Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries

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Security sector reform (SSR) remains an unmet challenge for the United Nations and the international community, despite the growing demand for it in peacekeeping missions around the world. What is the way forward? This study, by the United States Institute of Peace, argues that if the United States plans to support good governance programmes in states emerging from hostilities, a comprehensive approach to SSR is needed. The United States also needs a formal inter-agency structure for managing SSR programs.

Since security is a precondition of sustainable development, SSR is essential in the transition from war to peace in conflict-affected countries. But SSR is a complex task that requires transforming the “security sector” - those organisations and institutions that safeguard the state and its citizens from security threats - into professional, effective, legitimate, apolitical, and accountable actors.

Work on SSR remains in its early stages. There is no U.S. government doctrine, best practices, or even common terminology concerning SSR. This is primarily due to SSR’s recent conceptual development, the inherent difficulty in implementing SSR programs and the lack of an official inter-agency policy coordinating committee within the current administration.

The U.S. government has made progress in SSR, but fundamental gaps remain:

• The lack of an internationally accepted SSR framework has jeopardised sustainable security and development in societies emerging from conflict.
• There is an absence of integrated training and implementation continues to fall to individuals lacking a broad background in security sector transformation.
• The theory of SSR programmes has been articulated by academics, lawyers and bureaucrats lacking SSR field experience. Practitioners have failed to relate their experience on returning from the field.
• Single agencies often control SSR programmes and their interests dominate the agenda, to the exclusion of others. This produces a fragmented approach that undermines the ultimate objectives of SSR.
• There is a lack of performance indicators to monitor and evaluate SSR programmes. These should take into account citizens’ perceptions as well as quantitative data.
• Most SSR programmes pay little attention to the reaction from host governments and local citizens.
  

SSR can be an effective instrument for conflict prevention and conflict management in changing threat environments. In order for it to be successful, the U.S. government needs to:

• reach agreement with key policy-makers and stakeholders on a common description for SSR goals and a terminology for SSR activities. It should take into account its allies’ definitions for SSR as well as those of the United Nations, the OECD and the World Bank;
• move from ad hoc approach to SSR projects to a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to SSR. Leadership for SSR programmes should be in a single department of government;
• produce common civil-military–approved doctrine for SSR that covers both security and development. It should promote local ownership and alignment with other activities, such as democracy and governance strengthening and economic growth;
• engage with the United Nations and the international community on SSR issues, incorporating best practices and lessons learned and creating information-sharing mechanisms;
• create educational opportunities and new positions at the national and international levels, in order to develop a body of professionally trained practitioners capable of working in the security-development nexus;
• take into account the unique requirements of post-conflict scenarios and develop a broad range of programmes, flexible types of assistance and be responsive to local concerns.