK is a smaller, but by no means insignificant, player. The overall aim of HMG's GCPP strategy is to contribute to a more benign security environment for Israelis and Palestinians. GCPP funded SSR activities to assist the PA in (re)building its security capacity are an important component of this approach. It is clear, however, that in OPT the lead on the delivery of SSR is with the United States Security Coordinator and his staff. At the same time, the USSC has limited influence over US security policy in toward OPT and no control over Israeli actions that affect the success of the USSC's efforts.

## D.2 Current GCPP work

4. During a GCPP strategy workshop with participation of among others the London based MENA strategy manager, the Consulate General in Jerusalem has worked towards the development of a shared strategy on OPT. Although this is not yet a fully integrated plan, it shows that GCPP can help in bringing the three departments together with the aim to share information, to consult partners, and to develop a joined-up approach. This role of GCPP in this is important as it was noted by officials at post that it is sometimes helpful to discuss different points of view.

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<sup>1</sup> The team spent three days in Jerusalem, received excellent support from the Embassy and DFID, and had the opportunity to meet with representatives of all three departments at post, the PA, the USSC, EUCOPPS and other international actors including representatives of the Netherlands, the Quartet, and the EU.



5. There is no recent SCA for OPT. Reasons for this offered by UK officials at post ranged from experiences with previous SCAs as being too big, to issues of findings and recommendations that are impractical given the highly politicised environment of OPT. The alternative approach chosen by the country team is to focus on smaller, more strategic assessments that will 'drip feed' information to guide decisions and, when taken together, will provide an overall picture of the situation. This includes support to ICG for specific studies, as well as the use of smaller studies by other donors (for example on the detention system). However, officials at post noted that there still may be insufficient attention to all perspectives and issues on the Israeli and Palestinian sides. This seems to suggest that there still is added value from a broader analysis supporting strategy development.

6. GCPP strategy has a strong focus on SSR. However, the concern was raised by some members of the country team that activities are implemented under conditions of actual conflict and questions were raised whether this was an appropriate environment for SSR. The London based MENA strategy manager has paid special attention to the issue of risk assessments and risk management, and the risks assessment for all OPT projects is updated monthly.

7. GCPP team at post meets on a fortnightly basis at the Consulate General to discuss projects. The team also consults and includes views from the Embassy in Tel Aviv. These meetings involve the (Deputy) Head of Mission, the Defence Attaché, the conflict adviser, the head of EUCOPPS, and the military liaison officer working with the USSC.


8. HMG's strategy focuses on civil policing (EUPOL COPPS), security service reform through the USSC (with a strong military focus), and security governance. GCPP activities are complementary to those of DFID and the MOD. DFID focuses more on the civil police reform activities, while the MOD prioritises the reform of the security services through the USSC. DFID also funds activities related to security governance, such as the Public Administration and Civil Service Reform Project, and plans to fund the Governance Support Facility.

9. GCPP has provided some £1.4 million for SSR-related activities between 2004/05 and 2007/08 (see figure). This has financed, among other things, training and equipment support to EUPOL COPPS, as well as the UK staff seconded to the USSC team consisting of a Military Liaison Officer, a Project Manager, and a Policing Adviser. Since there is no SSR strategy for OPT, the UK also brought in a Brigadier to work for the USSC with the aim to help develop such a strategy.

10. The UK secondments to the USSC should be seen as part of an influencing strategy aimed in part at broadening the primarily military perspective of the USSC on SSR. The review team believes that the addition of the police adviser resulted in a better understanding of the scope of SSR, of the importance of linking policing, justice and corrections, and of the role of other international actors such as EUPOL COPPS. The other added value of the UK postings is that they provide the USSC with 'eyes and ears' in OPT. UK staff do not face the same restrictions as US officials in travelling within OPT or meeting with relevant stakeholders, except Hamas.

11. At the same time, the USSC's current approach faces several challenges. First there is the question of the sustainability of an approach that does not include all major Palestinian stakeholders. Second there are questions about the degree to which such an approach promotes conflict resolution / management / reduction objectives. Third, the USSC's plan is costly and probably not financially sustainable, especially without significant US support. It was therefore worrying that the USSC has disbursed only a small amount of money to date. This was perceived by some Palestinian stakeholders as undermining confidence and demonstrating a lack of real commitment. While the USSC is beginning to finance some training, stringent Israeli regulations and procedures have complicated the execution of such projects.

12. The impact of the Brigadier's mission could not yet be assessed. However, it seems possible that the



Brigadier and his eventual team can play an important role in the absence of a Palestinian lead in this area and the increasing pressure on the USSC to develop such a more comprehensive SSR plan.

13. The impact of the UK is also visible in the critical area of the reform and strengthening of the Palestinian Civilian Police EUPOL COPPS was originally a UK initiative and the UK continues to provide funding and seconded staff. Here too, the influencing role of the UK seems significant and vital.

### **D.3 Next steps**

14. Given existing limitations on resources and the political weight of the UK, the country team has developed an SSR approach guided by strategically positioned advisors, co-ordination and a focused selection of projects where the UK can make a difference. This has contributed to the effectiveness of UK efforts at influencing. Continuing along these lines therefore seems advisable. ***In addition to continue influencing activities along the current lines, the country team may wish to explore new avenues for influencing such as the Governance Strategy Group's decision to split the working group on rule of law into one on justice and another on the security sector.***

15. While the country team uses various reports and reviews pragmatically to inform policy makers, there appears to be scope for a broader analysis. ***The country team may wish to consider conducting an SCA to identify ways of increasing the role of forward thinking in bids and planning. The Lebanon country team's approach to conducting an SCA, in which the OPT Conflict Adviser is participating, might also be a useful way ahead for OPT. This would imply an internally executed SCA with support provided by posts in Beirut and Tel Aviv.***

16. ***Given the volatility of the situation, the country team could consider building on the risk assessments that are part of the MENA project monitoring and risk mitigation strategy. Such assessments could be used as building blocks for broader ongoing risk assessments. Ideally, they could even be used as input for developing short to medium term scenarios.***

17. In terms of a coherent strategic approach and the effective use of money and in view of the expected increase of DFID's budget, ***the country team may wish to closely assess potential linkages between CPP funded and DFID funded activities.***

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