Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia

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Armed forces support transition from authoritarian rule when losers in an intra-military conflict enter into a pact with domestic opposition and garner foreign support. This paper, published by Comparative Political Studies, explains why and under what conditions militaries in authoritarian regimes faced with popular demonstrations will support political liberalisation. While regime collapse in the Philippines, Indonesia and other countries support the military conflict argument, further research is needed to assess its wider application.

Authoritarian regimes usually use divide-and-rule strategies to ensure their militaries remain acquiescent. This can contribute to intense intra-military conflicts. Losers in such power struggles are likely to seek opportunities to move against their internal rivals and the regime.

Transitions to liberalisation begin when there is disagreement within the military over management of a political crisis, typically a major popular protest against authoritarian rule. The marginalised military losers take a softer line on public protests and seek alliances and pacts with domestic opposition, civil society and/or foreign states. When such opposition reaches a critical mass, regime collapse follows.

Case studies of the Philippines and Indonesia illustrate the following political/military conditions in support of the military conflict argument:

• In the Philippines in 1986, regime collapse began with withdrawal of military support from President Marcos. An internal military power struggle led the loser, Lt. General Fidel Ramos, to make pacts with domestic opposition to Marcos.
• Doubting Marcos’ ability to manage communist insurgencies, the United States (US) began to distance itself from Marcos and support Ramos. Military officials began to defect. The Filipino Catholic Church supported the opposition; public demonstrations ensued. The US made a forthright call for Marcos’ resignation.
• In Indonesia, mass demonstrations in 1998 called for Suharto’s resignation. The military were lukewarm to Suharto’s call for harsh action against the demonstrators.
• Conflict within the military led to the rise of Lt. General Prabowo, leading the loser, General Wiranto, to seek a pact with domestic opposition. Once military defections occurred and the bulk of the armed forces indicated their loyalty to Wiranto, Suharto resigned.
• Two other events in Asia – Tiananmen Square in China in 1989 and the Kwangju Massacre in South Korea in 1980 demonstrate the opposite outcome. In both cases, the military supported authoritarian rule and suppressed both popular demonstrations.

While the military conflict argument holds in the case of the Philippines and Indonesia, this analysis has the following limitations:

• The study examines only authoritarian transitions containing mass demonstrations. The military conflict argument may not apply to other military defection examples.
• The study lacks sufficient insight into cases in other parts of the world. Intra-military conflict may be more evident in Asia.
• The study begs the question: Is it serendipitous that armed forces are united, or do authoritarian regimes possess specific skills and strategies to ensure military cohesion?
• Further research is necessary to assess the scope of application of the military conflict argument.

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