Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

Revisioning the International Compact for Afghanistan

 Printable version

While Afghanistan has made remarkable progress recently, its transition to democracy remains fragile and uncertain. Authored by Mark Sedra and Peter Middlebrook, this paper assesses Afghanistan’s progress since the onset of the 2001 Bonn Agreement, which provided a road map for the transformation of the state. Continued progress requires sustained international support and a renewed Afghan commitment to pursue deep structural security sector and general public administration reforms.

The 2001 Bonn Agreement, endorsed by international organisations, donors and the Afghan government, provided pledges of international support and a blueprint for democratisation. Recent presidential and legislative elections marked the end of the Bonn Agreement and the beginning of renewed efforts to sustain the country in its transition to democracy.

Afghanistan’s progress during the Bonn Process was marked by:

• Extension of state authority outside Kabul and a decrease of the influence of warlords in national politics;
• Stabilisation of some institutions, including education;
• The return of millions of Afghan refugees and demobilisation of combatants; and
• Adoption of a new currency.

However, insecurity, poverty, weak governance, corruption and fiscal issues persist. Virtually all of Afghanistan’s recent achievements have been supported substantially by international funding, which is likely to decrease over time. In particular, the security situation remains volatile and security sector reform (SSR) is slow and uneven.

The following are reflections on Afghan achievements during the Bonn Process and challenges that remain:

• Despite substantial SSR efforts, its achievements to date leave much to be accomplished. Security forces still lack professionalism, judicial reform has been under-funded and security sector costs are prohibitive. 
• Taliban insurgency has increased recently; warlords still operate with impunity in their core constituencies. 
• International forces in Afghanistan have deterred serious security challenges to the government. But this commitment could decrease if the United States (US) reduce its forces and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) does not replace departing US forces.
• While the Karzai government has decreased warlord influence in the national government, his otherwise accommodating approach to warlords at times violates principles of good governance.
• Corruption, clientelism and excessive patronage still permeate Afghan politics and government administration.

The post-Bonn agenda should continue to address the following security sector issues:

• With the prospect of the US reducing its troops, it is vital that the US and NATO develop a long-term security support framework for the country.
• SSR should concentrate on rejuvenating the Afghan judicial system and maintaining the momentum of the counter-narcotics campaign and the demilitarisation process.
• Fiscal sustainability must be endorsed as a core overriding principle guiding security sector reforms. 
• Donors must maintain current levels of assistance to Afghan security institutions.
• Efforts to enhance government and civil society oversight of the security sector must be redoubled.
• The Afghan government should assume control over SSR design and implementation.

A post-Bonn international Afghan Compact should also address the illicit economy, enhance government competency, reduce corruption and clientism, and improve public services delivery to the people. But addressing the country’s security dilemma and the fiscal sustainability of the security sector must be positioned at the top of the agenda of the new international Afghan compact.

Access full text