Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

Strengthening Security Sector Governance in West Africa

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What progress have Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia made in establishing effective democratic governance of their security sectors? How can international donors, civil society actors and parliamentarians strengthen legislative oversight of the security sector in West Africa? Based on case studies of Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia this report from the Center on International Cooperation examines security sector governance in West Africa. It argues that strengthening security sector governance by creating opportunities for citizens to influence security policy can help bridge divisions between society and state institutions.

There is increasing public demand for security sector governance in West Africa for several reasons. The first of these is the role of the security sector in creating or failing to prevent insecurity. The second is West African governments’ prioritisation of the professionalisation and modernisation aspects of security sector reform (SSR) over governance reform. A further reason is the impression in West Africa that SSR is donor driven. There is concern that the SSR agenda promoted by donors does not sufficiently acknowledge local achievements or reflect local norms, values and historical experiences.

Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia have all experienced authoritarian regimes that placed their own security over that of their citizens. Studies of governance of the security sector in these three countries show that:

• Ghana has followed a path of gradual democratic reform, but has not undertaken SSR systematically in either conceptual or policy terms. Despite advances in civilian oversight generally, progress in parliamentary oversight has been limited.
• Civil society groups criticised Liberia’s highly internationalised and technical SSR process for giving inadequate attention to security sector governance. External control has, however, steadily given way to greater, if still insufficient, national ownership.
• Use of private security companies by external actors to conduct SSR in post-conflict environments without effective national oversight, as in Liberia, risks creating further security governance deficits.
• SSR in Sierra Leone has involved the re-conceptualisation of national security as ‘people-centred’ and the inclusion of SSR in the Poverty Reduction Strategy. It has also involved decentralisation of security architecture to focus on peacebuilding.
• SSR in Sierra Leone has been criticised as being under ‘donor tutelage’ and too donor dependent. International involvement has raised questions about long-term security sector sustainability.

• including oversight dimensions of SSR in political settlements;
• promoting procedures and identifying incentives for longer, more qualified appointments to oversight committees by party leaderships;
• increasing legislative political capacity to engage with and represent constituents, alongside technical capacity to perform oversight functions, and addressing educational attainment in legislative capacity-building programmes;
• professionalising and institutionalising parliamentary security sector expertise and supporting access to – and accessibility of - security sector information and guidance for legislators and civil society;
• incorporating security and justice provision by non-state actors into national security strategies and state regulatory frameworks where appropriate; and
• supporting the development of an SSR advisory capacity for the ECOWAS Community Parliament.

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