Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)

Lessons in Post Conflict Reconstruction from the New Afghanistan Compact

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The 2006 Afghanistan Compact, a multilateral agreement for state reconstruction, marks the beginning of the second phase of reforms in Afghanistan. This paper by Peter Middlebrook and Sharon Miller cites lessons learned from the first phase of Afghan state reforms embodied in the 2001 Bonn Agreement. This new phase of reform should engender greater government ownership, alignment with the national strategy and budget, and an increased focus on building institutions that deliver services through sub-national and community groups.

The Afghanistan Compact provides joint government-cooperation partner benchmarks to enhance security, governance, rule of law, human rights and economic and social development, as well as tackling the drug trade. It should assist the Afghan government in establishing a cooperative framework with the international community to address governance and development challenges.

Constraints to improved Afghan state capacity can be summarised into two categories: idiosyncratic (specific to Afghanistan) and generic (conforming to other cases of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, East Timor, Rwanda and Iraq):

1. Idiosyncratic: Insecurity constraining the growth of the private sector, exorbitant costs of financing the security sector, largely ineffective sub-national public sector capacity and unacceptably high poverty rates. Afghanistan needs to reaffirm its citizens’ belief in the national state and the long-term benefits of adopting a formal and legal economy.
2. Generic: International aid programme evaluations and needs assessments fail to incorporate recipient government perspectives and almost always underestimate levels of external assistance required to reconstruct core functions of the state. External assistance normally circumvents national budget systems and creates parallel aid structures that soak up international funding.

In addition, regional security issues, including the issue of oil and gas politics, require a far more comprehensive and collaborative approach than has been displayed by the international community and specific international actors to date. Sequencing of post-conflict reconstruction is best informed by a clear analysis of the political economy, followed by sustained, consistent, aligned and multi-year support.

Lessons in post-conflict reconstruction gleaned from other post-conflict situations include:

• Political normalisation is fundamental to state reconstruction and economic growth; external support must allow for the rapid return of state delivery functions.
• Needs assessments must prioritise state-building reforms; the national budget must remain the instrument of policy reforms.
• International aid should work to establish an enabling environment for private sector growth, including reform of justice systems and financial and land markets.
• Reforms must reconcile the need for aid success with the construction of a fiscally sustainable state.
• Bypassing national administrative/governance structures undermines capacity development.
• Aid policies often favour international private companies and NGOs at the expense of domestic companies who could assist in reconstruction efforts. Early aid investment to develop national monitoring capacities to track expenditures and outcomes is vital.

This second phase of Afghan reform should include:

• Building of institutions that deliver services through both central and sub-national administration and community groups;
• Security sector reforms that build fiscally sustainable structures addressing root causes, rather than merely effects, of insecurity;
• Maintenance of economic growth by emphasising high-value, export-focused production; and
• Aid community efforts that support the new national strategy and the building of core governance capacities.

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