Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

Pakistan, Taliban and Global Security - Part I

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What threat do the Taliban and al-Qaeda pose to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and material? What hope is there for reducing nuclear risk within Pakistan? This article from YaleGlobal Online outlines the danger that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda pose to Pakistan’s nuclear assets. It argues that, given the global risks from nuclear material falling into the hands of the Taliban or al-Qaeda, winning against Pakistan’s insurgents is critical. Hope for reducing nuclear risks within Pakistan rest largely on the Pakistani government’s success on the battlefield.

The Taliban and al-Qaeda do not need access to all of Pakistan’s nuclear sites in order to create a weapon of mass destruction. While the Taliban or al-Qaeda obtaining fissile material and building a nuclear device may be the greatest worry, it is not the primary one. A more pressing concern is the possibility that the Taliban could topple Pakistan’s civilian government and take charge in Islamabad. While most observers consider this scenario unlikely, a gravely weakened central government could nevertheless lead to uncertain or divided control over the country’s nuclear assets.

Securing Pakistan’s nuclear assets is not simply a matter of locking away Pakistan’s 80 or so nuclear weapons. A much wider array of nuclear resources are potentially at risk and extremists have multiple means to attempt to gain access to and use them:

• Pakistan’s nuclear weapon production complex is spread over roughly a dozen sites, many producing or processing weapon-grade nuclear materials. Acquisition of these materials could enable Taliban or al-Qaeda technicians to assemble a nuclear device.
• The weapon-material production sites themselves present potential targets. Extremists could attack a nuclear reactor to cause the release of radioactive debris and trigger mass panic.
• While physical security measures for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are relatively robust, there are a number of scenarios which they cannot protect against. These include insider collaboration or the insurgency overrunning a nuclear site.
• Continued Taliban and al-Qaeda military gains and intensified attacks could enable the militants to topple the government. A pro-Taliban faction of the military seizing power is another possibility. This would transform Pakistan into a hostile nuclear-armed state.

The Obama administration is struggling to address these varied challenges:

• The administration’s first objective is to build a consolidated effort to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The increase in US forces in Afghanistan and the Pakistani offensive in the Swat Valley are promising, even if their ultimate impact remains uncertain.
• A second prong of US strategy is the pledge to provide substantially increased economic aid to Pakistan to support new infrastructure projects and educational reform. Unfortunately it could take over a decade for this effort to produce results.
• The US has also actively supported Pakistani efforts to improve security over its nuclear enterprise. While these efforts have made considerable progress, expanding Pakistani nuclear capabilities will make sustaining this progress more difficult.

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