Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

Pakistan, Taliban and Global Security – Part II

 Printable version

What are the implications of the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan for India and for the US-India relationship? How should the US and India respond to the situation in Pakistan? This article from YaleGlobal Online looks at how the US can cooperate with India to prepare for and respond to instability in Pakistan. It argues that the effect of the evolving situation in Pakistan has been to re-link India with Pakistan in US relations. The US and India need to hold intimate conversations on how to deal with Pakistan if the situation worsens.

The US has four vital national interests concerning Afghanistan and Pakistan: first, to prevent Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the possession of Islamic extremists; second, to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for terrorists to launch attacks against the US and its allies; third, to avoid war between India and Pakistan; and fourth, to prevent the Taliban and its allies from gaining control of Pakistan. While policymakers are trying to positively influence Pakistan, every important trend is negative and getting worse.

The effect of the US preoccupation with Pakistan seems to be to re-link the relationship with India to Pakistan. Observations on the implications of this include the following:

• The Obama administration is coming to see India largely through the lens of deeply disturbing developments in Pakistan. This comes at the expense of a focus on wider strategic cooperation between the US and India.
• The focus on Pakistan will produce growing US interest in trying to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan. India may therefore encounter US pressure over Kashmir.
• The Obama administration’s efforts to internationalise the Pakistan problem are well advised. However, it would be a mistake for the US to treat India as a lesser player on issues relating to Pakistan. India is in fact the object of Pakistan’s obsession.
• Some Obama administration officials argue that the US, India and Pakistan are now together in facing a common threat. This is not the case. The Pakistani military has long regarded Islamic terrorists as a policy instrument against India.

Neither the US nor India has a set of penetrating prescriptions that promise to end the internal slide of Pakistan. Observations on policy instruments for responding to the situation in Pakistan include the following:

• Conditioning military assistance on the Pakistan army acting vigorously against the Taliban and its allies should be a US requirement. Training the Pakistan army in counter-insurgency techniques makes sense.
• Working out joint management of Predator attacks would reduce public outcry in Pakistan. Diversifying NATO supply routes into Afghanistan to avoid over-dependence on Pakistan would help. Staying out of Pakistan’s domestic politics is vital.
• US policy instruments are too weak to hinder significantly the rise of Islamic extremism in Pakistan. This is a task for Pakistanis. Inept US actions can make the situation worse, however.
• There should be intimate, intensive, and private US-India talks on how to deal with a turbulent and increasingly chaotic Pakistan. This should include examining various specific scenarios regarding deteriorating events in Pakistan.
• If Pakistan’s situation deteriorates, the US and India, along with Iran and other nations, may have to adopt a strategy to contain Pakistan’s Islamist extremism.

Access full text