Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan

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What is the security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan? What strategy should the US and its allies adopt in these countries and how will they know if it is succeeding? This paper from the Center for a New American Security assesses the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan, making operational recommendations for the US and its allies. It argues that as of mid-2009, the situation in both countries is dire and getting worse. The US and its allies should adopt an ‘ink blot’ counterinsurgency strategy, prioritising protection of the population while setting the stage for strengthening state institutions.

Decreasing government control and increasing civilian casualties threaten the objectives of the US and its allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Afghanistan, Taliban influence has displaced government control in large sections of the country. The government and the coalition, meanwhile, have been unable or unwilling to guarantee security for the people. In Pakistan, extremist control in the northwest has spread rapidly and threatens traditionally stable areas. In both countries, civilian casualties resulting from military opera­tions have been increasing.

Since momentum is crucial in counterinsurgencies, accurate metrics are necessary to reinforce what works and to change what does not. Measurement of progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan so far has focused excessively on inputs rather than outcomes. When measurement has focused on outcomes, they have often been the wrong ones. Key metrics for the next 12 months are:

• Civilian casualties in Afghanistan. A decrease in civilian casualties will indicate a genuine improvement in security. Conversely, a rise in civilian deaths will imply deterioration in the security situation.
• Afghan elections. A free and fair election, occurring without significant incidents of violence, will demonstrate both political progress and continuing Afghan commitment to the democratic process.
• The assassination rate of Maliks in Pakistan. The more Maliks (tribal representatives) killed by the Taliban, the fewer obstacles there are to the consolidation of Taliban influence in northwest Pakistan.
• Taliban chapters in Punjab and Sindh. Greater Taliban activity in Punjab and Sindh will suggest that the insurgency is gathering momentum in the Pakistani heartlands, causing greater insecurity.

To address the most pressing dangers and make progress towards meeting the benchmarks that matter, the US and its allies should:

• adopt a truly population-centric counter-insurgency strategy that emphasises protecting the population rather than controlling physical terrain or killing Taliban or al Qaeda operatives;
• use the ‘civilian surge’ to improve governance and decrease corruption in Afghanistan, placing civilian experts in Afghan ministries and provincial reconstruction teams rather than embassies;
• in Pakistan, strictly curtail the counterproductive drone strikes on non-al Qaeda targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier Province; and
• strengthen the Pakistani police, with an emphasis on areas such as Punjab and Sindh where the Taliban has not yet exerted control.

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