Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

Securing, stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq

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How successful has the US’s The New Way Forward strategy been in helping Iraq achieve key security, legislative and economic goals? This US Government Accountability Office report measures progress against key aims and argues that while the US has made some progress, these advances are fragile. Unmet goals and challenges remain and as the New Way Forward and the military surge end in July 2008, an updated strategy is needed.

In January 2007, the President announced a new US strategy to stem the high levels of violence in Iraq and help the Iraqi government foster conditions for national reconciliation. Security and political conditions in Iraq were more difficult than anticipated. To improve these conditions, The New Way Forward established near-term (12 to 18 month) goals. This report discusses progress in meeting these goals, specifically: (1) improving security conditions; (2) developing Iraqi security forces’ capabilities; (3) facilitating Iraqi government efforts to draft, enact and implement key legislative initiatives; (4) assisting Iraqi government efforts to spend budgets; and (5) helping the Iraqi government provide key essential services.

The US has made some progress in achieving these goals but progress is fragile and unmet goals and challenges remain:

• Violence has declined from the high levels of 2006 and early 2007, largely the result of an increase in US combat forces, the creation of nongovernmental security forces, and the Mahdi Army’s ceasefire. However, the security environment remains volatile and dangerous.
• The number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces is approaching 500,000. However, the number of Iraqi units capable of performing operations without US assistance has remained about 50,000. Efforts to turn security responsibilities over to Iraqi forces remain a continuing challenge.
• The Iraqi government has passed key legislation to return some Ba’athists to government, give amnesty to detained Iraqis, and define provincial powers. However, it has not enacted other important legislation for sharing oil resources or holding provincial elections, and its efforts to complete a constitutional review have stalled.
• Finally, Iraq has not followed through on commitments to spend more money on its own reconstruction efforts. Low spending rates for the critical oil, electricity, and water sectors are problematic since US investments have ended and increased production goals for these sectors have not been met.

With the New Way Forward strategy and the surge coming to an end in July 2008, an updated strategy is needed for how the US will help Iraq. Accordingly, it is recommended the Department of Defence and State, in conjunction with relevant US agencies, develop an updated strategy for Iraq that:

• defines US goals and objectives after July 2008, and addresses the long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself;
• builds on recent security and legislative gains;
• addresses the remaining unmet goals and challenges for the near and long term; and
• clearly articulates goals, objectives, roles and responsibilities, and the resources needed.

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