Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Kosovo

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How can the UN engage effectively in post-conflict Security Sector Reform? What lessons can be learned from multidimensional peacekeeping missions in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti and Kosovo? This book from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) examines the role and experience of UN integrated missions in post-conflict SSR. A common, comprehensive and coherent approach is necessary to enhance UN SSR support. This is especially important in the areas of strengthening local ownership and domestic oversight and accountability of the security sector.

UN peacekeeping operations are increasingly involved in providing a wide range of SSR support, and the UN has recently begun to develop a common approach to SSR. However, current UN SSR capacity is limited, fragmented, under-resourced and poorly coordinated. Focus tends to be on short-term security and justice institution building at the expense of important governance issues.

• An integrated, long-term strategy is important from the outset of a mission so that the UN perceives SSR as an entry strategy for long-term development assistance rather than a short-term exit strategy for peacekeeping.
• Limited access to or slow release of funds has undermined the UN's SSR activities and credibility with local stakeholders. The UN should increase financial support for SSR and explore the creation of a common or integrated funding mechanism.
• To develop a system-wide approach to SSR the UN could: agree on a concept of SSR; identify its comparative advantage in SSR and address gaps; generate best practices and inter-agency implementation guidelines; allocate SSR roles among UN bodies; allocate capacity and expertise; and establish coordinating mechanisms.

SSR programmes need to be holistic, taking account of SSR's complex interdependencies to avoid compartmentalised and piecemeal approaches. The UN should develop SSR strategies at the beginning of integrated missions in close consultation with local actors; recognise judicial and prison reform as integral to SSR; take account of the governance dimension; address cross-cutting issues such as gender and child protection in all aspects of SSR; and explore linkages with SSR-related activities such as DDR and transitional justice. The UN should also:

• prioritise local ownership by supporting local stakeholders, including civil society, to develop and implement a joint SSR strategy;
• strengthen engagement with national SSR stakeholders by using public information campaigns to help reassure the population, increasing transparency and information provision to prevent negative perceptions in civil society;
• prioritise SSR in mission planning and view SSR's objective as effective, efficient and accountable service delivery, rather than capacity-building as an end in itself;
• instigate monitoring and evaluation schemes, possibly by trained local actors, to ensure effective management of SSR support activities, and develop SSR performance indicators;
• strengthen UN HQ and field SSR support capacity, and provide sufficient experts with skills in programme management, training and languages;
• issue longer-term contracts to increase continuity; and
• facilitate coordination among international donors when an integrated mission is involved in substantial SSR activities. This could involve agreeing with other actors who should lead on which SSR issues, or taking a proactive coordinating role.

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