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Security Sector Reform Monitor: Haiti

 Printable version

A consensus among domestic security sector reform (SSR) actors in Haiti that the reform agenda is imposed from outside has led to limited local ownership of the process. This paper, published by the Centre for International Governance Innovation, reviews the current status of reform of Haiti’s judiciary, police and penal systems. Until the suspicion of reform measures imposed by outsiders can be reversed and genuine political will for reform nurtured, SSR policy makers will be hard-pressed to succeed.

Since the end of the Duvalier era in 1986, Haiti has been engaged in a lengthy and arduous political transition. Despite the 1987 Constitution’s commitment to representative and participatory democracy, political turmoil became the norm. Numerous coups, counter-coups and widespread violence during the past two decades dampened popular enthusiasm and optimism for reform.

From 1991 to 2004, eight United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions were deployed in Haiti. After President Aristide’s fall in 2003, the UN established the Mission for the Stabilisation of Haiti (MINUSTAH), which launched the current SSR programme. Despite considerable international investment in reform, Haiti’s security system remains dysfunctional in many areas.

While the current national government SSR strategy is comprehensive, its implementation suffers from a lack of political will at all levels of involvement. The following indicators also exhibit the inability or unwillingness of Haitians to genuinely engage in SSR:

  • Haitian national actors are ambivalent about SSR. Many police stakeholders see the plan as an attack on the sovereignty of the institution; the government has done a poor job disseminating the plan to rank-and-file officers.
  • SSR assistance is not balanced or uniform. The police have an abundance of SSR resources; other SSR areas, including the prison system, are poorly resourced and coordinated.
  • While donor aid to the justice sector has focused primarily on training, equipping and strengthening administrative structures, the judiciary suffers from deep-seated corruption and serves only a small portion of society.
  • Prison conditions improved and training occurred between 1995 and 2003. However, overcrowding, poor health and sanitation conditions and extended pre-trial periods continue to plague the system.
  • Since the Haitian National Police (HNP) was established in 1995, the performance of police has improved. However, the bulk of policing and security operations are still carried out by MINUSTAH, proving that Haitian security forces are still not capable of providing internal security alone.

Although Haitian political leaders express support for SSR, the continuing dilemma is the lack of national ownership. The following factors describe continuing obstacles to reform and one small ray of hope:

  • Security and justice systems do not utilise the Creole language; thus, the majority of Haitians must deal with a system that does not recognise its language.
  • Many justice sector personnel perceive justice as a business, rather than a service. Corruption, cronyism and incompetence are rampant.
  • Political tensions abound between and among the executive, parliament, judiciary and police.
  • The SSR process has gained some momentum in the past two years. A critical mass of willing and pro-active national stakeholders is emerging; it is critical that SSR policy makers seize this window of opportunity for reform.

 

Author: Mark Sedra
Source: Sedra M. (ed.), 2009, 'Security Sector Reform Monitor: Haiti', Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Canada
Size: 12 pages (1.55 MB)