

Intelligence Reform and the Security Sector

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Intelligence reform and SSR

- Why intelligence reform?
- How do you control and direct intelligence services? The UK experience
- Sri Lanka
- Sierra Leone
- Kosovo
- Lessons learnt

What can intelligence do?


- Replace gossip with rational reporting
- Discard outdated threats
- Facilitate trust between former enemies
- Identify emerging threats
- Provide evidence and confidence for wider security sector reform – a tipping point
- Replace the “hidden wiring” with accountable institutions

The contribution of intelligence reform to governance reform


- “Intelligence may not be able to find the truth; even less may it be able to persuade others that it has found it. But keeping the players honest, not permitting disreputable arguments to thrive, pointing out where positions are internally contradictory or rest on tortured readings of the evidence would not be a minor feat. While it would not save the country from all folly, it would provide more assistance than we get from most instruments of policy”.

R. Jervis

Understanding UK reforms – An evolutionary approach




The range of controls on British Intelligence



How is it different elsewhere?

- Will probably require people to stop doing things that are:
 - Politically useful
 - Financially profitable
- May be introduced in a time of crisis, or as a political tool
- Will not necessarily be underpinned by existing internal or external cultures



Sri Lanka

Possible end state

New coordinating
committee

Analysis and
Assessment

Tasking

NSC

Secretariat

Collection

Enhanced SIS

Enhanced SB

Military agencies

Advisory committee providing legitimacy and continuity

FY 06/07

FY 07/08

End state

Jan 07

2-day workshop.

PURPOSE:

Start process

Receive Presidential direction

Agree end state

Develop shared understanding

Agree participation and process

1. Propose TORs and structure for coordinating committees and secretariat

2. Prepare options for development of SIS

3. Prepare options for development of SB

4. Prepare draft legislation

5. Write TORs for advisory committee

6. Propose TORs and structure for security think tank

Apr 07

2-day workshop.

PURPOSE:

Synthesise work

Finalise proposals

Agree submission to President

1. Capability building including analysis training

2. Capability building including operational and management training

3. Capability building including operational and management training

4. Finalise and implement legislation

5. Create committee. Prepare reports. Support other strands.

6. Seek proposals. Appoint head. Commission initial activity.

1. Coordinating committees, secretariat

2. Enhanced SIS

3. Enhanced SB

4. Legislation

5. Advisory committee

6. Greater academic/non-Govt analysis of security issues

Two mini examples

- Sierra Leone
- Kosovo

What do we learn?

- Sri Lanka
 - High level political buy-in
 - Clear recognition of problems that need to be solved
 - “Reform by stealth”
 - Capable and powerful delivery unit
- Sierra Leone
 - Overcoming chaos in threat assessment
 - Intelligence as a “tipping point”
 - Importance of leadership and cultural change
- Kosovo
 - Intelligence as an element of a post-conflict settlement
 - The need for a positive view of what intelligence can achieve

Questions?

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