Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

The Justice Dilemma in Uganda

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What are the legal and practical constraints to justice and reconciliation in Northern Uganda? What are the next steps in addressing traditional justice challenges? This briefing by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) provides a background of the conflict and peace process, analyses justice priorities and recommends key elements of a comprehensive justice plan.

The Northern Ugandan conflict originated in an effort to prevent the Museveni government consolidating power. It was taken over by a cult – the Holy Spirit Movement which later became the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA committed acts of extreme brutality, and this violence also produced up to 1.8 million internally displaced people (IDPs) gathered in refugee camps in Northern Uganda. The Ugandan army has also been accused of committing atrocities.

In February 2008 the Ugandan government and the LRA reached an agreement on an accountability and reconciliation accord. This provides for prosecution in Uganda of senior LRA commanders most responsible for atrocities. Lower level perpetrators will be held accountable by traditional justice mechanisms indigenous to the conflict region. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has indicted the LRA’s leader, Joseph Kony, and his two senior commanders for crimes against humanity. Key issues affecting the justice framework are:

• ICC indictments are controversial. ICC engagement weakened support for the LRA and forced accountability into negotiations. However, the LRA leader’s refusal to surrender unless ICC indictments are lifted has led many Northerners to view the institution as an obstacle to peace.
• Amnesty for lower level perpetrators is exceptionally broad. Many heinous crimes are likely to go unpunished, leading to victims taking revenge. This will undermine the peace process.
• Perpetrators are in many cases also victims, especially abducted child soldiers. Separating more culpable leaders from these victims is a morally arduous task.
• Indigenous traditional justice mechanisms may not be able to deal with the scale and diversity of LRA crimes. They have fallen out of use. Women are under-represented and their rights under-protected. A key element of traditional justice is compensation with livestock, but the livestock population has been decimated by war.

Near total reconstruction is needed in the North to enable IDPs to return home. The government has pledged US$600 million over three years to rebuild conflict-affected regions. However, not enough thought has been given to how this redistribution of wealth will affect reparations and reconciliation. Planning mechanisms for accountability and reconciliation are lagging behind fast developments on the ground. Urgent action is needed to address transitional justice challenges and form the foundation for lasting peace. Some recommendations include:

• conducting a review of the national justice system and the legislative framework to identify statutory and technical capacity gaps relating to trying individuals for international crimes;
• assessing the feasibility of relying on traditional justice systems for dealing with low-level perpetrators. The issue of compensation and its interaction with the governments redevelopment plan must be a key element;
• establishing rules and procedures for a truth/historical examination process;
• modifying the Amnesty Act to provide conditional amnesty for remaining LRA fighters, with no immunity for most responsible perpetrators of worst crimes; and
• ensuring that equivalent investigation and accountability measures are taken for government troops who committed atrocities as well as insurgents.

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