Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

Securing Southeast Asia: The Politics of Security Sector Reform

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To what extent has security sector reform taken hold in Southeast Asia? What are its main drivers and inhibitors? This book focuses on Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. It finds that although the region's governments and security forces have adopted the language of professionalism and reform, entrenched institutions and interests have largely blocked fundamental change. External pressure for SSR in Southeast Asia is needed, but has so far been half-hearted.

Southeast Asian militaries are often involved in internal security, regime protection, civilian and economic affairs – and in violating human rights. They have also proved almost uniformly unable to defeat armed opponents.

The region's history and its place within the global economy and international society have helped to create deeply entrenched identities, institutions and relations. These are threatened by the reform agenda, which has therefore struggled to find broad acceptance. Without external pressure, there has been little domestic impetus for anything beyond superficial SSR. The contradiction between declared policy and strategic culture was highlighted in the 2006 Thai coup that installed the country's most prominent SSR advocate as unelected prime minister.

• East Timor is the only case of explicit externally-driven SSR in the region, but in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia there have been moves since the 1990s to develop civilian (not necessarily democratic) control of the military.
• In the Philipppines and Indonesia, the military is involved in a process of internal review, but reality is at odds with SSR rhetoric. Philippine governments have been too corrupt, incompetent or otherwise unable to implement reform. Indonesia's central government has little leverage with which to change the incentive structures of vested interests or patterns of resource distribution and entrenched patronage.
• In Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, where civilian control of the military is entrenched, there have been positive steps towards greater transparency and accountability.
• In the Philippines, Burma, Cambodia and the Solomon Islands the security sector remains a powerful barrier to development and democratisation.

Social and cultural factors seem to have contributed to Southeast Asian militaries assuming a developmental role in the political, social and economic sectors. The nature of this role has depended on the relationship between military and civilian elites (formed during struggles against colonisation). There are four models of civil-military relations in Southeast Asia:

• Military rule: The government is run by military officers (rare and brief in the region)
• Concordance: Civilian and military elites are part of a common ruling community and cooperate closely.
• Polyarchic: Civilian and military elites establish separate power bases and represent different interests. The roles of statebuilding and nation building were taken up by the military.
• Constitutional: The military is governed by laws. In practice, informal relationships may play a part, and neither an active civil society nor extensive individual liberties may exist.

Consideration of SSR raises three key issues in relation to security in Southeast Asia. It: 1) prompts a renewed focus on the importance of civil-military relations; 2) highlights the interdependence of security and development; and 3) questions the effectiveness of externally sponsored development programmes within insecure environments.

Emerging areas of reform in the region have the potential to stimulate wider SSR processes and address security sector problems. These are:

• Military professionalism: In Indonesia this has been driven by a greater proportion of officers given professional military education in the 1960s and 1970s, who have initiated a 'regeneration' strategy.
• Socio-economic role of the military: Some of the wider roles fulfilled by militaries in the region (such as building infrastructure and providing humanitarian assistance) can help to improve socio-economic conditions.
• Democratisation and transparency: Military reform itself can indirectly support broader democratisation.
• International cooperation: Cooperation aimed at addressing terrorist threats could open up opportunities for SSR and enhance human security.

However, until structural constraints are overcome so that militaries can be funded by central governments and alternative employment and economic opportunities provided, there is little likelihood of meaningful SSR in Southeast Asia. Military inability to run a complex modern economy may offer potential entry points for external promotion of SSR, but colonialism, globalisation and American hegemony made local elites deeply concerned with boundaries, sovereignty and regime maintenance. In addition, the 'war on terror' seems to be reducing external pressure for reform.

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