Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

The Arms Trade Treaty and Military Equipment: The case for a comprehensive scope

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What types of military equipment should be covered by an International Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)? This report from Saferworld examines the national lists of military equipment that are currently controlled by a number of national governments. It reveals that more than 98.8 per cent of military equipment subject to international transfer is currently sourced from jurisdictions that use comprehensive national lists, and argues that these national lists – in effect a def facto international standard – should therefore form the basis for the scope of an ATT.

The debate on the scope of an ATT centres on whether the seven categories of major conventional weapons listed under the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA) together with Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) - often referred to as ‘7+1’ - would be sufficient, or coverage should be more comprehensive. For some states the term “more comprehensive” includes only 7+1 plus related ammunition, components and production equipment (sometimes referred to as ‘7+1+1+1’).

However, such an approach leaves out a wide range of military equipment that is fundamental to the international trade in conventional arms and that is used in the ongoing prosecution of conflict and violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that are taking place around the world.

National states already appreciate the need to control all types of military equipment. More than 98.8 per cent of military equipment subject to international transfer is currently sourced from jurisdictions that use comprehensive national lists. The national control lists in use are very similar. This confirms the hypothesis that there is already in place a de facto international standard for this aspect of arms transfer control scope.

There are significant doubts about the utility of 7+1 as a start point for discussions on ATT scope:

• Rather than establishing agreed global standards for arms transfer controls, it would promote the establishment of two different levels of regulation.
• Although many states may continue with their existing national lists, an ATT based on 7+1 could encourage some states to reduce the range of equipment they already control.
• Such a development would be a retrograde step because it runs counter to the current trend among individual states to adopt more comprehensive control lists.
• It would complicate capacity-building programmes. An ATT based on the 7+1 approach would tend to delegitimise (and disincentivise) capacity-building that goes further.
• Almost all items categorised as military are already subject to transfer controls by a significant number of states.

In introducing a new global agreement, the international community should note the following issues:

• It should not ignore reality - setting a much lower standard would be counter-productive and could serve to undermine the very idea of an ATT.
• If it is to be effective and relevant to the international trade in conventional arms, an ATT should reflect existing national control lists for strategic goods.
• States should endorse the case for basing the scope of military equipment to be controlled under an ATT on the existing comprehensive standard already in use.

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