Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

Colombia’s New Armed Groups

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What is the nature of the new armed groups emerging in Colombia? How effective is the Colombian government’s strategy of treating them simply as criminal gangs? This report from the International Crisis Group examines Colombia’s new armed groups. It argues that some of these groups are acting as the next generation of paramilitaries. They require a more urgent and comprehensive response from the government, linking military action and law enforcement to improved reintegration.

Since 2006, the Organisation of American States (OAS) and NGOs have warned of the continuation, rearming and merging with criminal organisations of paramilitary groups in Colombia. Some of Colombia’s new armed groups may have established business relations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN). These groups do not yet have the organisation, reach or power of the disbanded United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC). However, some are operating much like the AUC, undertaking counterinsurgency operations and attempting to control territory and people in order to dominate the drug trade. Others are less visible and both compete and cooperate with established criminal networks on Colombia's border, in particular the one with Venezuela.

The government’s response to the threat of the new armed groups has been insufficient, treating the groups as simply a law enforcement matter:

• Instituting a police action plan and one special search unit to deal with ‘criminal gangs’ has not stopped the spread of the groups.
• Security forces in some regions do not cooperate with each other and show low commitment to fighting the new groups.
• Justice institutions, particularly the attorney general’s office, often cannot undertake investigations due to lack of resources and assistance from security forces and because of intimidation.
• The plan for reintegrating demobilised paramilitaries is deeply flawed and while it is being restructured to overcome serious shortcomings, time is working against it.

It is essential to design and implement a comprehensive strategy to confront the emerging groups and criminal organisations. This should involve improved intelligence and law enforcement measures, stronger military action against visible large units, strengthened justice institutions and increased outreach to community groups. The Colombian government should conclude swiftly the restructuring of reintegration and implement a rural governance and development strategy. Additionally:

• The police and armed forces should cooperate closely with justice institutions in investigating the new armed groups. They should investigate links between security personnel and these groups. They should increase protection of civilians.
• Justice institutions should request additional staff and resources and more cooperation in investigations. They should coordinate with the prison service to ensure paramilitary leaders cannot control groups from prison.
• The OAS Peace Support Mission should continue verifying reintegration of demobilised combatants and issuing timely alerts about the rearming and emergence of paramilitary groups.
• The US should make military and police aid dependent on severing links with new armed groups. It should establish an equal balance between military/police assistance and economic, justice, rural development and humanitarian assistance.

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