Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

Reflections on Guns, Fighters and Armed Violence in Peace Processes

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What are the common problems in negotiating and implementing disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes during peace processes? What lessons can be learned from experience to strengthen practice? This book by the Centre for Human Dialogue (HD Centre) provides first-hand observations on the negotiation of security issues in the El Salvador peace process and mediation in Aceh, Indonesia.

Weapons control and DDR are sensitive topics during peace negotiations. However, neglecting detailed attention to it can derail the implementation of peace processes. Mediators and those directly supporting and advising in peace negotiations are encouraged to substantive discussion of security issues – DDR, SSR, weapons control – sooner rather than later, taking an incremental approach and being transparent in raising issues.

Post-war disarmament has received greater attention and support in recent years. Post-Cold War peace operations have included DDR and over time incorporated broader weapons control measures such as voluntary civilian weapons collection and establishing regulatory frameworks for possession. However, despite growing awareness of the necessity of DDR in order to achieve lasting peace, it is frequently neglected during the negotiation process. This can be due to political priorities of negotiators and the view that DDR is ‘technical’, lack of expertise among parties to address issues in detail, or a deliberate choice to delay discussion out of fear of derailing the peace process. Disarmament is particularly resistant to compromise as weapons carry a symbolic, ideological and psychological significance that exceeds their military utility.

Lessons arising from experience in El Salvador, Aceh, and elsewhere are that:

• Politics is primary. Even well planned and implemented DDR will fail if the political conditions for a resolution of the conflict are not in place.
• In El Salvador negotiators failed to address the issue of guns in civilian hands. This threatened the fragile peace through social violence and the continued availability of small arms.
• Impunity for war crimes in El Salvador hindered reconciliation and was an obstacle for the reintegration process.
• Reintegration in El Salvador was hastily conceived and poorly implemented. It contributed to the high levels of social violence that continue to this day.
• In Aceh demobilisation was inadequately addressed. Failure to sever the guerrilla military chain of command is a key element in current disorder.

Peace cannot be acquired without attention to the tools of armed violence and consideration of those whose livelihoods and identities are linked to them. Failure to make strong and sufficient provisions for DDR in peace agreements make it likely that implementation will be difficult or derailed. DDR and weapons control are sensitive and difficult to discuss. However it is crucial to substantively discuss them if implementation of the peace agreement is to be achieved. Timing and transparency are key. Key guidelines on achieving successful DDR and weapons control are:

• Address issues in as much detail as possible during peace negotiations - Expert advice should be available to ensure appropriate and realistic provisions.
• Be context specific. What works in one situation may not in another - External frameworks should not be arbitrarily imposed.
• Recognise the vital role of reintegration in achieving lasting peace - Reintegration programmes should address social and psychological as well as economic needs, and should take account of transitional justice issues.
• DDR should be discussed and planned in a wider context of post-war security and linked to security and justice sector reforms - This context can make weapons control less threatening to negotiating parties.
• Formal demobilisation is politically and psychologically important - It is necessary to break the chain of command of militias and armed groups or they may develop into terrorist or criminal networks.

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