Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

Intelligence Sector Reform in Uganda: Dynamics, Aspects and Prospects

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Uganda's post-independence history is largely characterised by military regimes using the intelligence services to maintain their power and to intimidate, harass and execute political opponents. What has been achieved in reforming Uganda's intelligence sector? What challenges remain to be overcome? This chapter finds that while human rights abuses have significantly decreased, Parliament needs to fulfil the requirement of the 2005 Constitution to establish a new legal framework for the security services. This framework should establish a clear mandate and accountability mechanisms, including civilian oversight.

The intelligence sector is defined here as internal intelligence-gathering agencies and the Foreign Service. Historically, Uganda's political leadership has determined what intelligence should be gathered and on whom. A similar mindset persists in the intelligence sector today: the focus is on why intelligence should be gathered, rather than on how. However, there are now greater expectations of accountability and transparency.

Uganda's first elite intelligence service was shaped during the first Obote regime. Called the General Service Unit, it was a paramilitary group designed to counter threats to the regime from within the police and the army, and was largely staffed by members of northern ethnic groups linked to Obote. In 1967, Amin added another unit (the Military Police) under his personal leadership.

• Amin also established the State Research Bureau and the Public Safety Unit. The PSU, a political intelligence unit, recommended killing people even with the least grounds for suspicion, and the SRB presided over an estimated 300,000 extrajudicial killings.
• Returned to power, Obote established a counter-intelligence agency, the National Security Agency (NASA) to help deal with Museveni's insurgency. Despite human rights abuses by members of the armed forces, the NASA (staffed by ex-military personnel) would not collect intelligence on the abusers.
• Museveni came to power in 1986 and began to establish security services with a better human rights record. The Security Organisations Statute (1987) established Internal and External Security Organisations (ISO and ESO) to gather and process intelligence under Presidential control, unclear accountability arrangements and a mandate so vague as to be meaningless. Their classified budgets made the likelihood of corruption very high.

No substantial reforms have taken place in the intelligence sector since 1987. While some elements of the sector still operate outside the law, the intelligence services' human rights record has significantly improved. The ESO has become an effective foreign service, training personnel in various specialities and maintaining deep-cover operatives. (Some agents are instead deployed to unrelated fields, often due to political interference.) There has also been inter-agency collaboration with other governments. However, Uganda lacks a national security strategy. An NSS would help in setting benchmarks for human security and in underscoring the importance of intelligence for development objectives. It is also important to:

• Institutionalise in the intelligence sector principles of good governance such as equity, participation, accountability, responsiveness and efficiency.
• Build the capacity of oversight groups such as Parliament. This could involve education programmes for parliamentarians and the creation of guidelines for the supervision of security groups.
• Civil society organisations and think tanks can help in the development of training and manuals on security sector policies and functions, financial management and oversight issues.
• They can also encourage public debate, provide policy research, and - through their involvement - help to boost public confidence in the intelligence agencies.

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