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Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform

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What is the status of security sector reform in Liberia five years after the end of the conflict? This report from the International Crisis Group assesses current progress and finds programmes long on ambition but short on results. While army reform has made significant strides since the end of the war, police reform and efforts in other areas have proved far less successful. The report warns that unless Liberia is quickly made more secure and stable, the efforts and investment made so far may prove to be in vain.

The context in which the security sector reforms were conceived and implemented was far from conducive. Given the scarcity of resources and the endemic corruption in Liberia, a lot of attention was paid to limiting the costs associated with improving the security sector. Operating under this constraint, strategic planning was often neglected, and oversight structures were poorly designed and enforced.

Nevertheless, the reforms did have the benefit of a strong national consensus of support and a large UN presence. A review of the programmes demonstrates that this complex environment yielded mixed results: 

  • Army reform, particularly the vetting process, has been a provisional success;
  • Police reform has been poor - the police are still viewed to be corrupt and ineffective; and
  • Vigilantism and disrespect of the police is growing in Monrovia

Liberia and the international community face many challenges in continuing with the reform of the security sector. The successes that have been achieved at lower levels in the army structure must be scaled up to include the recruitment and training of a managerial and leadership core. Reforms within the security sector must be linked with other improvements in the general legal and judicial systems to achieve optimal results. Most critically, the Liberian state, which until has previously left the reform programmes to external actors, must take an active role in driving the reforms forward, lest the departure of international partners spell a reversal of progress achieved.

The security situation in Liberia is a complicated one, involving many parties. Recommendations must address each of these actors’ roles individually to ensure a more secure and stable future for Liberia. The report makes the following recommendations:

To the Government of Liberia:

  • Clarify division of roles between security bodies, including deploying the Liberian National Police across the entire national territory and reining in the Special Security Service; and
  • Take clearer control over the provisioning, recruitment, and management of army personnel, ensuring proper civilian oversight of military and national security policy.

To the Government of the United States:

  • Rein in the influence of private military companies through more transparent contracting and improved oversight capabilities; and
  • Provide funds and expertise for the training of army and police personnel, including the embedding of US officers where necessary.

Other Actors:

  • The UN Mission should maintain sufficient peacekeepers on the ground to ensure adequate security and expedite the training and organisational development of the Liberian National Police; and
  • ECOWAS should provide comprehensive support for the security sector through training and emergency guarantees.

 

Author: International Crisis Group
Source: International Crisis Group, 2009, 'Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform', International Crisis Group, Brussels
Size: 45 pages (2.3 MB)